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INTRODUCTION
The following Article summarizes recent published patent lawrelated opinions delivered by the Federal Circuit during the 1998
calendar year. The discussion of these cases is broken down
according to the substantive area of patent law discussed therein.
Part I addresses the procedural aspects of Federal Circuit practice.
Part II discusses those cases dealing with patentability and validity.
Part III focuses on infringement. Part IV deals with infringement
remedies and limitations on recovery. Finally, Part V concludes with
a discussion of cases concerning other sources of liability including
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antitrust and breach of contract.
I.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts must have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim
before it may be heard. Subject matter jurisdiction exists where a
party satisfies either the diversity or federal question requirement.
Alternatively, when a case involves both a federal question and state
law claim, the Federal Circuit may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
so that it may review both claims.1
In Textile Productions, Inc. v. Mead Corp.,2 the Federal Circuit
considered whether it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to hear
Textile’s contract claim against Mead after dismissal of the patent
infringement claim.3 Although Textile did not raise the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that
it could raise the issue sua sponte.4 The Federal Circuit explained that
once the district court dismissed the patent infringement claim, the
court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim. Even
assuming that Textile asserted a breach of contract claim, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction after dismissal of the patent
infringement claim.5 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court correctly dismissed the contract claim.6
Dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are usually
dismissals without prejudice.7 In the instant case, however, the
district court dismissed the case with prejudice.8 The Federal Circuit

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) (granting jurisdiction to district courts over patent claims);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (regarding supplemental jurisdiction).
2. 134 F.3d 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Textile Productions, the
plaintiff sued its co-inventor and a company that manufactured additional harnesses, and his
suit alleged breach of a requirements contract to purchase plaintiff’s harnesses, as well as patent
infringement. See id. at 1482, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
3. See Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1485, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
4. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636 (discussing the fact that federal appellate courts
have an obligation to ensure that both appellate and lower court jurisdiction is proper) (citing
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)).
5. See Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1486, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (explaining that
diversity jurisdiction could not provide jurisdiction over the contract claim because Fiber Trim
and Textile were both Michigan corporations).
6. See id. at 1486, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (deciding that a district court has no
discretion to apply the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine over a pendant state claim after the
jurisdiction-conferring patent infringement claim is dismissed for lack of § 281 standing) (citing
Gaia Techs., Inc. v. Reconversion Techs., Inc., 104 F.3d 1296, 1297, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134,
1140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
7. See id., 134 F.3d at 1486, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
8. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
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vacated the dismissal and remanded for a determination of whether
Textile actually asserted a breach of contract claim.9 The Federal
Circuit instructed the district court to enter an order dismissing the
action without prejudice if such a claim had been asserted.10 If, on
the other hand, Textile had intentionally dropped or waived its
breach of contract claim at some point during the original district
court proceeding, the Federal Circuit instructed the district court to
renew its original dismissal with prejudice.11
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction allows a court to exercise its power over a
party, which is either physically present in the state where the court
resides or which has sufficient contacts with the forum state to
warrant such an exercise of control.12
In Dainippon Screen Manufacturing Co. v. CFMT, Inc.,13 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment defendant.14 The defendants
were CFM, a semiconductor equipment manufacturer with a sales
office in California, and CFMT, a Delaware corporation and wholly
owned subsidiary of CFM. CFMT, a holding company with no
employees, agents, or offices in California, had been assigned all of
CFM’s patents.15 CFM was granted an exclusive license to these
patents in return for a ten percent royalty based on CFM’s net sales.16
CFMT, however, maintained both the power to negotiate a sublicense
and the power to commence litigation against patent infringers.17
Unable to negotiate a license with CFMT and CFM, Dainippon
filed suit and sought a declaration that the patent at issue was invalid
or, in the alternative, that Dainippon had not infringed the patent.18
The lower court dismissed the suit and held that, although the
defendant’s actions created a reasonable apprehension of suit on the
part of the plaintiff, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
CFMT, a necessary party to the suit under Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.19
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
142 F.3d 1266, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1616 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1273, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
See id. at 1268, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), a party shall be joined if “(1) in the person’s

1999]

1998 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1323

On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied a two-part test to determine
whether personal jurisdiction existed. The court considered whether
the forum state’s long-arm statute permitted service of process and
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction violated due process.20
Because California’s long arm statute is co-extensive with the limits of
due process,21 the two-step inquiry collapsed into a single question:
whether personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this case
comported with due process.22
To evaluate whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
CFMT comported with due process, the court utilized the three-part
test applied in Akro Corp. v. Luker.23 The Akro Corp. three part test
asks: (1) whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities
towards residents of the forum state; (2) whether the claim arises out
of or relates to the defendant’s activities within the forum state; and
(3) whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and
fair.24
The Federal Circuit held that the facts in Dainippon compelled it to
find personal jurisdiction over the defendants.25 CFMT argued that
any threats of suit made to Dainippon only came from CFM agents
and did not justify the application of personal jurisdiction.26 The
court concluded, however, that the agents of CFM were also the
agents of CFMT.27 The court further stated that, if CFMT had
intended to distance itself from the negotiations, the CMFT agents
should have communicated clearly that they acted on behalf of the
parent company only.28 To further buttress its conclusion, the court

absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). See Dainippon, 142
F.3d at 1268, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (rejecting Dainippon’s argument that CFMT’s
receipt of licensing revenues from the state of California created minimum contacts with the
state).
20. See Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1269, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (citing Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985)).
21. See id. at 1270, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West
1997) (providing that a California court “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Constitution of this state or of the United States”).
22. See Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1270, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619; see also CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 410.10 (West 1997).
23. 45 F.3d 1541, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
24. See Dainippon, 142 F.3d at 1270 n.2, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 n.2.
25. See id. at 1271, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (holding that it is proper for California to
assert jurisdiction over CMFT because it had minimum contacts with the state including
maintaining sales agents in the state and deriving substantial revenue from in-state sales).
26. See id. at 1270, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
27. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (evaluating individuals’ actions and concluding
that, in light of CFMT’s exclusive authority, CFM did not act alone).
28. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 (explaining that the language used in the agents’
communications to CMFT suggested that they were also agents of CMFT).
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referred to the licensing agreement between CFMT and CFM, which
empowered only CFMT to enter into licensing negotiations and
enforce the patents.29
Although the court noted that delivery of infringement letters into
a forum state is insufficient by itself to satisfy the requirements of due
process, it also noted that CFMT licensed the technology to CFM,
which maintained sales agents in California.30 CFMT captured
substantial revenue from CFM’s California-based sales and therefore
possessed more than a mere casual relationship with CFM.31 The
court also found that the parent-subsidiary relationship between the
defendants further compelled a finding of personal jurisdiction over
CFMT.32
In a reproach of the defendant’s argument, the court characterized
it as a contention that
a parent company can incorporate a holding company in another
state, transfer its patents to the holding company, arrange to have
those patents licensed back to itself by virtue of its complete
control over the holding company, and threaten its competitors
with infringement without fear of being a declaratory judgment
defendant, save perhaps in the state of incorporation of the
33
holding company.

Ultimately, the court warned that a holding company cannot fairly be
used to insulate patent owners from defending declaratory judgment
actions in those fora where the parent company operates under the
patent and engages in activities sufficient to create personal
jurisdiction and declaratory judgment jurisdiction.34 The court
concluded by qualifying defendants’ argument for one of its
“chutzpah” awards.35
C. Standing
To insure that an actual case or controversy exists, every litigant
must meet constitutional standing requirements. A federal district
court does not have jurisdiction if the litigant does not meet the
29. See id. at 1270 n.1, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620 n.1 (“Licensor shall thereupon have
the exclusive right, but shall not be obligated to take appropriate legal action in connection
therewith.”).
30. See id. at 1270-71, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620-21.
31. See id. at 1271, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
32. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (holding that personal jurisdiction over CMFT is
consistent with Akro’s requirement that exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant must be “reasonable and fair”).
33. Id. at 1271, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
34. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (noting that CFM did not appear to incorporate
CMFT in Delaware for the specific purpose of avoiding law suits in other fora).
35. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
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standing requirements.36 Standing requires a demonstration of an
“injury in fact” along with a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct at issue.37 The Federal Circuit reviews issues of standing
de novo.38
In Textile Productions, Inc. v. Mead Corp.,39 Textile and Mead
executed a contract to assign the entire interest in the patent to Mead
while the patent application covering a spandex harness was pending
and to split the costs of prosecuting the application.40 The agreement
also gave Textile the opportunity to participate in any litigation that
might arise from the assigned patent(s).41
In 1995, Mead contracted with a third party to manufacture the
spandex harness without first notifying Textile.42 After Textile
discovered that this third party was manufacturing the harness, Mead
notified Textile that it was suspending performance under the
agreement.43 Textile sued Mead and the third party.44 Textile alleged
that it was an exclusive licensee of the patent and that Mead and the
third party infringed its rights under the license.45
Under the Patent Act,46 only the patentee has a remedy by civil
action for patent infringement.47 A patentee is a party to whom the
patent is issued or any successor in title.48 “This has been interpreted
to require that a suit for infringement must ordinarily be brought by
a party holding legal title to the patent.”49 In the case of a transfer of
patent title, anything less than a complete transfer constitutes a
license, and title remains in the patent owner.50 Therefore, a licensee
cannot bring suit in its own name unless the licensee holds all of the

36. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) (noting that standing to sue is
crucial to a court’s ability to resolve an otherwise justiciable controversy).
37. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
38. See Enzo APA & Sons, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1092, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
39. 134 F.3d 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
40. See id. at 1482, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634 (describing a “sock-like” spandex harness
developed by employees at Mead and Textile to enable Ford Motor Company to pass a large
bundle of wires through a narrow opening during the production of the interior control panel
of automobiles).
41. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
42. See id. at 1483, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
43. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
44. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634-35.
45. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
47. See Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Patent Act as restricting who may bring a patent
infringement suit to a party holding legal title to the patent).
48. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 100(d)).
49. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
50. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
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substantial rights granted under the patent.51 An exclusive licensee
without all substantial rights under the patent only has standing to
sue as a co-plaintiff along with the patentee.52 Despite this rule, “an
exclusive licensee that does not have all substantial rights does have
standing to sue in his own name when ‘necessary to prevent an
absolute failure of justice, as where the patentee is the infringer, and
cannot sue himself.’”53 A bare licensee, on the other hand, has no
standing to sue whatsoever.54
In the instant case, the Federal Circuit first examined whether
Textile was an exclusive licensee under the agreement with Mead
because the exception outlined above applies only to an exclusive
licensee.55 After considering the entire agreement between Mead and
Textile, the court concluded that Mead did not promise that all
others would be excluded from making the invention.56 Further, the
court found that Mead did not grant Textile the rights of an exclusive
licensee and, therefore, Textile did not have standing to assert a
patent infringement claim.57 Notably, the Federal Circuit held that
“‘[a]llowing subsequent assignment to automatically cure a standing
defect would unjustifiably expand the number of people who are
statutorily authorized to sue.’”58 Thus, the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s entry of judgment on the merits.59
A similar issue arose in Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G.60 The
Federal Circuit considered whether Geapag A.G., as a non-exclusive
licensee, had standing to bring an action under the patent-in-suit.61
The court traced the patent’s chain of title to analyze the standing
issue.62 U.S. Patent No. 4,715,274 (“the ‘274 patent”) was issued on
January 31, 1986, with a company called Spidem listed as assignee of
record.63 Spidem executed an exclusive license to J&K, which
51. See Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1484, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
52. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
53. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (quoting Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252
(1891)).
54. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (stating that because a bare licensee does not have
“all substantial rights” under the patent, it lacks standing to sue).
55. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (explaining that the purpose of permitting
standing to an exclusive licensee not holding all substantial rights to sue in its own name is to
prevent a miscarriage of justice).
56. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636.
57. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636.
58. Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093-94, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1368, 1371 (quoting Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 305,
310, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1682 (D. Del. 1995)).
59. See Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1485, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636.
60. 134 F.3d 1090, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
61. See id. at 1092, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
62. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
63. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
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subsequently granted a sublicense to Geapag.64 The court concluded
that the ‘274 patent was not covered as part of this sublicense grant.65
After the action in issue had been filed, Geapag and Spidem
attempted to clarify the chain of title to the ‘274 patent. The two
entities entered into an agreement by which all previous licenses were
canceled and an exclusive licensing agreement between Geapag and
Spidem was executed.66 This license gave Geapag rights in the ‘274
patent and was retroactive so as to predate the ongoing court
dispute.67
The district court found that Geapag had standing and, after a
hearing, declared the ‘274 patent not invalid and infringed.68 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit found that it “was clear from the record
that there was no writing transferring all substantial rights under the
‘274 patent to Geapag at the time it brought suit” and that such rights
were necessary for an assignee to bring suit.69 Geapag’s argument
that the absence of a written license did not prevent standing was
soundly rejected by the court. “While we acknowledge that a license
may be written, verbal, or implied, if the license is to be considered a
virtual assignment to assert standing, it must be in writing.”70 To
allow otherwise would subsume the narrow exceptions to this rule.71
Similarly, the court rejected Geapag’s assertion that the nunc pro
tunc assignment with Spidem rendered it a virtual assignee for the
purposes of standing.
Conferring retroactive standing would
unnecessarily expand the circle of those statutorily allowed to sue and
would result in unworkable principles and delay.72 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on standing and
vacated the court’s decision on the merits.
D. Clarification of Prior Decisions
In Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,73 the Federal Circuit
heard Exxon’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a new trial on

64. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
65. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (finding that the agreement covered only Italian
applications and patents listed in the agreement).
66. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
67. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370. The suit was filed on January 27, 1993, and the
assignment was retroactively dated December 4, 1992. See id. at 1091-92, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1369-70.
68. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
69. Id. at 1093, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
70. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370-71.
71. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
72. See id. at 1093-94, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.
73. 137 F.3d 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.74 Both
Exxon and Lubrizol manufacture lubricating oil compositions for
automobiles.75 Exxon originally filed a patent infringement suit
against Lubrizol on its automobile engine lubricant.76 Once the
district court adopted a favorable claim construction,77 however,
Exxon removed its proposed jury instruction on the issue of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.78 Lubrizol then
appealed the jury’s finding for Exxon of literal infringement,79 and
the Federal Circuit held that, under the correct claim interpretation,
no reasonable jury could find for Exxon on the issue of literal
infringement.80 The court reversed the district court judgment.
Exxon petitioned for rehearing and requested that the panel clarify
its opinion regarding Exxon’s right to move for a new trial on the
issue of doctrine of equivalents.81 The panel denied this petition
without the requested clarification. Subsequently, the district court
denied Exxon’s motion for a new trial on infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. The district court stated that the Federal
Circuit’s decision left it with “‘no authority to grant a new trial.’”82
Exxon then appealed that order.
Exxon argued that the Federal Circuit’s previous decision was
confined to literal infringement and thus did not preclude further
proceedings regarding the doctrine of equivalents.83 The Federal
Circuit agreed that its original decision only referred to the issue of
literal infringement and was not meant to be construed as covering
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.84 Thus, it was not
the court’s original objective to determine whether Exxon would
receive a new trial under the doctrine of equivalents.85 Exxon
“cannot be charged with having abandoned its doctrine of
equivalents theory of liability by not submitting it to the jury. Once
74. See id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
75. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
76. See Exxon, 137 F.3d at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
77. Exxon’s claim was that its lubricating oil composition contained five ingredients and
that its patent covered any product made by using these five ingredients. Lubrizol’s claim was
that Exxon’s patent only covered the product, not the process for making a product or a
product made by a claimed process. Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1555.
78. See Exxon, 137 F.3d at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
79. See Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1559 (“Literal infringement requires that every limitation in
Exxon’s claims be found in the accused product.”).
80. See Exxon, 137 F.3d at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
81. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
82. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
83. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
84. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
85. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
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the district court construed the claim in Exxon’s favor, the doctrine
of equivalents issue became moot.”86 The court held that Exxon was
not required to request alternative jury instructions seeking an
advisory verdict on whether the patent would be infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.87
Lubrizol argued, however, that the original Federal Circuit
decision implied that Exxon was not entitled to a new trial because
Exxon asked for clarification of its right to move for a new trial, and
the court failed to respond to this request.88 The court, however,
responded that:
[n]o inferences can be drawn from the court’s silence in response
to Exxon’s request for clarification. Courts normally do not
respond to petitions for rehearing and it would be a mistake to
conclude that a court’s non-response to an argument made in a
rehearing petition necessarily means that the court has rejected
89
that argument on the merits.

Lubrizol also argued that the Supreme Court, in Neely v. Martin K.
Eby Construction Co.,90 found that “in an appropriate case, a court of
appeals may direct that judgment be granted against an appellee
without permitting the appellee to seek a new trial from the district
court.”91 The Supreme Court, however, explicitly tied the exercise of
this appellate court power to a court’s ability to make an informed
judgment based on the record before it.92 According to the Federal
Circuit, the discussion in Neely “did not implicitly adopt a new rule
requiring all possible grounds for a new trial to be presented to the
reviewing court, no matter how tenuous their connection to the
issues on appeal.”93
Therefore, a court does not expect an appellee “to preserve all
issues that might give rise to a motion for a new trial.”94 Exxon’s first
opportunity to make arguments for a new trial would be in the
petition for rehearing. Rehearing petitions normally are not suitable
for making new arguments to the appellate court.95 A petition for
rehearing must specifically address those points of law or fact that the
86. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
87. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
88. See id. at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
89. Id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
90. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
91. Exxon, 137 F.3d at 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
92. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
93. Id. at 1482, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
94. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
95. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (citing Pentax Corp. v. Robison, 135 F.3d 760, 762
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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petitioner believes the court left unaddressed or misunderstood.
Otherwise, the court will not consider the arguments raised.96
The Federal Circuit did not make any decisions on the merits of
Exxon’s doctrine of equivalents infringement claim, nor did the
court consider whether a procedural error would prevent the district
court from deciding this claim on the merits. Instead, the Federal
Circuit left those issues to the discretion of the district court.97 The
Federal Circuit held that although a court of appeals may find in
favor of appellant without allowing appellee to request a new trial
from a district court,98 this finding would not deprive the district
court of the authority to entertain Exxon’s motion for a new trial.99
E. Vacatur and Remand
The Federal Circuit revisited a familiar case in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States.100
Earlier, the Federal Circuit had found the
government liable for infringement of Hughes’ ‘051 patent and
remanded to the trial court for a damages determination. On appeal
regarding the damages calculation, the Federal Circuit refused,
under the doctrine of law of the case, to reconsider it infringement
determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on that
judgment and vacated. The Court remanded to the Federal Circuit
for reconsideration in light of its Warner-Jenkinson decision.
The Federal Circuit, in construing the scope of the Supreme
Court’s remand, stated that the Court will issue such an order when
intervening developments or recent developments that the court
below did not consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the lower
court would now reject its previous decision if given the
opportunity.101
The Federal Circuit noted that a vacatur and remand order does
not imply that the lower court should change its prior determination,
but merely raises an issue that it may not have been considered fully
for reconsideration in light of the newly presented authority.102
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit limited its review on remand to
96. See Pentax, 135 F.3d at 762.
97. See Exxon, 137 F.3d at 1483, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
98. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(d).
99. See id., 137 F.3d at 1483, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
100. 140 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285. A total of eight decisions were previously
issued in Hughes Aircraft, which makes the Supreme Court’s vacatur and remand order the
ninth decision and the Federal Circuit’s review the tenth decision. See id. at 1472-73, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286-87 (summarizing the previous decisions).
101. See id. at 1473, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (citing Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163,
167 (1996)).
102. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286-87.
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whether the trial court’s analysis was proper in light of the recently
issued Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.103 decision.104
F.

Preemption

In Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp.,105 the Federal Circuit considered
whether federal patent law preempts the state law tort of intentional
interference with actual and prospective contractual relations.
Relying upon the common law definition of the state law tort of
intentional interference with contractual relations,106 the court stated
that one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract or with the prospective contractual
relations is liable for the resulting pecuniary harm caused to the
other.107 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,108
state causes of action are preempted if they present an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
a congressionally enacted statute.109
The Supreme Court has
provided significant guidance as to what constitutes such an
obstacle.110 “Under the standard mandated by the Supreme Court,
the state law cause of action at issue [in Dow Chemical Co.] does not
present an ‘obstacle’ to the execution and accomplishment of the

103. 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (upholding Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339
U.S. 605 (1950) (affirming the application of the doctrine of equivalents when the trial court’s
decision was not “clearly erroneous”).
104. See Hughes Aircraft, 140 F.3d at 1474, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88; see also WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (holding that “each element in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus, the doctrine of equivalents must be
applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole”).
105. 139 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
106. See id. at 1473, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
107. See id. at 1472 n.1, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 n.1. The Federal Circuit goes on to
quote from the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the
third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform
the contract. . . . One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s
prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary
harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation . . . .
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766B (1979)).
108. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law . . .”).
109. See Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1473, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
110. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1974)
(focusing on preemption due to discord with federal objectives); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (1964) (declaring preemption of state law
to be appropriate when state law isolates something from the public which federal law has
deemed to be public).
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patent laws.”111
Dow Chemical Co. concerned an allegation that Exxon Corp.
engaged in bad faith enforcement of an unenforceable patent.112 The
evidence indicated that the tortfeasor, Exxon, knew that its patent
was unenforceable when it engaged in market misconduct.113 Exxon
contended that Dow Chemical’s state law cause of action was an
impermissible attempt to create an alternative state remedy for
inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”).114 The elements necessary to establish this tort, however,
must occur in the marketplace, not before the PTO.115 As stated by
the court: “[b]ecause it requires entirely different elements to
establish a prima facie state tort action for intentional interference
with contractual relations, it plainly is not a preempted alternative or
additional state law remedy for inequitable conduct.”116 Similarly, the
Federal Circuit noted that the wrongful acts, remedies, and forum
were all different for tortious interference of contract and inequitable
conduct.117 Thus, the court concluded that no preemption of state
law existed and allowing Dow Chemical to litigate its claim would not
create a new cause of action.118
In Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.,119 the Federal Circuit
determined the extent to which federal patent law preempts state law
causes of action that prohibit tortious activities in the marketplace.120
The Federal Circuit also considered whether such state law causes of
action arise under federal patent law with respect to exclusive
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.121
111. Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1475, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
112. See id. at 1476, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
113. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. See generally Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that both materiality and intent are essential factual predicates of unenforceability
due to inequitable conduct, and each must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
114. See Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1476, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
115. See id. at 1477, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 (listing as required elements that “the
tortfeasor have knowledge of the contractual relationship with which he is interfering and that
he commit an act of intentional inducement to harm that relationship”).
116. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
117. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
118. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
119. 153 F.3d 1318, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1037
(1999), overruled in part by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (overturning the court’s previous holding that,
in cases where patent law preempts particular state law causes of action, courts are to apply the
law of the circuit from which the case originated and noting that the Federal Circuit will now
apply their own law to such questions).
120. See id. at 1321, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770 (ruling that federal patent law preempts
state law causes of action when the state law conflicts with federal patent law).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
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In its complaint, the plaintiff, Hunter Douglas, pleaded a total of
eight claims, with both federal and state causes of action.122 To
succeed on the state claims, the plaintiff was required to prove either
the invalidity or unenforceability of a U.S. patent.123 The district
court dismissed plaintiff’s federal claim for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. The court exercised jurisdiction over the state
law claims but dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding them
preempted by federal patent law.124 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims and the ruling on
jurisdiction but vacated the trial court’s preemption ruling.
The Federal Circuit began its review by considering the jurisdiction
issue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), district courts can exercise original
jurisdiction over any civil action arising under any act of Congress
relating to patents.125 A cause of action “arises under” federal patent
law if the federal law creates the cause of action, or if the plaintiff’s
right to relief depends on a substantial question of federal patent
law.126 The plaintiff asserted that jurisdiction was proper because
both claims were based on the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal
law.127 In addition, resolution of the state law tort claims required

any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant
variety protection and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under
the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
122. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1320, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (identifying Hunter
Douglas’ federal and state claims for relief). Under the federal law, Hunter Douglas first
sought a declaratory judgment of “noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability of claims” of
the defendant Harmonic’s patents while alternatively alleging that under the Patent Clause of
the Constitution and 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, it had a federal right to material classified as
public domain. See id. at 1322. The remaining five claims were state law causes of action,
including: “unfair competition, violation of the Unfair Competition Act, California Business &
Professional Code § 17200 et seq., injurious falsehood, negligence, intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage.” Id.
123. See id. at 1321, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
124. See id. at 1323, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (summarizing the district court’s
decision to dismiss the federal cause of action while denying the motion to dismiss the state
claims because 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) grants district courts jurisdiction over matters which require
resolution of questions of federal patent law).
125. See id. at 1324, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. See generally Travel Magazine, Inc. v.
Travel Digest, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 830, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting that district courts have
original jurisdiction over a claim of unfair competition if it is joined with a substantial and
related claim under patent, copyright, or trademark laws, and that identity of issues is not
required for the claims to be related).
126. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (quoting Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).
127. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1322, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (stating that plaintiff
asserts federal jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994)).
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resolution of a federal question—the validity of the patent at issue.128
The plaintiff’s federal law claim sought a declaration under the
Declaratory Judgment Act129 that the defendant’s patents were invalid
and unenforceable because of inequitable conduct.130 The Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court that it could not exercise
jurisdiction over this claim because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
a reasonable apprehension of being sued for infringement.131
Without such an apprehension, no actual case or controversy existed
and therefore, the court had no jurisdiction.132
The plaintiff also asserted a federal right to copy and use
information in the public domain and noted that an implied cause of
action existed to enforce that right.133 The Federal Circuit, however,
agreed with the district court that no such right existed because the
patent laws did not create an affirmative right to copy what was in the
public domain.134 It is worth noting that, because the Federal Circuit
found the plaintiff’s case to be insubstantial and frivolous, the court
dismissed it for lack of federal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1)135 instead of dismissing the claim under Rule
12(b)(6)136 for failure to state a claim.137 This difference is significant
because, if the court had jurisdiction over the federal claim, which
would have been implied if the court had dismissed the claim under
Rule 12(b)(6), then the claim would have supported jurisdiction over

128. See id. at 1322, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994) (allowing any court of the United States, in a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction, to declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party, whether or not further relief is or could be sought).
130. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
131. See id. at 1326, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (noting that for a district court to have
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, there must be an “actual controversy”). A twostep inquiry is necessary to determine whether there is an “actual controversy”: (1) an explicit
threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of
the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit; and (2) present activity that could
constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with intent to conduct such activity. See
Cyganus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 2 F.3d 1153, 1159, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1670
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
132. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1326, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
133. See id. at 1327, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
134. See id. at 1328, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) provides a defense alleging a court’s lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. This defense may be made in a responsive pleading or by
motion. See id. According to Rule 12(h)(3), the court shall dismiss the action if it appears that
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides a defense on grounds that a party
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(2), an
objection of failure to state a claim may be made by pleading, motion for judgment, or trial
upon the merits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2).
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (holding
that wholly insubstantial and frivolous claims do not merit federal jurisdiction).
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the state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.138 If there were no
jurisdiction over the federal claim, however, the plaintiff would need
to seek an independent basis for federal jurisdiction for its state
claims.139
After it had dispensed with all claims purportedly created by
federal law, the Federal Circuit reviewed the remaining six state law
counts140 to determine whether any of the counts arose under federal
law, thereby permitting the court to confer jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a).141 The question under § 1338 is whether the state
law cause of action “necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”142 Every element of the
complaint’s stated claims is reviewed to ascertain whether all the
theories upon which a plaintiff could prevail rely solely on the
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.143
The Federal Circuit, in accord with the district court, found that
the plaintiff’s claim alleging that the defendants committed an
injurious falsehood arose under § 1338(a).144 An element of the
plaintiff’s alleged claim was that the defendant had made a false
statement.145 The alleged false statement was the defendant’s
assertion that it had “exclusive” rights to make or sell the product
allegedly covered by the patent.146 Accordingly, to prove this cause of
action, the plaintiff needed to establish that the claims were either
138. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1328, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1994) (stating that district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that “are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”).
139. See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1328, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (noting that since
the court did not have jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) over the federal claim, the remaining
state law claims “stand naked” and at least one would need to fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) for
the court to consider them).
140. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (stating that counts two through seven involved
allegations of state law relations concerning unfair competition, violation of the Unfair
Competition Act, injurious falsehood, negligence, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage).
141. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (indicating that under § 1338(a), whether a state
law claim has federal jurisdiction depends on whether resolution of the claim requires
consideration of a substantial question of federal patent law).
142. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1998)).
143. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (discussing the Court’s holding in Christianson,
486 U.S. at 808-09).
144. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (explaining that the plaintiff’s state law claim of
injurious falsehood arose under § 1338(a) because theories used to establish the state law falsity
claim depended on resolving a question of federal patent law).
145. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (illustrating that claimant must satisfy the wellpleaded complaint rule by showing how an element of the state law cause of action “necessarily
depends on a question of federal patent law”).
146. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
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invalid or unenforceable, which are both questions of federal patent
law.147 The Federal Circuit held that invalidity and unenforceability,
like infringement, are “substantial” questions of federal patent law
because one determines whether there is a property right, while the
other determines whether that right is enforceable.148 Ultimately, the
court determined whether federal law preempted the remaining
state cause of actions.149 State law is preempted in one of three ways:
explicit, field, or conflict preemption.150
In analyzing preemption by federal patent laws, the Federal Circuit
applied regional circuit law according to established precedent. It
should be noted that this practice was later overruled in Midwest
Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.: “Henceforth, we will apply our
own law to such questions. To the extent that . . . Hunter Douglas, Inc.
v. Harmonic Design, Inc., hold[s] that we are required to apply
regional circuit law to conflicts between patent law and other legal
rights, we therefore overrule [that] decision[].”151 Although this
holding overrules statements of law in Hunter Douglas regarding the
standard for determining preemption, it should have no effect on the
underlying conclusions of law, as the court in Hunter Douglas
ultimately applied Federal Circuit law in deciding the preemption
issues. The court stated: “Because Ninth Circuit law does not require
any analytic process for assessment of preemption based on conflict
with federal patent law, we apply our plenary authority to the issue at
hand.”152
The district court in Hunter Douglas held that federal law
preempted the field of state unfair competition laws based on patent

147. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
148. See id. at 1330, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78 (expanding the substantiality
requirement under Christianson, with respect to the nature of the federal interest, to include
invalidity and unenforceability as a component of infringement, one of the four recognized
substantial, federal patent law interests).
149. See id. at 1331, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. The court noted that the Supreme Court
has set forth two presumptions that guide preemption analysis: (1) Congress does not
“cavalierly” preempt state law causes of action unless there is a clear manifestation of
congressional intent such as federal legislation in field occupied traditionally by states,
and (2) “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1778 (quoting Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
150. See id. at 1333, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779; see also English v. General Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72, 78-79 (providing the three circumstances in which state law is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause). First, a state law is preempted when Congress explicitly defines the extent
to which its laws preempt state laws. See English, 496 U.S. at 78. Second, a state law is
preempted when it regulates conduct that Congress “intended the Federal Government to
occupy exclusively.” See id. at 79. Third, a state law is preempted when it directly conflicts with
a federal law. See id.
151. Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1674-75.
152. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1333, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
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claims.153 The lower court reasoned that federal law did not create
the state law claims. The court, however, concluded that the issue of
whether there is a valid patent claim is a substantial question of
federal patent law, conferring federal jurisdiction.154 The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s finding and held that federal
patent law issues embedded in state law causes of action may be
adjudicated, even without an accompanying federal claim.155
G. Declaratory Judgments
A declaratory judgment action allows a non-patent holder to seek a
determination as to whether another’s patent is valid and/or
enforceable, as well as whether its product or method infringes the
patent. In order for a federal court to have Article III jurisdiction
over a declaratory judgment suit, an actual case or controversy must
exist. Even if such an actual case or controversy were present, a court
may nevertheless utilize its discretion to not hear the action.156
In Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid, Ltd.,157 the Federal Circuit addressed
whether an actual controversy exists with respect to the Declaratory
Judgment Act158 when the plaintiff’s potential liability is solely for
inducing infringement.159 In Fina Research, S.A., the declaratory
judgment plaintiff, Fina Research, S.A. (“FRSA”), manufactured an
ingredient (“FINAGREEN”) in a mud or fluid that is used when
drilling for oil.160 FRSA had not sold any of the product to any
customer in the United States.161 It had been established that FRSA
could only be liable for inducing infringement.162
153. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1770 (describing the district court’s determination that
the federal patent law pre-empted the state law claims).
154. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
155. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
156. See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
157. 141 F.3d 1479, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Section 2201(a) provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . as determined by the
administering authority, any court pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not other relief
is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment of decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Id.
159. See Fina, 141 F.3d at 1480, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
(“Whoever actively induces infringement shall be liable as an infringer.”).
160. See Fina, 141 F.3d at 1480, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
161. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
162. See id. at 1481, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (stating that, first, suit could not be
brought against FRSA for contributory infringement because defendants noted that
FINAGREEN is suitable for “substantial noninfringing use,” and second, both parties stipulated
that FRSA had no intention of directly infringing the ‘910 patent).
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The court applied a two-prong test, which required: (1) an explicit
threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face
an infringement suit; and (2) a present activity that can constitute
infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity, to establish a basis for a declaratory judgment action.163 With
respect to the first prong, the court noted that the defendant had
sent two letters to FRSA with statements such as: “Baroid . . . intends
to vigorously protect and enforce its rights in the subject patents,
including the filing of suit if necessary.”164 The court found these
letters sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of suit.165
Baroid, however, attempted to show that it had disavowed the
letters.166 Baroid pointed to a third letter in which Baroid’s counsel
wrote that the company “has not and does not make any claim of
infringement against [FRSA].”167
The court found this letter
insufficient, under its precedent, to disavow the threats.168 In
particular, the court noted that the letter did not amount to a
covenant not to sue equivalent to those approved in previous cases.169
The defendants countered that they are not required to “covenant
not to sue” to avert the creation of a reasonable apprehension of
suit.170 Despite the fact that the court agreed with this statement, it
noted that a reasonable apprehension of suit already existed and that
the defendants sought to dissipate the threat, not to avoid its
creation.171 Although the court noted that means or factors other
than a covenant not to sue, such as changed circumstances, can
dispel an apprehension of suit. It also commented that such an
exception to the covenant requirement should be narrow to avoid
the scare and run tactics that the Declaratory Judgment Act was

163. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (holding that the declaratory judgment plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that there is an actual controversy).
164. Id. at 1482, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
165. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
166. See id. at 1483, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
167. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
168. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (noting that the third letter was written after FRSA
had already filed suit and taking the three letters as a whole would not have altered FRSA’s
apprehension of a possible suit).
169. See id. at 1483-84, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. See, e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v.
Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding that Super Sack is “forever estopped by it’s counsel’s statement of nonliability.”);
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., Inc., 940 F.2d 631, 636, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1549
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that in light of defendant’s statement of non-liability it is “forever
estopped from asserting . . . patent claims against Spectronics”).
170. See Fina, 141 F.3d at 1484, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
171. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
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intended to forestall.172
The defendant also argued that no actual controversy existed
because no customer of FRSA directly infringed the patent in suit.173
The Federal Circuit refused to create a per se rule that an actual
controversy that is predicated only on a claim of inducing
infringement may only exist if direct infringement has already
occurred.174
Instead, the court held that even if inducing
infringement were an issue, the second prong of the Declaratory
Judgment inquiry is a “‘question of degree to be resolved on a caseby-case basis.’”175
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the
University of California176 (“Genentech II”) may be more interesting for
the legal determinations that it did not make than for those that it
did. Genentech II focused on Public Law 102-560,177 a congressional
attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for states in
patent cases.
Previously, the Federal Circuit had dealt with Public Law 102-560 in
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.178 (“Genentech I”). In Genetech I, the
Federal Circuit heard arguments concerning the applicability of
Public Law 102-560 to declaratory judgment actions under the patent
laws and concluded that it was applicable.179 Following the decision,
Genentech’s declaratory action in district court against the
172. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (noting, however, that “changed circumstances”
were not at issue in this case, and thus the exception would not apply, leaving the apprehension
created by defendants intact).
173. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
174. See id. at 1485, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
175. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4
F.3d 975, 977-78, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); accord Arrowhead Indus.
Water, Inc. v. Ecolochemical, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
176. 143 F.3d 1446, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
177. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560,
106 Stat. 4230 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1995)) (allowing states, as well
as their instrumentalities, officers, and employees acting in their official capacity, to be subject
to suit in federal court for infringement of patents and plant variety protection); see also
Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (noting that it is not necessary to
decide the constitutionality of Public Law 102-560, because the University waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity and consented to the suit).
178. 998 F.2d 931, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
179. See Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (noting that the Federal
Circuit’s finding that Public Law 102-560 included not only infringement, but “‘any other
violation under this title,’” and therefore concluding that Public Law 102-560 included
declaratory actions against the states). No constitutional question was presented in Genentech I.
At the time of argument, the statute was presumed to be constitutional because it conformed to
the holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1588. In Union Gas, the Supreme Court held that Article I of the Constitution allowed Congress
to supersede state immunity when appropriate to effectuate the purposes of Article I. See Union
Gas, 491 U.S. at 23.
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University of California and Lilly resumed; it sought a declaration of
invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement of California’s
4,363,877 patent (“the ‘877 patent”).180 While the district court case
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,181 which expressly overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas182 and
held that Article I did not permit Congress to abrogate a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity.183 The district court in Genentech
subsequently held that “Public Law 102-560 must now be deemed to
be in violation of the Eleventh Amendment, at least as applied in
Genentech I to encompass a declaratory action against the state when
the state is the patent owner.”184
On appeal, both parties debated and briefed the constitutional
basis for Public Law 102-560. A significant portion of the Federal
Circuit’s decision discusses the law’s constitutionality.185 The Federal
Circuit, however, explicitly avoided the constitutional validity of
Public Law 102-560 when rendering its decision.186 Instead, the
Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding on a purely factual
basis.187 The court found that the University had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity protection by availing itself to the protection
of the federal laws based upon its litigation-related actions.188
The Federal Circuit relied on numerous factors in making its
determination. The court placed great emphasis on the University’s
“voluntary and deliberate creation of a case or controversy that can
be resolved only in federal courts, concerning federally-created
property rights of a national scope that are enforceable only by
180. See Genetech, 143 F.3d at 1448, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
181. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
182. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
183. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45; see also Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1588.
184. Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
185. See id. at 1451-52, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590-91. Genentech argued that Public Law
102-560 is constitutional as written and interpreted by the district court, because the Patent
clause of Article I, as well as “broad property principles” in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment, permitted statutory abrogation. See id. at 1450, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
Genentech further contended that if not permitted to bring declaratory action against the
University, it would be deprived of property and liberty interests, without due process. See id. at
1450, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. The University contended that Congress had no power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Public Law 102-560, as the court in Genentech I
interpreted it. See id. at 1452, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
186. See Genetech, 143 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
187. Id. at 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (discussing the factual basis underlying the
decision, including the creation of federal property rights by federal law and the property of
national effect that is actionable only through the federal judicial power).
188. See id. at 1453, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (finding that the University’s threat of
federal legal action implicated the power of “nation-wide injunction” whereby the University
voluntarily created a case and controversy under Article III that could be resolved only by
federal judicial authority).
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federal judicial power.”189 The court stressed that the University’s
attempts to secure patent protection for its inventions did not waive
its immunity.190 Rather, the University created the federal cause of
action through its accusations of patent infringement and “threat of
federally imposed and enforced remedial action.”191 In addition, the
court noted that the University’s actions did not lie at the heart of its
education and research purposes.192
The court specifically rejected the University’s argument that it
“simply manag[ed] its property for optimum income” in accordance
with a California law that required it to manage its real and personal
property in a manner beneficial to the public.193 The court found
that patents are neither personal nor real property, normally subject
to state law, but rather property of “national scope.”194 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the University chose to enter the “federal
arena” and thus consciously created a controversy.195 In doing so, the
University had consented to federal jurisdiction.196
H. Standard of Review
In a long-anticipated decision, the Federal Circuit agreed to hear
an en banc argument in In re Zurko197 regarding the standard of review
employed to review factual findings by the PTO Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (“Board”).198 The court granted en banc
review after a panel reversed the Board’s decision that Zurko’s
method claims for improving security in computer systems was
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as based on clearly erroneous findings
of fact.199 Specifically, the Federal Circuit agreed to review the
189. Id. at 1453, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
190. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (stating that consent to suit requires more than
entering a field of activity).
191. See id. at 1453-54, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
192. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592-94 & n.5 (stating that “the University is
California’s primary stated supported academic agency for research, and is charged with the
mission to provide undergraduate instruction in the liberal arts and sciences and in the
professions”) (citing the California Educational Code § 66010.4(c) (West 1989)).
193. See Genetech, 143 F.3d at 1453-54, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (citing CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 92431n (West 1989)).
194. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (“The federal government grants to the patentee
the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the patented subject matter anywhere
in the United States and its possessions.”).
195. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592 (“Neither the creation nor the validity or
enforcement of this right is subject to state law.”).
196. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
197. 142 F.3d 1447, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d, Dickinson v. Zurko,
119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999).
198. See id. at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.
199. See In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 890, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]
patentable invention may lie in the discovery of the source of a problem even though the

1342

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

following question: “Should this court review Patent and Trademark
Office fact-findings under the Administrative Procedure Act standard
of review instead of the presently applied ‘clearly erroneous’
standard?”200
Ultimately, the court declined to adopt the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) standard of review based on its
reading of the legislative history of the APA and principles of stare
decisis.201 This decision has subsequently been reversed by the
Supreme Court, thus the following discussion is purely illustrative of
the Federal Circuit’s thinking on the issue and is not proper law.202
The Commissioner argued that the court should accept factual
findings that underlie Board patentability decisions “as long as they
are supported by probative evidence of a substantial nature.”203 In the
APA, this standard is known as the “substantial evidence standard.”204
Alternatively, the Commissioner suggested that the court apply the
“arbitrary and capricious standard” of the APA, which called for
acceptance of Board factual findings, provided they were based upon
“consideration of the proper factors.”205 Both APA standards require
a review of the decisions based on the Board’s reasoning.206
The court first performed an extensive review of the legislative
history of the APA.207 With a focus on the underlying purpose of the
APA, the Federal Circuit stressed that Congress sought to eliminate
abuses of power by agencies and to foster “uniformity and consistency
in and among the administrative and adjudicative processes of these
agencies.”208 The APA expressly provides in § 559 that its judicial
review provisions “do not limit or repeal additional requirements

remedy may be obvious once the source of the problem is identified.”) (quoting In re
Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585 (1969) (alteration in original)).
200. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.
201. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693 (“[S]ection 559 of the Administrative Procedure
Act permits, and stare decisis warrants, our continued application of the clearly erroneous
standard in our review of these fact-findings.”).
202. See Dickinson, 119 S. Ct. at 1821 (holding that the framework provided by § 706 of the
APA applies to findings of fact by the PTO).
203. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693.
204. See id. at 1449 n.1, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693 n.1 (“This standard is often quantified
as: ‘more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’”) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994).
205. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1448-49, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693; see also 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
206. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693 (“Currently, we affirm
convictions as long as we lack a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”).
207. See id. at 1450-51, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695-96 (analyzing the legislative history of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to determine the effect of the APA on judicial review
of Patent and Trademark Board decisions).
208. Id. at 1450, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.

1999]

1998 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1343

imposed by statue or otherwise recognized by law.”209 The court
concluded that the APA is not intended to replace existing standards
absent express congressional action.210 As applied to the Patent
statute, the legislative history of the APA suggests that Congress did
not intend to alter the then “existing common law standards and the
availability of trial de novo pursuant to section 4915 of the Revised
Statutes, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 145 . . . .”211 The court then
construed “section 559 of the APA as freeing Patent and Trademark
Office patentability decisions from judicial review” under the
arbitrary and capricious standard or the substantial evidence standard
to the extent that they would replace standards of review that existed
prior to 1947.212
The Federal Circuit then explored the judicial review of Board factfinding prior to 1947 under both the common law and the Patent
Statutes.213 The court found that no statute explicitly provided the
standard of review for Board factual findings.214 The court did find,
however, that the common law provided several standards prior to
1947, including clear error and its equivalents.215 It also noted that
since the Board’s creation in 1982, the court used the clearly
erroneous standard to review factual findings by the Board.216 This
exploration of judicial review led the court to conclude that the clear
error standard is “an ‘additional requirement’ that was ‘recognized’
in our jurisprudence before 1947,” and which courts continue to
apply under the APA § 559 exception.217
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that principles of stare decisis
supported its conclusion. Reiterating that courts are hesitant to
replace long-standing practices without substantial justification, the

209. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559).
210. See id. at 1452, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695. The court stated that:
[T]his history suggests that Congress drafted the APA to apply to agencies generally,
but that because of existing common law standards and the availability of trial de novo
pursuant to section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 145,
Congress did not intend the APA to alter the review of substantive Patent Office
decision.
Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695.
211. Id. at 1452, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
212. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697.
213. See id. at 1452-57, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697-99.
214. See id. at 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699 (“[C]ongress intended not to encumber
other Patent Office proceedings, such as fact finding by the Board of Appeals, with the type of
deferential review contemplated by section 10 of the APA.”).
215. See id. at 1454-55, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697-98 (detailing “manifest error” as the
standard employed between 1925 and 1952 to review the Board’s factual findings).
216. See id. at 1457, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
217. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700; see also Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 559
(1994).
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Federal Circuit noted that the Commissioner did not argue that the
current standard is “unworkable, intolerable, prejudicial,
burdensome, or even that it adversely affects the administration of
the patent system.”218
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Preliminary Injunction-Validity
In Canon Computer Systems, Inc. v. Nu-Kote International, Inc.,219 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the
patentee’s motion for a preliminary injunction.220 Canon brought an
action against Nu-Kote International for infringing their patent
relating to replacement ink cartridges for “bubble jet” printers. NuKote argued that the grant of the preliminary injunction was based
erroneously on the district court’s determination that Canon made a
strong showing on the issue of validity.221
The Federal Circuit noted that Canon had the burden of
establishing the validity.222 Nu-Kote argued that the sheer number of
named inventors on the patent in question was evidence of the
patent’s invalidity.223 The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court stated
that the evidence indicated the plausibility of the contributions made
by each of the named inventors.224 The court also dismissed NuKote’s argument that two of the inventors were joined improperly to
the action because they were not listed on any of the foreign priority
documents.225 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not find clear error in
the district court’s determination that Canon successfully fulfilled its
burden of demonstrating the validity of the patent.226

218. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
219. 134 F.3d 1085, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
220. See id. at 1090, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350 (“The district court properly applied the
law and did not clearly err in finding that Cannon made a strong showing on both the
infringement and validity issues.”).
221. See id. at 1097, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
222. See id. at 1098, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358 (“It is true that Canon carries the burden
of establishing a likelihood of success on the validity issue and thus must show that Nu-Kote will
not likely prove that the patent is invalid.”).
223. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358.
224. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359 (“[N]one of the inventors testified that any named
inventor was not involved in that collaborative effort.”).
225. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358 (stating that “a strong showing of misjoinder by
Nu-Kote would not necessarily preclude the imposition of a preliminary injunction. Incorrect
inventorship is a technical defect in a patent that may be easily curable.”).
226. See id. at 1089, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
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B. Anticipation
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, one may receive a patent on an invention
unless it is anticipated. A claim in a patent application is anticipated
(i.e., lacks novelty) if all of its elements are present in a single
reference in the prior art. The test for anticipation is the same as for
infringement: does the claim, properly construed, read on the
product or process in question?
In Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hercon Laboratories Corp.,227 the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that a patent owned by Key
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was valid and enforceable. Key’s patent, U.S.
Patent No. 5,186,938 (“the ‘938 patent”) covered an adhesive
nitroglycerin transdermal patch for the treatment of coronary artery
disease, known as “Nitro-Dur II.”228 The claim at issue specified an
adhesive layer comprising a cross-linked acrylate polymer and a
pharmaceutically active drug, nitroglycerin.229 The claim further
required that the patch deliver “a pharmaceutically effective amount”
of nitroglycerin to the skin over a twenty-four hour time interval.230
Hercon Laboratories, Corp. sought approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) for a generic version of Nitro-Dur II.231 Key
sued Hercon and alleged that Hercon infringed on the ‘938 patent
when it submitted applications to the FDA for approval.232 In its
defense, Hercon first argued the invalidity of the asserted claim based
on a published prior art Japanese patent application.233
At issue in the validity dispute was whether the Japanese prior art
disclosed a transdermal patch capable of delivering the amount of
nitroglycerin claimed in the ‘938 patent.234 The district court
construed the ‘938 patent’s claim to mean a dose capable of
providing a patient with 2.5-15 mg of nitroglycerin per day,235 or more
specifically, 2.5-15 mg of nitroglycerin, plus an excess amount to
ensure delivery of the desired amount.236 Based on this claim
construction, the district court found that Hercon failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the Japanese prior art anticipated

227. 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
228. See id. at 711, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1912.
229. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
230. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912-13.
231. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
232. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
233. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912-13.
234. See id. at 712, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
235. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (noting that the district court based construction
“on range of nitroglycerin doses conditionally approved by FDA in 1984”).
236. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
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or rendered obvious the asserted claim.237
The Federal Circuit rejected Hercon’s assertion that one example
shown in the Japanese prior art would inherently anticipate or render
obvious the asserted claim.238 Hercon argued that the size of the
exemplary patch need only be increased in size by twenty-five percent
to deliver the appropriate amount of drug.239 The court found no
support in the record for this argument, and held that the trial court
did not err in its conclusion that Hercon failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the ‘938 patent was anticipated or
rendered obvious by the prior art Japanese patent application.240
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s finding of validity.241
In Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc.,242 the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding that U.S. Patent No. 4,763,440 (“the ‘440
patent”) was invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).243 The
‘440 patent claimed a method and apparatus for protecting a plot of
foliage plants from freezing by establishing an insulating covering of
ice over ground watering.244 The district court found that the claims
of the ‘440 patent were anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) because
the subject matter was previously known or used in the U.S. before
the invention was made by the patent applicant.245 In reaching its
conclusion, the district court relied solely on the oral,
uncorroborated testimony of four witnesses.246
Judge Newman, writing for the Federal Circuit, first noted that by
barring a person who is not a true inventor from the patent system,
§ 102(a) prohibits a later inventor from obtaining a monopoly
without the inventor having contributed to the store of knowledge
the patent system seeks to develop.247 Thus, prior knowledge or use
by others in this country only invalidates a patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) if the prior knowledge or use was accessible to the public.248
The court further noted, that a person challenging the validity of a
237. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
238. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
239. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
240. See id. at 718-19, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
241. See id. at 719, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
242. 148 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
243. See id. at 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
244. See id. at 1369, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364.
245. See id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
246. See Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1369-70, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
247. See id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
248. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365. The Federal Circuit also noted that the district
court mentioned 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as a possible ground for invalidating the ‘440 patent,
however, Judge Newman summarily dismissed the applicability of this argument by noting that
§ 102(b) only applies to situations where the asserted prior use is by the applicant, not by the
third party. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
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patent must prove the patent’s invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.249
With the above principles in mind, the Federal Circuit noted that
the only evidence relied on by the district court was oral testimony by
four interested witnesses,250 and that as a general rule, corroboration
of oral evidence of prior invention is required.251 In assessing
corroboration, the Federal Circuit has endorsed the following
criteria:
(1) the relationship between the corroborating witness and the
alleged prior user; (2) the time period between the event and the
trial; (3) the interest of the corroborating witness in the subject
matter of the suit; (4) contradiction or impeachment of the
witness’ testimony; (5) the extent and details of the corroborating
testimony; (6) the witness’ familiarity with the subject matter of the
patented invention and the prior use; (7) probability that a prior
use could occur considering the state of the art at the time; [and]
(8) impact of the invention on the industry, and the commercial
252
value of its practice.

Applying these factors to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit
found that the uncorroborated oral testimony of interested parties
was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard necessary
to invalidate the patent.253 In reaching its conclusion, the court found
particularly troubling the total absence of any physical report to
support the oral testimony, the relationship of the witnesses, and the
fact that the asserted prior uses allegedly began over thirty years and
ended twenty years before the commencement of the suit.254
1.

On-sale bar
An inventor is entitled to a patent unless the invention was “on
sale” in the United States more than one year prior to the filing date
of the patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
In Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Products,
Inc.,255 the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding on
summary judgment that a design patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) because of an “on sale” bar violation.256
A claimed design is considered to be “on-sale,” within the meaning
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id. at 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
See id. at 1372, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id. at 1371, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
Id. at 1371, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
See id. at 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
141 F.3d 1073, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1076, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
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of section 102(b), when an embodiment of the design was sold or
offered for sale in this country more than one year before a filing
date to which the claim is entitled (the critical date) and the sale or
offer to sell was primarily for profit rather than for experimental
257
purposes.

Courts consider all of the circumstances surrounding the sale or
offer to sell to determine whether the activity was an actual sale or
offer to sell, or done for experimental purposes.258 The courts review
surrounding circumstances that include the “stage of development of
the invention and the nature of the invention.”259 The policies
affecting this determination include: discouraging the removal of
designs from the public domain; favoring the prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions; allowing the inventor a reasonable amount
of time following sales activity to determine the potential economic
value of a patent; and prohibiting the commercial exploitation for a
period greater than the statutorily prescribed one year.260
In Continental Plastic Containers, Continental entered into a supply
agreement on January 3, 1992.261 The contract, beginning in the fall
of 1992, represented the culmination of a series of events beginning
in late 1990.262 Continental solicited interest through utilization of a
series of drawings and molds depicting the design in question.263
Despite this, Continental argued that the molds and drawings did not
embody the patented design because significant changes were made
as a result of its failure to mass-produce a bottle using the earlier
designs.264 The Federal Circuit noted, however, that insufficient
differences existed between the early drawings and the patented
designs, and “hence, the molds and article drawings did embody the
patented design.”265
Continental also argued that the patent was not subject to the “onsale” bar266 because it was unable to produce a functional object prior
257. Id. at 1077, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
258. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
259. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
260. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279 (citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767
F.2d 853, 859-60, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
261. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
262. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
263. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279-80 (“The series of drawings begin with the threedimensional article drawing designated HM-2189-1 and dated 18 October 1991, and end with
the article drawing designated HM-2189-7 and dated 19 August 1992.”).
264. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (stating that changes were made to “the rocker
bottom and surface handle eye, height, vertical load, cavity area, wall thickness, lip width and
label size/contour” of the container).
265. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
266. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (refusing to extend Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28
F.3d 1192, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1994) to hold that “any adjustments to
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to the critical date.267 The court rejected the argument, stating that
Continental’s failure to manufacture a “functionally acceptable
container” was irrelevant in the triggering of the “on-sale” bar.268
Continental then argued that the “on-sale” status of its patented
design was negated by experimental use.269 In utility patent cases,
“[e]xperimental use negation applies . . . if there is genuine
experimentation directed to perfecting the features of the claimed
invention.”270 The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument, noting
that the application of this “experimental usage” exception in the
design context allows entities to increase the life of their design
patents beyond the life of their patents “merely by tarrying over the
production of their article of manufacture.”271 Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court’s ruling and found that Continental only
sold the bottles for commercial exploitation.272
In Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.,273 the
Federal Circuit reversed, as a matter of law, the denial of Rockwell
International Corporation’s motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
(“JMOL”) issued by the district court regarding patent validity.274 The
court found that Rockwell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on its anticipation defense because substantial evidence did not
support the jury’s verdict.275 That is, the Court found that the patent
at issue was invalid as anticipated by prior art.
Celeritas was the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 5,386,590 (“the ‘590
patent”) for an apparatus used to increase the rate of data
transmission over analog cellular networks.276 The analog cellular
network combated a common noise problem “by boosting the high
functional features of the article of manufacture suspends the application of a section 102(b)
bar for the purpose of claiming the ornamental design”).
267. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279 (explaining that “a claimed design is considered
to be ‘on-sale,’ . . . when an embodiment of the design was sold or offered for sale in the
country more than one year before a filing date to which the claim is entitled” (the critical
date)).
268. See id. at 1078, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (“Continental’s agreement with L&A Juice
to sell the patented design is an explicit commercial exploitation of the claimed design outside
of the generous one year grace period.”).
269. See id. at 1079, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
270. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281 (relying on Western Marine Elec., Inc. v. Foruno
Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
271. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
272. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
273. 150 F.3d 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
274. See id. at 1356, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517 (holding that the “claims of the patent
have been shown to be anticipated as a matter of law”). A claim is anticipated “if each and every
limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” See id., 47
U.P.S.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
275. See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
276. See id. at 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
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frequency components of the transmitted signal and then decreasing
the components at the receiving ends.”277 “The de-emphasis on the
receiving end, however, reduces the high frequency hiss and
therefore increases the fidelity of the cellular communications
channel.”278
The claimed invention counteracted the adverse
distortion effects of the pre-emphasis and limiter circuits by deemphasizing the data signal before presenting it to the cellular
network.279
Rockwell claimed that a 1991 Telebit Corp. article280 disclosed each
limitation of the ‘590 patent claims.281 Because the 1991 Telebit
Corp. article was before the PTO during the prosecution of the ‘590
patent and the PTO considered the reference before granting the
patent, Rockwell’s burden on this claim was particularly heavy.282
Celeritas responded that the article taught away from the claimed
invention because it disclosed multi-carrier systems and stated that
de-emphasis would not work well in a single-carrier system, which was
the subject matter of the ‘590 patent claims.283 The court dismissed
this argument because “[a] reference is no less anticipatory if, after
disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it. Thus, the
question whether a reference ‘teaches away’ from the invention is
inapplicable to an anticipation analysis.”284 Celeritas’s own witnesses
previously testified that the 1991 Telebit Corp. article described a test
signal that sends twenty-one tones to simulate a modulated signal,
which had a probability distribution of a magnitude that closely
matched that of the V.29 modem, a single-carrier data signal.285 The
court said that “[t]he fact that a modem with a single carrier data
signal is shown to be less than optimal does not vitiate the fact that it
is disclosed.”286
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found for Rockwell on its
anticipation claim, and dismissed the trial court’s award of $900,000
277. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
278. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
279. See id. at 1360, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
280. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (citing The Static Characteristics of Analog Cellular
Radio Channels and Their Effects Upon Data Transmission, CCITT Study Group XVII, Delayed
Contribution D 136, Geneva, Oct. 29-Nov. 6, 1991).
281. See id. at 1360, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
282. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (noting Celeritas’ argument that the article was
disclosed to the Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution, thus adding to Rockwell’s
burden and affirming that “the burden of showing . . . invalidity . . . is especially difficult when
the prior art was before the PTO examiner”) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
283. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521-22.
284. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
285. See id. at 1360-61, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
286. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
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in attorney’s fees for Celeritas under 35 U.S.C. § 285.287 Celeritas did
not lose any of the actual damages awarded by the lower court,
however, because the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusions on Celeritas’ breach of contract claim.288 Celeritas agreed
to accept the highest award under its three independent theories of
liability: breach of contract, patent infringement, and trade secret
misappropriation.289
The patent infringement award (after
remittitur)290 was only $17,484,160, which an agreement by the parties
doubled to $34,968,320 in light of Rockwell’s willful infringement.291
This amount still was less than the amount Celeritas was entitled to
recover for its successful breach of contract claim, which was
$57,658,000.292
In Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,293 the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s grant of summary judgment.294 The district court
found Scaltech, Inc.’s U.S. Patent No. 5,433,717 (“the ‘717 patent”)
invalid “because an embodiment of the claimed invention was ‘on
sale’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).”295
The ‘717 patent disclosed a method of producing coke, a porous
solid fuel.296 Specifically, the claimed invention involved a process for
the production of coke through use of a particular quench stream
that had from five to thirty-five percent of solids by weight.297 Seventy
percent of the solids would have a particle size of less than fifteen
microns.298 The specific solid content and particle size distribution
limitations enhanced the amount of recycled waste that could be
used in the process as compared to the amounts of waste recycled in

287. See id. at 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523; 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (stating “[t]he
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”).
288. See Celeritas Technologies, 150 F.3d at 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
289. See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519. Celeritas claimed breach of contract
against Rockwell based on evidence that Rockwell breached an agreement not to disclose
Celeritas’ proprietary technology, patent infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1519.
290. Blacks Law Dictionary defines “remittitur” as the procedural process by which an
excessive jury verdict is reduced. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
291. See Celeritas Technologies, 150 F.3d at 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. Willful
infringement “is established only where it is shown that there was a deliberate purpose to
infringe, and such a purpose is not found where the reliability of the patent is open to honest
doubt.” American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 106, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1673, 1689 (D. Del. 1989) (citing International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 728, 142
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1964)).
292. See Celeritas Technologies, 150 F.3d at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
293. 156 F.3d 1193, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
294. See id. at 1194, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
295. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
296. See id., 156 F.3d at 1194, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
297. See id. at 1194-95, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
298. See id. at 1195, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
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conventional processes.299
Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., in moving for summary judgment under
§ 102(b), argued that Scaltech sold or offered to sell a process that
embodied the claimed invention more than one year before the
patent’s filing date of January 19, 1993.300 Retec pointed to several
contacts with refineries from 1988 to 1991, where Scaltech proposed
to use a “DC-6” centrifuge to treat refinery waste before recycling the
waste as a quench stream in the coking process.301 During this time,
Scaltech did not mention any specific solids content or particle size in
the proposals.302 In 1992, using the DC-6 centrifuge under contract
with CITGO, Scaltech discovered that the centrifuge could
dramatically increase the amount of refinery waste used in the
quench stream.303 In February 1992, Scaltech found that this
enhanced performance was due to the high concentration of solids in
the quench stream.304 Ultimately, Scaltech claimed the high solids
concentration and small particle size limitations in the ‘717 patent.305
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and stated that a § 102(b) analysis must first ask whether
the subject of the barring activity met each limitation of the claim.306
The court found that under this standard, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because the record failed to indicate
whether the processes in Scaltech’s 1998 proposals actually would
produce the limitations of five to thirty-five percent of solids in the
quench stream and the specified particle size.307
The court, after assuming that no offer for sale of an actual
embodiment of the inventory existed, addressed whether Scaltech
nonetheless offered a substantially completed invention with the
expectation that it would work for its intended purpose.308 The court
relied on UMC Electronics Co. v. United States309 and found that Scaltech
did not, in reality, hold this expectation. The court noted that
Scaltech did not determine the importance of the claimed solids
concentration and particle size until it performed the CITGO
299. See id. at 1196, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
300. See id. at 1195, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
301. See id. at 1196, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
302. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
303. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
304. See id. at 1196, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039-40.
305. See id. at 1196, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
306. See id. at 1197, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
307. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (noting that “invention” offered for sale must be
limited by details of the claim).
308. See id. at 1197-98, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
309. 516 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that there
was no “invention” where inventor merely had conception or was developing conception).
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contract in February 1992.310 Therefore, Scaltech did not conceive of
the claimed invention until February 1992, less than a year before the
filing date of January 19, 1993.311 Because the patent’s inventor was
still working toward the development of a conception, the court
found that there was no invention to offer for sale before the critical
date.312 The Federal Circuit also noted that neither the district court
nor the parties addressed whether the activity would have applied as
prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, or whether the 1988 use
was an “experimental use.”313 Thus, the court vacated the district
court’s summary judgment that Scaltech’s proposals rendered the
‘717 patent unenforceable under § 102(b)’s “on-sale” bar.314
C. Obviousness
The determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is based
on four factors: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the
differences between the claims and the prior art, (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the art, and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of
nonobviousness.315
Secondary considerations, also known as
“objective evidence of nonobviousness,” include commercial success
of the invention, satisfying a long-felt need, failure of others to find a
solution to the problem, and copying of the invention by others.316 A
prima facie case of obviousness requires that there be a suggestion or
motivation to combine the teachings of prior art.317
In In re Dance,318 the Federal Circuit affirmed a rejection by the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of claims directed to a
310. See Scaltech, 156 F.3d at 1197-98, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
311. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
312. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (noting that the critical date is more than one
year prior to the date of application for patent).
313. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. The 1988 experimental use involved injecting deoiled waste sediment into large drums or “coker units” in order to convert unrefined
hydrocarbons into solid coke fuel. Previous attempts at this process by other companies
resulted in waste injection rates in excess of one to two pounds of solids per ton of coke. This
in turn typically caused uneven solid coke formation, noxious odors and soft spots in the coke
bed. Scaltech believed its method may overcome the one to two pound waste per ton of coke
ratio and thus create a viable method for waste product disposal. See id. at 1195-96, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038-39; see also Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1100, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing the policy behind “experimental use negation”
as a provision of opportunity for an inventor to discover if an invention is suitable for its
intended purpose).
314. See Scaltech, 156 F.3d at 1911, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
315. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434,
1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
316. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1593, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
317. See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
929, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
318. 160 F.3d 1339, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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obstruction-removing catheter device based on a finding of
obviousness in view of prior art.319 During prosecution, the examiner
found the claims to be obvious over a combination of two prior
patents.320
The applicants argued before the Board that the
examiner’s act of combining two prior art patents constituted
hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention and therefore, was
an improper basis for rejection.321
According to the Federal Circuit, “[o]bviousness is a question of
law based on findings of underlying facts related to the prior art, the
skill of the artisan, and objective considerations.”322 Moreover, a
showing of some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art
comprising the applicant’s specific combination may establish a prima
facie case of obviousness.323 The court held, however, that using
hindsight combination to produce the claimed invention cannot be
used to establish obviousness.324
The inquiry of whether it is obvious to select and combine certain
teachings will be satisfied if those specific teachings suggest to one
skilled in the art to combine the teachings to produce the claimed
invention.325 The court also held that if the prior art references are in
the same field as that of the applicant’s invention, knowledge of those
references will be presumed.326 Because the Federal Circuit agreed
with the Board’s finding that knowledge of the references within the
319. See id. at 1341, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636.
320. See id. at 1341-43, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636-37 (noting the examiner’s comment
that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art” to combine two prior
devices to construct the device at issue).
321. See id. at 1342, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. The Kensey patent disclosed all of the
same processes as the claimant with the exclusion of a “means for recovery fluid and debris.”
See id. at 1342, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636. Sullivan, a different catheter patent holder, had
already disclosed a means for recovery fluid and debris namely, attaching a return channel that
removes the debris released by the catheter. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636-37. The
examiner combined the Kensey device with the Sullivan device and held that anyone skilled in
the art would naturally combine the two in order to create a catheter capable of removing
debris. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636. Accordingly, the examiner held that in light of
both existing patents, claimant’s patent was obvious and thus, unpatentable. See id. at 1341, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636. This determination, from which claimant appealed, was an alleged
product of hindsight reconstruction as the examiner looked to two distinct patents, previously
granted, and determined that the current patent was too obvious to be patented.
322. Id. at 1343, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
323. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637; see also In re Rynes, 7 F.3d 1037, 1039, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630, 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that “focus is upon the state of
knowledge at the time the invention was made. The Commissioner bears the burden of
showing that such knowledge provided some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to make the
particular combination.”).
324. See In re Dance, 160 F.3d at 1343, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (holding that
“[o]bviousness cannot be established by hindsight combination to produce the claimed
invention”).
325. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
326. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
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same narrow field were to be presumed and that the prior art did not
teach away from the claimed invention, the court affirmed the
finding of obviousness.327
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc.,328 which also involved the
issue of obviousness, the Federal Circuit overturned the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Johns Hopkins
University for non-obviousness.329 The court noted that the district
court erroneously prohibited CellPro from introducing evidence of a
reference not relied on in the first trial.330
CellPro sought
introduction of the reference only after the district court adopted its
broad claim construction.331 The district court, however, ruled that
CellPro waived the right to assert the reference when it failed to
produce it in the claim construction phase and then sought to
introduce it for the first time during the court’s consideration of
Hopkins’ motion for summary judgment. Under these facts, the
Federal Circuit ruled that a party is allowed to rely on a reference
that becomes relevant only after the district court adopts a broad
claim construction.332 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the
reference’s merits.333
In In re Daniels,334 the court reversed a decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences rejecting Daniels’ design patent
application. The Board found Daniels’ application unpatentable as
obvious in light of a prior publication.335 The central issue on appeal
was whether Daniels’ patent application was entitled to the benefit of
an earlier filing date for a co-pending application under 35 U.S.C.
§ 120.336
Daniels, through the American Inventors Corporation (“AIC”),
327. See id. at 1344-45, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368-69.
328. 152 F.2d 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
329. See id. at 1356, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16.
330. See id. at 1356, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16.
331. See id. at 1354-55, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14. The district court had adopted its
own definition of the term “substantially free” as it was contained in an earlier patent with
regards to the patent’s ability to require more than 10% mature cells to allow for a cell
suspension of 90% purity.
332. See id. at 1358, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (ruling that the district court’s claim
construction may have been “unorthodox,” but not erroneous).
333. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
334. 144 F.3d 1452, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
335. See id. at 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788-89.
336. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994). The statute reads:
An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the
first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an application previously filed in the
United States . . . shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on
the date of the prior application, . . . .
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originally filed a design patent application on a “leecher,” a device
that trapped leeches.337 Among the drawings included in the
application were several showing the leecher with a leaf pattern.338
Daniels later learned that the application was part of a deceptive
invention-promotion scheme by AIC.339 He retained new counsel and
filed a continuation design application under 37 C.F.R. § 1.62.340 By
amendment, Daniels requested removal of the leaf design from the
drawings.341
The examiner rejected the application based on an intervening
marketing brochure that depicted the leecher with the leaf pattern of
the original application.342 On appeal, the Board affirmed the
rejection of the application and held that Daniels was not entitled to
the benefit of the filing date for his parent application under 35
U.S.C. § 120, which would have obviated the rejection.343 The Board
found that Daniels’ design in the continuation application was “new
and different” from the original design.344 Thus, in the Board’s view,
the continuation application failed to satisfy the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1345 and therefore, Daniels was not
entitled to the earlier filing date.346
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stressed that 35 U.S.C. § 120 applies
equally to design patents and utility patents, with the “common
thread” being adherence to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1,
which requires that the specification contain a written description of
the invention in such terms so as to allow “any person skilled in the
art” to make and use the invention.347 When one analyzes the
sufficiency of a written description for a design patent, one must
examine the drawings.348 The Federal Circuit found the leaf design to
be a mere ornamentation that did not obscure the overall design of

337. See In re Daniels, 144 F.3d at 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
338. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
339. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789 (noting that AIC misled inventors by concealing
the difference between design patent and utility applications).
340. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
341. See id. at 1454-55, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
342. See id. at 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
343. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
344. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
345. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994) (requiring specification to certain terms sufficiently
concise to enable a person skilled in art to make and use the device).
346. See In re Daniels, 144 F.3d at 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90.
347. See id. at 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790.
348. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790 (“It is the drawings of the design patent that
provide the description of the invention.”); see also In re Klein, 987 F.2d 1569, 1691, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that drawings are often only a
description in design applications).
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the leecher.349 Consequently, the court held that it would have been
apparent to any artisan who examined the original application that
Daniels possessed the design of the leecher at the time of the
application.350 Accordingly, Daniels met the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and was entitled to the filing date of
his original application under 35 U.S.C. § 120.351 Thus, the court
reversed the Board’s decision and overruled the examiner’s
rejection.352
In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,353 the Federal Circuit, in a
cross-appeal, considered whether the claims of Gentry Gallery, Inc.’s
patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103354 as being obvious.355 The
Federal Circuit reviews the legal conclusion of non-obviousness de
novo and its underlying facts for clear error.356 Berkline Corporation
argued that the simplicity of Gentry’s console design was evidence of
its obviousness.357 The court, however, concluded that Gentry’s
design solved a problem that Berkline’s alleged combination of prior
art did not overcome.358 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Berkline
failed to prove that the invention would have been obvious at the
time it was made.359
In Monarch Knitting Machinery Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GMBH,360 the
Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the issue of obviousness.361 Ultimately, obviousness is a
question of law based on underlying questions of fact including:
scope and content of the prior art; level of ordinary skill in the art;
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and

349. See In re Daniels, 144 F.3d at 1457, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790-91.
350. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
351. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
352. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791.
353. 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
354. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (describing non-obvious subject matter and conditions for
patentability).
355. See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1474, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
356. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
357. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501-02 (“Simplicity is not inimical to
patentability.”) (quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443, 1446
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
358. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. The patent at issue disclosed a sectional
sofa containing two reclining seats facing the same direction. There was evidence that when
tow of the prior art reclining seats were physically inserted into a prior art sectional sofa, the
seats “bumped against the side,” which caused the seats to open prematurely. The invention
solved this problem by recessing the push button slightly. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1446.
359. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
360. 139 F.3d 877, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
361. See id. at 878, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1979.
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existence of objective indicia of non-obviousness.362
In Monarch Knitting Machinery Corp., the Federal Circuit first
analyzed the scope of the prior art.363 The court disputed the district
court’s formulation of the problem that confronted the inventors of
the patent.364 The Federal Circuit determined that “[t]he district
court based its conclusion of obviousness heavily on its determination
that the prior art showed a ‘trend’ . . . .”365 Although a trend may
constitute evidence of a suggestion to make “minor” changes over the
prior art, it is important that the prior art actually contain a
suggestion or motivation to combine the references to form the
trend.366 The Federal Circuit noted that the evidence of record called
into question the assertion that the prior art showed a “trend” and
found a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether a trend
existed.367
The Federal Circuit then examined the district court’s review of
the objective evidence of the secondary considerations.368 The court
agreed with the district court’s determination that there was no
genuine issue of fact with respect to the existence and degree of
commercial success. The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with
the district court as to other facts.369 Although the appellants argued
that the “uninterrupted existence of a long-felt need in the art”
negated any evidence of contemporaneous independent
development, the Federal Circuit stated that the relevant
consideration is actually “long-felt but unsolved need.”370 Thus, the
Federal Circuit held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the evidence of contemporaneous development solved the
need in the art.371 Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that the record
also contained evidence of skepticism in the art, as well as evidence
that the prior art taught away from the claimed invention.372 The
362. See id. at 881, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)).
363. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981.
364. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981 (commenting that the district court’s formulation
of the inventor’s problem, defined by the court as designing a portion of a knitting needle to
minimize damage to itself and maximize operating speed of an industrial knitting machine,
presumes a solution to the problem).
365. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981.
366. See id. at 881, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1981.
367. See id. at 882-83, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1982.
368. See id. at 883, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1983 (examining, under these secondary
considerations, both the trial court’s conclusions and the evidence in record regarding
commercial success).
369. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1983.
370. See id. at 884, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1983.
371. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1983.
372. See id. at 885, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1984 (adding that skepticism can be evidence of
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Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings after holding that summary judgment was
improper where genuine issues of material fact existed.373
In In re Rouffet,374 the court reversed the Board’s rejection of an
application as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).375
Rouffet’s
application disclosed a method to reduce the number of handovers
between beams transmitted by the same satellite, that were caused by
the satellite’s motion.376 Handovers result from a satellite’s motion
causing a receiver to move from the footprint of a beam transmitted
by one satellite into the footprint of a beam transmitted by a second
satellite.377 Handovers cause interruptions in signal transmission and
reception.378 Rouffet eliminated satellite-motion handovers by having
the satellite’s antenna emit a fan-shaped beam.379 A fixed point on
the Earth’s surface would likely remain within a single footprint until
it became necessary to switch to another satellite.380
The Board affirmed Rouffet’s rejection over U.S. Patent No.
5,199,762 (“King”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 4,872,015 (“Rosen”)
and a conference report (“Ruddy”). King disclosed a system for
launching a plurality of satellites into low Earth orbits from a single
launch vehicle.381 Rosen taught a geostationary satellite that used a
plurality of fan beams to communicate with both mobile and fixed
terminals on the Earth.382 Ruddy taught the use of a series of satellites
in Molniya orbits, which always followed an identical path across the
sky when viewed from a stationary position on the ground.383 Ruddy
used a fan beam to eliminate the need for the grand station’s
antenna to track the satellite’s motion around the apogee loop.384
Ruddy, however, taught the projection of a single beam from the
Earth to the satellites.385 In contrast, Rouffet’s application taught the
projection of multiple beams from a satellite to the Earth.386 Despite
these differences, the court found that the Board was correct in
non-obviousness and teaching away is a more pointed form of skepticism).
373. See id. at 886, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985.
374. 149 F.3d 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
375. See id. at 1352, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
376. See id. at 1353, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
377. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (noting analogy of cellular phone traveling from
one cell to another).
378. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
379. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
380. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
381. See id. at 1356, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
382. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
383. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
384. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
385. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
386. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
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finding that the combination of King, Rosen, and Ruddy contained
all of the elements claimed in Rouffet’s application.387
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in
failing to identify any motivation to combine these references.388
Lacking a motivation to combine the references, the Board simply
failed to make out a prima facie case of obviousness.389 In fact, Ruddy
addressed the handover problem with orbit selection, not beam
shape.390
The court identified three possible motivational sources to
combine references: “the nature of the problem to be solved, the
teachings of the prior art, and the knowledge of persons of ordinary
skill in the art.”391 The Board incorrectly relied upon the very high
level of skill in the art to overcome the differences between the
claimed invention and the selected elements in the references.392
This rejection impermissibly allowed the examiner to use the claimed
invention as a model for combining elements in the prior art to
undermine the patentability of the claimed invention with
hindsight.393 A “rote invocation” of the high level of skill in the field
of art did not suffice to supply a motivation to combine.394 Rejections
on such grounds make it difficult for the “more sophisticated
scientific fields” to ever “experience a patentable technical
advance.”395
The Board also affirmed a rejection over U.S. Patent No. 5,394,561
(“Freeburg”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,170,485 (“Levine”).396
Freeburg taught a cellular radiotelephone system on a constellation
of low Earth orbit satellites that use conical beams to transmit from
the satellite to both fixed and mobile Earth stations.397 Levine taught
an Earth-based cellular radio system that used fan beams broadcast
from antenna towers.398
Again, the Federal Circuit determined that the Board erred in
failing to identify a motivation to combine Levine and Freeburg.399
The court stated that “even when the level of skill in the art is high,
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id. at 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
See id. at 1358, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
See id. at 1359, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
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the Board must identify specifically the principle, known to one of
ordinary skill, that suggests the claimed combination.”400
Although Levine multiplied the number of potential handovers and
then isolated the necessary handovers from the unnecessary,401
Rouffet eliminated handovers attributable to the satellite’s motion by
using a different beam shape.402 The Board gave no actual suggestion
that one could select part of the teachings of Levine for combination
with Freeburg’s satellite system.403 Thus, the court concluded that
“[t]he Board’s naked invocation of skill in the art to supply a
suggestion to combine the references cited in this case is therefore
clearly erroneous.”404
In Kahn v. General Motors Corp.,405 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
decision by the district court of non-infringement of two means-plusfunction claims, but reversed the district court’s holding that the two
claims were invalid for obviousness.406 Kahn owned U.S. Patent No.
4,018,994 (“the ‘944 patent”), which addressed the problem of
minimizing distortion within an AM stereophonic receiver.407
Kahn sued General Motors Corp. (“GM”) for allegedly infringing
two means-plus-function claims (Claims 53 and 54) of the ‘994
patent.408 In the court’s view, claims written in means-plus-function
form are interpreted to cover the structure described in the
specification and its equivalents.409 The claim limitation at issue
required a “means for deriving a distortion cancellation component
from the stereo sum signal component.”410 The court identified the
structure in the specification and drawings corresponding to the
claimed means to include an electronic amplifier, summer, and
frequency doubler.411
The district court found Claims 53 and 54 invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over two patents.412 The Federal Circuit
reviewed the underlying factual issues413 for clear error and reviewed
400. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
401. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
402. See id. at 1353, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
403. See id. at 1359, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
404. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
405. 135 F.3d 1472, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 177
(1998).
406. See id. at 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
407. See id. at 1474-75, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
408. See id. at 1474, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
409. Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994)).
410. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
411. See id. at 1476-77, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
412. See id. at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (citing U.S. Patent No. 2,420,230 issued to
Crosby on May 6, 1947, and U.S. Patent No. 3,080,453 issued to Avins on March 5, 1963).
413. The underlying factual issues involved differences between the prior art and the
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the district court’s ultimate legal conclusion de novo.414
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion
that the two prior art patents invalidated the asserted claims.415 The
court recognized that the same structural analysis for the deriving
means limitation considered for infringement must also be
considered for obviousness.416 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the district court erred by failing to limit the asserted claim to
the structure in the ‘944 specification.417 The Federal Circuit held
that Claims 53 and 54 were not obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art based on the combination of the two prior art patents.418
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc.,419 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the
plaintiff’s invention was not obvious.420 The court held that the
accused infringer did not show the existence of prior art that
demonstrated the claimed process.421 Chiuminatta owned U.S. Patent
No. 4,889,675 (“the ‘675 patent”), which pertained to methods for
cutting concrete prior to its complete hardening.422 Chiuminatta
sued Cardinal arguing that Cardinal induced infringement of its ‘675
patent.423 Cardinal responded that the ‘675 patent was invalid as
obvious.424
At trial, Cardinal maintained that one prior art reference, a manual
authored by the American Concrete Institute, disclosed the cutting

claimed invention, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and objective evidence of secondary
considerations of patentability. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
414. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (stating that the determination of obviousness is
“freely reviewable on appeal”) (citing Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1182, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
415. See id. at 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-15.
416. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-15.
417. See id. at 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (stating that the district court’s failure to
limit Claim 53 precludes a finding of obviousness).
418. See id. at 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
419. 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
420. See id. at 1305, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing the district
court’s summary judgment holding for patent infringement and affirming the remainder of the
decision).
421. See id. at 1313, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
422. See id. at 1305, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
423. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
424. See Chiuminatta, CV 95-4995 LGB, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *27 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
4, 1996), rev’d in part, 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Cardinal also
asserted that the patent was invalid because Chiuminatta engaged in inequitable conduct when
it withheld material information from the PTO with culpable intent. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22196, at *48. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chiuminatta on
this issue. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *57. On appeal, Cardinal also argued that the
claims failed to specify the proper time for cutting, but the Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, and noted that “[t]he cutting step limitation has both qualitative and quantitative
language.” Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1312, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
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step at a hardness covered by the claimed invention.425 The fact that
during reexamination of the ‘675 patent, the patent examiner
initially rejected the claims as obvious in light of the prior art
supported this argument.426
Chiuminatta later convinced the
examiner that its claimed invention functioned at a lower hardness
range than that disclosed in the prior art.427
Cardinal also argued that Chiuminatta misled the examiner when
Chiuminatta interpreted the American Concrete Institute’s manual
in a “tortuous” manner so as to render Chiuminatta’s invention
nonobvious.428 The district court rejected this argument and granted
the plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that the prior art did not
disclose the cutting step.429 The district court concluded that
Cardinal failed to introduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to the American Concrete Institute
manual’s teachings.430
On appeal, Cardinal pointed to a report prepared by the
Department of Transportation431 to support its argument that
Chiuminatta’s claims were obvious.432
The Department of
Transportation report detailed the results of several studies that
addressed the cutting of highway concrete.433 Cardinal argued that
the report demonstrated that “‘acceptable’ cuts were achieved on
various concrete mixtures at hardnesses below” those claimed in the
‘675 patent.434 The district court found the report to be irrelevant
because it described results of tests that occurred after the filing date
425. See Chiuminatta, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *36-40 (dismissing this element of
Cardinal’s prior art argument because the manual concerned itself with “the hardness of the
concrete, rather than on the time elapsed since the concrete was finished”).
426. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *36 (quoting the patent examiner stating that
“in view of the teachings of [the American Concrete Institute’s manual]” Chiuminatta’s
invention “would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill”).
427. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *39-42 (detailing a series of phone
conversations between the plaintiff and the examiner that resulted in the reversal of the
examiner’s decision and confirmation of the patentability of the ‘675 claims).
428. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *40-42 (asserting as incorrect the defendants’
interpretation that the hardness range of the concrete claimed in his patent differed from that
described in American Concrete Institute’s manual, and thus that his invention was
nonobvious).
429. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *67-68.
430. See id., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *42 (finding Cardinal’s argument, that the
hardness range claimed in defendants’ patent was the same as found in the language of the
manual and rendering defendant’s invention obvious, to be unpersuasive).
431. See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1312, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759 (citing FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUB. NO. FHWA-RD-91-079, GUIDELINES FOR TIMING
CONTRACTION JOINT SAWING AND EARLIEST LOADING FOR CONCRETE PAVEMENTS (1994)).
432. See id. at 1311-12, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759-60 (arguing that genuine issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment on the claims relating to the ‘675 patent).
433. See id. at 1312-13, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
434. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
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of the ‘675 patent application.435
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and
emphasized that parties need to provide support for the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment.436
Indeed, the court noted that Cardinal failed to provide evidence of its
contention that the results contained in the report were indicative of
pre-filing prior art results.437
1.

Obviousness-type double patenting
Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicial doctrine that
prevents patent applicants from extending their patent right past the
statutory time limit.438 The doctrine prevents an unjustified extension
of a patent’s term by disallowing a second patent to issue on an
obvious variation of an invention to the same owner at a later time.439
Typically, examiners apply a “one-way test” that determines whether
the subsequent application would be obvious over the patent
claims.440 In unusual circumstances, however, examiners may apply a
“two-way test” that, in addition to the one-way test, examines whether
the patent claims are obvious over the application’s claims.441
In In re Berg,442 the Federal Circuit addressed the applicability of the
“one-way test” and the “two-way test” to patent certification.443 The
court first noted that the “‘two-way test’ is a narrow exception to the
general rule of the ‘one-way test.’”444 Berg claimed that the invention
was entitled to the “two-way test” because he filed two applications
simultaneously and could not be held responsible for their differing
435. See Chiuminatta, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *44.
436. See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1313, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
437. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760 (holding that without supporting testimony,
affidavits, or other evidence relating to the connection between the report and prior art cutting
techniques, no reasonable jury could find for the defendants).
438. See In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
439. See id. at 1431, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
440. See id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (defining the “one-way” test as a means of
“determin[ing] obviousness-type double patenting”). Under the “one-way” test, it is the duty of
the examiner to ask “whether the application claims are obvious over the patent claims.” Id., 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. Upon adjudication, the court will evaluate the examiner’s
determination and decide whether or not the application is a mere and obvious variation of the
patent claim. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
441. See id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
442. 140 F.3d 1428, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
443. See id. at 1432-34, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-31 (discussing whether the “one-way” or
the “two-way” test is appropriate under the circumstances).
444. Id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. The “two-way test” is reserved for unusual
circumstances and allows the examiner to look at whether the patent claims are obvious to the
application claims, rather than whether the application claims are obvious to the patent claims.
See In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (addressing
whether a patent application was a mere and obvious variation of an existing patent by
determining whether the patent claims are obvious to the application claims).
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rates of prosecution.445 In addition, Berg argued that claim 1 of the
patent was not obvious under claim one of the application and
therefore, the rejection of the claims could not be sustained under
the “two-way test.”446 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
however, because Berg could have filed all of the claims in one
instead of two applications, when the two applications contained
nearly identical disclosures.447 Thus, the court held that Berg was not
entitled to the “two-way test.”448
In its discussion of the circumstances in which the “two-way test” is
appropriate,449 the Court noted that the two-way test applies “‘when a
later-filed improvement patent issues before an earlier filed basic
invention.’”450 The Federal Circuit concluded that when an applicant
can file all of its claims in one application, the applicant is not
entitled to the exception of the “two-way test.”451 The court also
dismissed Berg’s contention that filing a terminal disclaimer would
be unfair.452 The court explained that Berg knowingly assumed the
risk that he would be required to disclaim terminally by filing two
identical applications simultaneously.453 Thus, the court applied the
“one-way test” to Berg’s two simultaneously filed patent applications
and affirmed the decision of the Board.454
D. Written Description
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1,
mandates that the specification adequately described the subject
matter. Although the specification does not need to describe the
445. See In re Berg, 140 F.3d at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. Berg argued that he
should not be penalized merely because the PTO issued one claim before the other, especially
when both claims had been filed simultaneously. See id. at 1433, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Thus, Berg claimed that because the PTO was responsible for the differing prosecution rates—
one claim issued before the other—the “two-way test” ought to apply in order to account for the
PTO’s actions.
446. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
447. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
448. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
449. The court uses the example of In re Braat in holding that the “two-way test” is
appropriate when: (1) the filing party could not file both claims together because “the
inventive entity named in the application did not invent the subject matter of all the patent
claims and vice versa,” (2) the “patent invention . . . [was] totally separate from that of [the
application], and could conceivably have been developed earlier rather than later,” or (3)
“when a later-filed improvement patent issues before an earlier filed basic invention.” Id. at
1433-34, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (citations omitted).
450. Id. at 1434, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting In Re Braat, 937 F.2d at 593, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292).
451. See id. at 1434, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (admonishing Berg for taking a
“calculated risk” when he simultaneously filed two applications).
452. See id. at 1435, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
453. See id. at 1437, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
454. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
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claimed subject matter in any particular form, it must convey with
reasonable clarity to one skilled in the art, that, as of the filing date,
the inventor was in possession of the invention.455
In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,456 Berkline argued that certain
claims of Gentry’s patent were invalid for failing to comply with the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 1.457 Berkline
argued that the patent only described sofas with controls on the
console,458 while “an object of the invention [was] to provide a
sectional sofa with a console . . . that accommodates the controls for
both the reclining seats . . . .”459 According to the court, “the original
disclosure clearly identifies the console as the only possible location
for the controls.”460 Applicants only are entitled to claims that their
disclosure will allow.461 Claims may be no broader than the
supporting disclosure, and therefore, a narrow disclosure will limit
claim breadth.462
E. Best Mode
The “best mode” requirement set out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a
patent’s specification to set forth “the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.” The requirement asks
whether the inventor had, at the time the patent application was
filed, a preferred way of practicing the invention, and if so, whether
the preferred way was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow “a skilled
artisan to practice it without undue experimentation. . . .”463
In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,464 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a grant of judgment as a matter of law on patent invalidity
for failure to disclose, as required by 35 U.S.C § 112, the best mode
455. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). The statute notes that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id
456. 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, reh’g denied, No. 97-1182, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7500 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 1998).
457. See id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
458. See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
459. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
460. Id. at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
461. See id. at 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503 (citing In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212,
1214, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
462. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
463. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
464. 141 F.3d 1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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contemplated by the inventor of carrying out the invention.465 In
response to Nobelpharma’s (“NP”) argument that the district court
erred in granting judgment as a matter of law,466 Implant Innovations
(“3I”) argued that NP’s own admissions indicated that it developed
and tested a preferred method of making the claimed invention
when the patent application was filed.467
The Federal Circuit reapplied the standard used by the district
court to review the grant of 3I’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law.468 Under the applicable standard of review, the record is
reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Therefore,
the non-movant is afforded the benefit of all reasonable inferences
and the court will affirm if the judgment is the only one possible
under controlling law.469 The determination of whether a patent fails
to comply with the best mode requirement involves two factual
inquiries.470 First, the fact finder must determine whether, at the time
the patent application was filed, the inventor had a best mode of
practicing the invention.471 Second, if a best mode existed, the fact
finder must determine whether it was disclosed “in sufficient detail to
allow a skilled artisan to practice it without undue
experimentation.”472
At trial, the deposition statements of the inventor, which NP
offered into evidence, actually weakened NP’s case.473 Indeed, the
inventor’s testimony explicitly stated that the patent did not include
some details of the invention. The court found the inventor’s
testimony to be persuasive evidence because it demonstrated that,
“[the inventor] was aware that a variety of undisclosed machining
parameters were critical to the production of a functional implant at

465. See id. at 1061, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098-99 (defining the issues under review as
(1) whether the patent is invalid due to a “failure to disclose the best mode of carrying out the
invention,” (2) whether the patent infringes upon an earlier patent, and (3) whether claimant
is entitled to either a court judgment or a new trial).
466. See id. at 1063-64, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01.
467. See id. at 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01.
468. See id. at 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101 (explaining that the district court’s
decision would be reviewed under the de novo standard).
469. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101 (citations omitted) (ruling that under FED. R. CIV.
P. 50(a), “the verdict may be directed . . . when it is clear that completion of the trial is
unnecessary in that the only sustainable verdict could be in favor of the defendant”) (citing
Allied Colloids, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
470. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
471. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
472. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101 (stating that the existence of a disclosure is
determined on an objective basis).
473. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1241, 1247-48 (N.D. Ill.
1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
178 (1998).

1368

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

the time he filed his patent application.”474 The Federal Circuit found
that the evidence led to one reasonable conclusion: the inventor
failed to disclose his best mode of practicing the invention.475 A grant
of judgment as a matter of law in favor of a party bearing the burden
of proof may be granted only when the only reasonable conclusion is
a decision in favor of the movant.476 In unusual circumstances, like
those in Nobelpharma, an admission by the plaintiff’s witness can
support entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
defendant.477
F.

Definiteness

Paragraph two of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent
specification conclude with claims that particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention.478
This
requirement has come to be known as the “definiteness
requirement.”479
In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade
Commission,480 the Federal Circuit considered whether the patent’s
claims were statutorily indefinite and thereby, in violation of 35
U.S.C. § 112. To determine whether a claim is sufficiently definite,
the trier of fact must decide whether one skilled in the art would
understand the bounds of the claims when read in light of the
specification.481 In Personalized Media Communications, the Federal
Circuit found that the International Trade Commission official
overseeing the proceeding erred in finding the asserted claims to be
indefinite and noted that the evidence did not indicate that the
claims were imprecise.482

474. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1065, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
475. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101-02.
476. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (“Accordingly, grant of JMOL in favor of a party
bearing the burden of proof may be granted only where . . . the ‘only reasonable conclusion is
in [the movant’s] favor.’” ) (quoting Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495 (10th
Cir. 1984)).
477. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (“Given [plaintiff’s] admission, we conclude that
this is one of those ‘extreme’ cases in which it was not improper to grant judgment as a matter
of law in favor of a defendant on an issue regarding which it bore the burden of proof.”).
478. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
479. See Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Comm’n, 161
F.3d 696, 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
480. 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (1998), reh’g denied, reh’g en banc denied, No.
98-1160, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4910 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 1999).
481. See id., 161 F.3d at 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
482. See id. at 705-06, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888-89.
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G. Means-Plus-Function
Paragraph six of § 112 of the Patent Act allows an inventor to
express an element in a claim as a means or step for performing a
specified function without the recital of structure.483 For example, a
patentee may claim a device comprising a first wooden board, a
second wooden board, and a nail connecting the first and second
wooden boards. Paragraph six, however, allows the patentee to claim
a device comprising a first wooden board, a second wooden board,
and means for connecting the first wooden board to the second wooden
board. At first glance this means-plus-function way of claiming
elements seems to allow a patentee broad protection. As will be
gleamed from the cases, however, the protection afforded by this
drafting technique is actually quite limited.
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,484 the Federal Circuit
addressed the construction of two means-plus-function limitations in
the relevant claims.485 In doing so, the court interpreted 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 6 and explained that under the statute “an accused device
with structure not identical to the structure described in the patent
will literally infringe the patent if the device performs the identical
function required by the claim with a structure equivalent to that
described in the patent.”486 Accordingly, the prosecution history is
relevant to the construction of means-plus-function language claims
because a patent applicant may surrender subject matter that is
arguably within the scope of the specification in order to overcome a
prior art rejection.487
In Cyber Corp., the Federal Circuit did not find that the district
court erred in its claim construction488 or in its refusal to grant
judgment as a matter of law.489 In addition, the court found the
district court’s jury instructions sufficient, even though the
483. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994).
484. 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
485. See id. at 1457, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
486. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
487. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175-76 (discussing whether the district court properly
refused to limit the scope of the claims “based on statements made to the examiner during
prosecution” and concluding that the “relevant inquiry is whether a competitor would
reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter”).
488. The district court construed the disputed language at issue in each of the claims.
Notably, the court instructed the jury that the second pumping means limitation within the
claim “refers to a structure identical to the structure disclosed in the specification of the patent,
or the equivalent to that structure, which performs the function of fluid accumulator/dispense
pump.” Id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that
such construction “did not narrow the scope of the claim language” so as to create an error in
the jury instructions. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
489. See id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176 (emphasizing that the district court
“construed several limitations, or disputed language, in the claims”).
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instructions failed to narrow the scope of the claim to exclude a
pump with any external reservoir as urged by Cybor.490 The Federal
Circuit explained that the district court instructed the jury to
determine two issues: (1) whether Cybor’s device, with its pump and
attached reservoir was structurally equivalent, and (2) whether
Cybor’s device possessed the same functionality as the second
pumping means.491 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court’s claim construction and jury instructions, finding that
“nothing in the specification or prosecution history suggests the
interpretation put forth by [the claimant].”492
In Cybor Corp., the inventors also limited the scope of their claims to
overcome a prior art reference493 by emphasizing the distinctions
between the prior art container and the claimed invention.494
According to the district court’s claim constructions, the inventors
did not disclaim a reservoir in overcoming the prior art.495 Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court’s interpretations were
supported by substantial evidence and concluded that it properly
denied Cybor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to literal
infringement.496
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. also involved the means-plusfunction issue.497 The Federal Circuit once again stated that a meansplus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 cannot be read to
cover any structure that would perform the claimed function.498
Chiuminatta owned U.S. Patent No. 5,056,499 (“the ‘499 patent”),
claiming an apparatus for cutting concrete at a time before the
concrete reaches its final, hardened stage.499 Cardinal manufactured
and sold the Green Machine TM saw, which performed the same
function as Chiuminatta’s cutting mechanism.500 As a result of this
functional similarity, Chiuminatta sued Cardinal and alleged literal
patent infringement.501
490. See id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
491. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
492. Id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
493. See id. at 1460, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
494. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
495. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (determining that the inventor’s statements “do
not show the deliberate unequivocal surrender of all external reservoirs”).
496. See id. at 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
497. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 130709, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752, 1755-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
498. See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1307-08, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1755-56.
499. See id. at 1305-06, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753-54.
500. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., No. 95-4995, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *6-7, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
501. See id., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *11-27.
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The pertinent claim in the ‘499 patent included a means-plusfunction limitation: “means connected to the saw for supporting the
surface of the concrete adjacent to the leading edge of the cutting
blade to inhibit” cracking the concrete.502 The only structure
disclosed in the patent for “supporting the surface” was a skid plate.503
The Federal Circuit explained, however, that the district court
construed the limitation to include “every conceivable support
surface.”504 Thus, the district court found that Cardinal’s apparatus
literally infringed the ‘499 patent and granted summary judgment for
Chiuminatta.505
On appeal, Cardinal argued that the district court erred in its
interpretation of the means-plus-function limitation.506 Specifically,
Cardinal argued that the limitation should be limited to the disclosed
skid plate and equivalent structures.507 Cardinal asserted that the
district court incorrectly identified the disclosed structure broadly
based on function, rather than on narrowly defined physical
structure.508 The Federal Circuit agreed with Cardinal and held that
the specification clearly identified the structure that performed the
limitation, which was the skid plate.509 Thus, the Federal Circuit
found the district court’s interpretation erroneous.510
The Federal Circuit also addressed whether the structure employed
by Cardinal was equivalent to the skid plate.511 Cardinal’s machine
utilized wheels to perform the same task as the skid plate.512 Cardinal
argued that the differences between its wheels and Chiuminatta’s skid
plate were substantial, thereby foreclosing a finding of literal
infringement.513
502. Id., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *15.
503. Id.
504. Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1307, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
505. See Chiuminatta, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *28 (granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on the literal infringement claim).
506. See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1307, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (restating Cardinal’s
argument that the means limitation should be construed to correspond only to the skid plate
and equivalent structures).
507. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
508. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (reciting Chiuminatta’s counter-argument that
“the limitation was properly construed as being broader”).
509. See id. at 1308-09, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (disagreeing with the district court’s
conclusion that “support surface” is a sufficient identification).
510. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
511. See id. at 1309, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756-57 (explaining that “the proper test is
whether the differences between the structure in the accused device and any disclosed in the
specification are insubstantial”).
512. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (addressing Cardinal’s assertion that the wheels
on its device were not equivalent).
513. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (arguing that the wheels were ratably mounted
and thus substantially different from the skid plate).
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Persuaded by these arguments, the Federal Circuit held that the
differences between the plate and the wheels were substantial.514 The
court pointed both to the differences in physical characteristics and
the differences in mode of movement.515 The court also rejected
Chiuminatta’s argument that the wheels were equivalent to the plate
because the two were interchangeable.516 Finally, the court discussed
the interplay between a means-plus-function analysis and an analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents.517 The court noted that a
technological advancement developed after the patent was issued
may constitute patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, yet may not be considered equivalent under a meansplus-function analysis unless the advancement was disclosed in the
patent.518
H. Inventorship
A patent application may only be made or authorized to be made
by the inventor.519 Failure to properly name the inventor or failure to
name all of the true inventors violates the inventorship requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) and is grounds for invalidating a patent.520
In Pannu v. Iolab Corp.,521 the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision, that Iolab failed to invalidate the patent at issue on
the ground of improper inventorship.522 Pannu sued Iolab for
infringement of its patent related to intraocular plastic lenses.523 The
patent at issue addressed two improvements over the prior art: (1)
the reduction of snagging on the eye tissue caused by the lens during
insertion,524 and (2) a one-piece construction of the lens that makes
its manufacture easier.525
514. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (concluding that no reasonable jury could find
other than that the wheels and the skid plate were substantially different).
515. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
516. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
The court recognized that known
interchangeability is an important factor when one determines equivalence. The court noted,
however, that this factor is not dispositive and that interchangeability is common among
structures that perform the same function. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
517. See id. at 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (comparing analysis under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶6 and the doctrine of equivalents).
518. See id. at 1310-11, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757-58.
519. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
520. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(f) he did
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”).
521. 155 F.3d 1344, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
522. See id. at 1345, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (noting that the district court granted
judgment as a matter of law).
523. See id. at 1347, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
524. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
525. See id. at 1346-47, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659-60 (detailing the new manufacturing
parameters).
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In defense to Pannu’s infringement charge, Iolab argued that the
patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) for failure to name the
true inventor.526 Iolab asserted that one of its own employees
developed the idea of one-piece construction during conversations
with the plaintiff and that the plaintiff failed to list the employee as a
co-inventor.527 Furthermore, Iolab asserted that even if Pannu
corrected the inventorship,528 the patent still would be invalid for
failure to disclose the inventor’s best mode529 of making the claimed
one-piece lenses.530
The Federal Circuit explained that proof of non-joinder of an
actual inventor by clear and convincing evidence renders a patent
invalid unless the patentee can demonstrate that inventorship can be
corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 256.531 Section 256 is a saving provision
under which a patentee can correct inventorship and avoid
invalidation if the patentee can show that the error occurred without
any deceptive intent on the part of the named inventor.532
In Pannu, the Federal Circuit first examined the requirements for
joint inventor status.533 The requirements are that the joint inventor:
(1) contribute in some significant manner to the conception or
reduction to practice of the invention, (2) make a contribution to
the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality . . . and
(3) do more than merely explain to the real inventors well-known
534
concepts and/or the current state of the art.

The court then considered Pannu’s discussion with Iolab about the
invention and noted that it was undisputed that the Iolab employee
was the first person to suggest a one-piece construction.535 Thus, the
court held that a reasonable jury could find that Iolab’s employee was
a co-inventor and should have been listed as such on the patent.536
526. See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1348-51, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-63.
527. See id. at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61 (explaining Iolab’s assertion that the
employee’s contribution to the design of the snag-resistant lens qualified the employee as a coinventor).
528. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994) (permitting the Commissioner, “on application of all the
parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed
[to] issue a certificate correcting such error”).
529. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a patentee to set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention. See supra Part II.F.
530. See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
531. See id. at 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (stating that “in cases of misjoinder and
non-joinder the operation of [35 U.S.C. §] 102(f) is ameliorated by section 256”).
532. See id. at 1351, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (describing the saving provision of § 256
and stating that, if correctable, the district court must order correction).
533. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
534. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
535. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663 (applying the test and concluding that a
reasonable jury could find that the Iolab employee is a co-inventor).
536. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
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Accordingly, the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law
against Iolab was improper.537
The issue of correct inventorship also may appear in the context of
an interference.538 In Schulze v. Green,539 the PTO declared an
interference between a patent application, naming Schulze and
Sherman as inventors, and U.S. Patent No. 5,156,315 (“the 315
patent”), issued to Green.540 Three months after the interference was
declared, the applicants, Schulze and Sherman, filed a motion to
correct inventorship on their application.541 Green opposed the
motion for failure to comply with the filing requirements of 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.48 and 1.639 and then requested a period of testimony, which
the applicants opposed.542 The administrative patent judge (“APJ”)
dismissed the applicants’ motion to correct inventorship without
prejudice, stating that the motion to correct may be filed or refiled at
any appropriate time in an interference.543 Despite the opportunity
to refile their motion to correct during the interference, the
applicants failed to do so.544
During the administrative proceeding, Green could not show
priority of inventorship. Schulze and Sherman, initially believing that
Green would be able to prove priority, offered to renew their motion
to correct inventorship, but elected not to do so. They believed
Green did not have standing to attack inventorship once the court
found against him on the issue of priority.545 Thus, the applicants
preferred to wait until after judgment on the interference issue and a
return to the ex parte examination to refile the motion.546 Green,
however, filed another motion for judgment under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
and argued that the count’s subject matter was unpatentable because

537. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
538. The purpose of an interference is not to resolve the question of priority of invention
when more than one person seeks ownership of substantially the same invention. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 135 (1994).
539. 136 F.3d 786, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
540. See id. at 788, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
541. In their motion, the applicants stated that the counts at issue were invented by Schulze
alone, rather than by both Schulze and Sherman. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
542. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.48(a) (1999). Section
1.48(a) states in part:
correction of inventorship require[s]: 1. Diligence, 2. A statement of facts verified by
the original named inventors establishing when and how the error occurred without
deceptive intent; 3. An oath or declaration by each actual inventor as required by 1.63;
4. The fee set forth in 1.17(h); and 5. The written consent of the assignee.
Id.
543. Schulze, 136 F.3d at 788, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
544. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
545. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.
546. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
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of the applicants’ failure to recite the correct inventorship in the
application.547 After the APJ deferred decision, the Board entered a
judgment against Green for lack of priority and against the applicants
for “failure to diligently correct inventorship.”548
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicants argued their
entitlement to correct inventorship upon resumption of the ex parte
examination.549 The court held that because the applicants fairly
placed correct inventorship at issue, and possessed the necessary
facts, the inventorship issue should have been decided inter partes
during the interference.550 In explaining its holding, the court noted
that for the inventorship issue to be appealable to the Board it must
have been “fully developed” before the Board.551 The court further
noted that Congress intended the Board to hear matters that
Congress “fairly place[d] at issue in the proceeding.”552 The court
then reasoned that filing a motion to correct inventorship during the
interference proceeding fairly placed the issue of the inventorship in
the interference and thus was appealable to the Board.553
Once fairly raised during an interference proceeding, the facts
relating to the inventorship issue must be developed fully to ensure
proper adjudication.554 In Schulze, the applicants argued that the
APJ’s denial of Green’s second motion for testimony with respect to
the inventorship issue, as well as the Board’s decision to vacate
Green’s earlier testimony order, prevented the facts from being fully
developed and thus could not be properly adjudicated during the
interference.555 The court found no merit in the applicants’
argument that the Board erred when it decided the inventorship
issue. The court reasoned that because the applicants were aware of
all the facts necessary to support a change in inventorship and could
have presented these facts in a proper motion, their failure to do so
was insufficient to preclude the Board from deciding the issue.556
547. See id. at 789, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
548. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
549. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (explaining that because Green did not prevail on
the issue of priority of invention, he had “no assertable legal interest in any impact of correct
inventorship on the patentability of application claims”).
550. See id. at 790-92, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-75 (stating that issues that are fully
developed before the Board should be addressed by the Board, but where an issue is “fairly
placed at issue” in a proceeding, it should be decided).
551. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
552. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (quoting Perkins v. Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 328, 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
553. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (“The very filing of this motion fairly placed the
issue of the inventorship of Appellant’s application in the interference.”).
554. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
555. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
556. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (adding that appellants should not have the
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The court then held that a patentability question fairly raised and
capable of being fully presented must be resolved inter partes.557 The
court noted that the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) places patent practitioners on notice that the Board will
decide all issues fairly raised and fully developed in the interference,
including issues that relate to patentability, pursuant to the 1984
Amendments.558 Therefore, the applicants should have known that
they had to file a motion to correct invertorship during the
interference.559 The APJ, however, unintentionally indicated that the
applicants could wait until return to ex parte proceedings to refile.560
Thus, while proper procedure dictated that the applicants should
have corrected inventorship during the interference, the court held
that the parties were not given adequate notice of this fact and were
actually mistakenly misled by the APJ into believing that they could
wait.561 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded to the Board with
instructions to allow Schulze and Sherman to reform and refile their
motion within a set period of time.562
The Federal Circuit also examined the related doctrine of
inventor’s rights in Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.563 In
Ethicon, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an infringement
suit on the ground that the newly added co-inventor did not consent
to the suit.564 Yoon, the patentee, and Ethicon Inc., his exclusive
licensee, owned U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773 (“the ‘773 patent”), which
related to trocars, a surgical instrument that makes small incisions in
the wall of a body cavity to admit endoscopic instruments.565
Yoon and Ethicon sued United States Surgical Corp. for
infringement of the ‘773 patent.566 While the suit was still pending,
opportunity to manipulate the interference process through such conduct in order to evade a
more rigorous inter partes proceeding).
557. See id. at 791, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
558. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, §§ 201-207, 98 Stat. 3383,
3386-89 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1994)); see also 130 CONG. REC.
28,065, 28,072 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5836-37 (stating that by combining
the two boards, “all issues of patentability and priority which arise in an interference can be
decided in a single proceeding rather than in a series of complicated inter partes or ex partes
proceedings”).
559. See Schulze, 136 F.3d at 791, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
560. See id. at 788, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (noting the APJ’s statement concerning
refiling in his dismissal of the motion to correct inventorship).
561. See id. at 791, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (acknowledging that the APJ contributed to
the confusion by not clearly stating appellants’ obligation to correct inventorship inter partes).
562. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
563. 135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998);
see also infra Part VI.F (discussing the licensing aspects of Ethicon).
564. See id. at 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
565. See id. at 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546-47.
566. See Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 954 F. Supp. 51 (D. Conn. 1997), aff’d,
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U.S. Surgical became aware of an associate of Yoon’s, Mr. Choi, who
worked on portions of the patented trocars and claimed to have
contributed to the ‘773 invention.567 Mr. Choi had not been named
as an inventor, but had granted U.S. Surgical a “retroactive license” to
practice his “trocar related inventions.”568 U.S. Surgical then moved
to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256, claiming that Choi was
a co-inventor.569
U.S. Surgical next moved to dismiss the
infringement suit, and asserted that Choi, as a joint owner of the
patent, had granted U.S. Surgical a valid license under the patent.570
For a person to be considered a joint inventor, it is not necessary
for him to “make the same type or amount of contribution” to the
invention as the other inventor(s).571 A co-inventor does not need to
make a contribution to every claim; a contribution to one claim is
enough.572 Furthermore, each co-inventor needs only to perform a
part of the task producing the invention.573 One does not qualify as a
joint inventor, however, by merely assisting the actual inventor after
conception of the claimed invention.574 Finally, “one of ordinary skill
in the art who simply reduced the inventor’s idea to practice is not
necessarily a joint inventor.”575
Applying the above principles to the case, the district court
dismissed the suit because it found that Choi was in fact a joint
inventor of the ‘773 patent and that he had granted U.S. Surgical a
license to practice the entire invention disclosed in the ‘773 patent.576
The fact that Choi only had contributed to two of the fifty-five claims
disclosed in the ‘773 patent was irrelevant.577
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began by explaining that “[t]o show
135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998).
567. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
568. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
569. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
570. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
571. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994) (stating in part that “[i]nventors may apply for a patent
jointly even though . . . (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution . . .”).
572. See id. (providing that “[i]nventors may apply for a patent jointly even though . . .
(3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent”); see
also Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (stating that one can qualify as a coinventor by performing “only part of the task which produces the invention,” but one cannot
qualify by only offering assistance to the actual inventor following the conception of the
invention).
573. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 116
(1994)).
574. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (emphasizing that the critical factor is who
conceived the subject matter of the disputed claims).
575. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
576. See Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 954 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D. Conn. 1997).
577. See id. at 52-53 (citing the informal partnership agreement, among other reasons, in
reaching its conclusion that Choi contributed to the subject matter of two of the ‘773 claims).
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co-inventorship . . . an alleged co-inventor or co-inventors must prove
their contribution to the conception of the claims by clear and
convincing evidence.”578 An alleged co-inventor must also supply
evidence that corroborates his testimony, which the court evaluates
under a “rule of reason” standard.579
The court determined that Choi’s testimony, corroborated by
contemporaneous sketches he made of the trocars, proved his
contribution to at least certain portions of the asserted claims.580 For
example, with respect to claim 33, the Federal Circuit agreed that
Choi conceived of locating a blunt probe in a shaft and allowing it to
pass through an aperture in a blade surface.581 In addition, the
Federal Circuit agreed that the district court justifiably discounted
Yoon’s testimony because the record supported the conclusion that
Yoon altered and backdrafted documents to make it appear that he
independently invented the trocars.582 Thus, the court held that Choi
demonstrated that he was entitled to co-inventor status and thus was
entitled to grant U.S. Surgical a license to practice the invention.583
Of particular note in Ethicon was Judge Newman’s dissent. Judge
Newman disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that coinventorship of one claim entitles one to co-ownership of the patent
as a whole.584 In particular, Judge Newman determined that the 1984
amendments,585 which eased the requirements for naming inventors,
did not affect the more stringent law on ownership.586
I.

Inequitable Conduct

Any person conducting business before the PTO has a duty to
disclose to the PTO all information of which he or she is aware of

578. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
579. See id. at 1461, 1464, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548, 1551; see also Holmwood v.
Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238-39, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(defining the “rule or reason” analysis in the context of patent and trademark cases as
“requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to examine, analyze, and evaluate reasonably all
pertinent evidence when weighing the credibility of an inventor’s story”) (citations omitted).
580. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1464, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551 (declining to reevaluate the
district court’s conclusion that adequate corroboration existed to satisfy the “rule of reason”).
581. See id. at 1462, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (agreeing with the district court that
Choi’s testimony was more credible and affirming the finding that Choi conceived part of the
claim 33 invention).
582. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
583. See id. at 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551-52.
584. See id. at 1468-69, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555 (Newman, J., dissenting).
585. See The Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, title I, § 104(a), 98
Stat. 3384 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994)). This provision amended the first paragraph of
§ 116 by adding a sentence stating that inventors may apply jointly for a patent even though
each did not contribute to every claim of the patent. See id.
586. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
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that is material to the patent application process.587 Applicants also
have a duty to refrain from misrepresenting facts.588 A person
violating this duty is guilty of “inequitable conduct” which renders the
patent unenforceable.589 That is, a patent may be unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct if the applicant, with intent to deceive the
PTO, withheld or submitted false material information.590
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co.,591 the
Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decision that Goodyear
had not committed inequitable conduct.592 In Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the plaintiff alleged that Goodyear did not disclose, with the
intent to deceive the examiner, a prior tire design that was material.593
Although the trial court found that the prior art was material based
on Goodyear’s admission that the prior art tire was the market leader
and the inventor’s purpose was to design a tire to compete with it, the
court did not find evidence of an intent to deceive.594 Without
providing much reasoning, the Federal Circuit noted that trial courts
are in the best position to weigh evidence that involves credibility
determinations, and thus reviewing courts should afford substantial
deference to such decisions. Accordingly, because the Federal
Circuit was not presented with clear and convincing evidence of
intent to deceive the examiner, it affirmed the lower court’s finding
of no inequitable conduct.595
The Federal Circuit, in Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hercon
Laboratories Corp.,596 affirmed the enforceability of a patent owned by
Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc.597 Key’s patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,186,938
(“the ‘938 patent”), covered an adhesive nitroglycerin transdermal
patch for the treatment of coronary heart disease.598 The claim at
issue required that the patch deliver to the skin “a pharmaceutically
effective amount” of nitroglycerin over a twenty-four hour time

587. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1122,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1772 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that both materiality and intent to
deceive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).
591. 162 F.3d 1113, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
592. See id. at 1114, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
593. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
594. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (noting that the district court is in the best
position to make the materiality determination).
595. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
596. 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh’g denied, Nos. 98-1067, 981180, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1725 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 1999).
597. See id. at 711, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
598. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.

1380

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1319

interval.599 Hercon Laboratories, Corp. sought approval by the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for a generic version of Key’s
patent.600 As a result, Key sued Hercon, alleging that Hercon
infringed the ‘938 patent by submitting applications for its generic
version to the FDA for approval.601
Hercon argued, in response to the allegation of infringement, that
Key committed inequitable conduct when it submitted to the
examiner only the English translation of the abstract of a highly
pertinent Japanese patent application, rather than the English
translation of the complete patent application.602 The Japanese
abstract disclosed an adhesive transdermal patch with a solvent drug,
but did not mention any specific drug.603 Hercon argued that Key
committed inequitable conduct when it failed to submit the full
disclosure of the Japanese prior art, which did disclose nitroglycerin
as one suitable drug.604
The Federal Circuit605 first reiterated that the party alleging
inequitable conduct must prove the requisite elements of materiality
and intent by clear and convincing evidence.606 At trial, the court
found that Hercon failed to produce such evidence on either issue.607
On appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that although this was a
close case, the court must defer to the district court’s determination
because the intent issue depended heavily on the trial court’s
assessment of witness credibility.608 Thus, without deciding the
materiality issue, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
finding of no inequitable conduct.609
J.

Other Patentability Procedures

Aside from the general patentability requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 102, and 103, there are several patentability procedures that
can affect the scope and validity of a patent. The following section
focuses on three of these patentability procedures.
599. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
600. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
601. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
602. See id. at 712-13, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913-14.
603. See id. at 712, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913-14.
604. See id. at 712-13, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913-14.
605. See id. at 719, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (citing Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v.
Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1556-57, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1500 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), which held that materiality and intent must be analyzed in light of all the
circumstances of the case).
606. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
607. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
608. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
609. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
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1.

Reissue
The reissuance of a patent is a procedure available to patent
owners by which a patent that has already issued may be corrected for
errors made without deceptive intent.610 The error must be one that
causes the patent to be wholly or partly inoperative or invalid by
reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the
patentee claiming more or less than he is entitled to.611 A reissue is a
particularly powerful tool because it can be used to broaden the
claims of the patent so long as the application for reissue is made
within two years from the grant of the original patent.612
In Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp.,613 the Federal Circuit held that
invalidated claims which were narrower than the claims originally
contained in the original patent, but broader than the claims
remaining in the patent after a disclaimer,614 impermissibly enlarged
the scope of the claims. 615
After Vectra was issued U.S. Patent No. 4,089,972 (“the ‘972
patent”), Vectra submitted a disclaimer to the PTO to overcome
some previously unknown prior art.616 After the PTO received the
disclaimer, it mishandled the disclaimer and neither entered the
disclaimer on the wrapper617 nor published it in the Official Gazette.618
More than two years after the issuance of the patent, Vectra filed a
reissue application.619 The reissue application contained new claims,
which were narrower in scope than those originally contained in the
‘972 patent, but broader than the claims remaining in the patent
after the disclaimer.620 The Federal Circuit framed the issue as
whether a reissue application filed after the grant of the original
patent “is bounded by the claims originally contained in the patent or
by the claims remaining in the patent after a disclaimer is filed.”621
610. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. 162 F.3d 1379, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2051
(1999).
614. A disclaimer is a device by which a procedural patentee may disclaim or dedicate to the
public any part of a patent for any reason. A patentee may use a disclaimer to disclaim one or
more invalid claims in a patent to ensure the survival of the remaining claims. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 253.
615. See id. at 1380-81, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
616. See id. at 1381, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (explaining that the disclaimer canceled
eight claims contained in the ‘972 patent, thereby limiting its scope).
617. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
618. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (explaining that the PTO also neglected to
publish the disclaimer in the Official Gazette as PTO regulations require).
619. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
620. See id. at 1380, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
621. Id. at 1382, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145-46.
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Vectra argued that the mishandling of the disclaimer prevented it
from being recorded as required by 35 U.S.C. § 253.622 The Federal
Circuit rejected this argument and found that the statute did not
require any PTO action for a disclaimer to be considered
“recorded.”623 In addition, Vectra argued that that the phrase “claims
of the original patent”624 in the statute refers to the claims contained
in the patent when it is issued.625 Conversely, TNWK Corp. asserted
that Vectra modified the original patent when it submitted the
disclaimer, thereby excluding the disclaimed material.626 The Federal
Circuit agreed with TNWK’s argument and concluded that the
decision urged by Vectra would be contrary to both statutory law and
relevant case law.627 Thus, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant
of summary judgment and refused to allow Vectra to claim the
disclaimed subject matter to overcome potential prior art
rejections.628
In Hester Industries v. Stein, Inc.,629 the Federal Circuit addressed the
“error” and “original patent” requirements for reissue patents.630 The
decision in Hester Industries extends earlier Federal Circuit
jurisprudence with respect to what constitutes surrender of subject
matter for the purposes of the error/recapture rule of reissue
patents.631 The recapture rule prevents a patentee from regaining
through reissue subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to

622. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1994) (requiring that “[s]uch disclaimer shall be in writing, and
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office, and it shall thereafter be considered as part of
the original patent”); Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1382, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (detailing Vectra’s
position that the disclaimer should not be considered part of the original patent and that
because the PTO did not properly record the disclaimer the court should look to the broad
scope of the original patent, which would allow for the new claims).
623. See Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1382, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (stating that “the recording
of a disclaimer is not dependent upon actions taken by the PTO”).
624. 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1994).
625. See Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1382, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (discussing Vectra’s
contention that the statutory language should be interpreted as referring to the original patent
and not any disclaimers).
626. See id. at 1383, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
627. See id. at 1384, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 253 to state
that a disclaimer effectively eliminates the disclaimed language from the patent). The court
cited three cases to support its holding: Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1157,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass’ns, 484 U.S. 365 (1988);
and Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 492 (1935).
628. See Vectra, 162 F.3d at 1384, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
629. 142 F.3d 1472, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 372 (1998).
630. See 35 U.S.C. § 251, ¶ 1 (“whenever any patent is through error . . . deemed wholly or
partly . . . invalid, . . . Commissioner shall . . . reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in
the original patent”).
631. See Hester Indus., 142 F.3d at 1481, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (holding that a
surrender can be established based on arguments, whereas previously the court held that a
surrender could be established only with arguments and a claim amendment).
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obtain allowance of the original claims.632
At issue in Hester Industries were two reissue patents of the original
patent, U.S. Patent 4,582,047 (“the ‘047 patent”).633 The reissue
patents, like the original patent, pertained to high humidity steam
cookers with continuous running conveyor belts.634 The reissue
claims differed from the original patent in that they claimed a
different source of heat for cooking.635
During prosecution of the ‘047 patent, the creator continually
stressed two limitations of the claimed invention.636 These limitations
were that the cooker used only steam to cook and that there were two
sources of steam, one internal and the other external.637 After
significant argument with respect to an obviousness rejection, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences agreed with the applicant
that the limitations rendered the claimed invention non-obvious.
Accordingly, the ‘047 patent was issued.638
Two years later, Hester learned that Stein was developing
competing technology and applied for two reissue patents pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 251.639 Both reissue applications claimed that attorney
error had limited unnecessarily the scope of the claims in the ‘047
patent.640 Specifically, the reissue applications sought the removal of
the “cook solely with steam” and “two steam source” limitations.641
The applications were subsequently approved, and reissue patents
were granted without the two limitations.642 Subsequently, Hester
sued Stein for infringement.643
Stein moved for summary judgment on invalidity and alleged that
the two reissue patents failed to meet two statutory requirements.644
First, Stein claimed that the inclusion of the “solely with steam” and
“two sources of steam” language was deliberate and not the result of
632. See In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
633. See id. at 1474, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (describing the reissue patents).
634. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
635. See id. at 1474-76, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-44.
636. See id. at 1475, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-44 (noting the inventor’s assertions that
his product could be distinguished from prior art because of two limitations: (1) it functioned
“solely with steam,” and (2) used “two sources of steam”).
637. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
638. See id. at 1476, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (stating the Board’s conclusion that no
combination of prior art would suggest to one skilled in the art to combine the elements in the
manner claimed in the ‘047 patent).
639. See id. at 1477, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
640. See id. at 1476-77, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (noting the inventor’s argument that
his attorney did not “appreciate the full scope of his invention”).
641. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (explaining the inventor’s argument that the
original patent’s two limitations rendered it too narrow in scope).
642. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
643. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
644. See id. at 1478, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
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error.645 Second, Stein argued that Hester violated the “original
patent” requirement because the original patent did not contain an
objective intent to claim the invention sought in the reissue
applications.646 The district court agreed with Stein’s arguments and
found the reissue patents invalid.647
The Federal Circuit shared the lower court’s “discomfort” with the
inconsistent positions taken by Hester during prosecution of the
original and reissue patents.648 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit also
noted that none of its prior decisions addressed the issue of whether
an applicant could surrender subject matter during prosecution for
the purposes of recapture where claims had not been amended or
canceled.649 The court then held for the first time that surrender
could occur through arguments alone,650 and found this holding
consistent with the public policy underlying the recapture rule.651
In its application of the new recapture rule in Hester Industries, the
court observed that Hester made numerous arguments that the
“solely with steam” and “two sources of steam” limitations
distinguished the original claims from prior art.652 Because Hester
eliminated the claim limitations without narrowing the claims in
other ways, the Federal Circuit held that the reissue patents
recaptured previously surrendered material.653 Thus, the court held
that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and the claims
in the reissue patents were invalid as a matter of law.654
The Federal Circuit also briefly addressed the district court’s
645. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
646. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
647. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
648. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (“We share the district court’s discomfort with
[the inventor’s] attempt to remove, through reissue, the ‘solely with steam’ and ‘two sources of
steam’ limitations after having relied so heavily on those limitations to obtain allowance of the
original patent claims over the prior art.”).
649. See id. at 1481, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (noting that prior cases in this area
involved impermissible recapture of claim amendments or cancellations).
650. See id. at 1482, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (holding that the inventor effectively
surrendered a claim scope that would not be limited by the “solely with steam” or “two sources
of steam” phrases by repeatedly arguing that these limitations distinguished his invention from
prior art).
651. See id. at 1478, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 (explaining that the court’s holding is also
consistent with the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel). See infra Part V.D (discussing
prosecution history estoppel).
652. See id. at 1482, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (noting that the “solely with steam”
limitation appeared at least 27 times in the file wrapper, while the “two sources of steam”
limitation appeared at least 15 times).
653. See id. at 1483, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650 (acknowledging an exception to the
recapture rule by allowing patentee to find “scope of protection to which he is rightfully
entitled,” by broadening the claims in certain aspects and simultaneously narrowing other
aspects of the claim).
654. See id. at 1484, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
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decision with respect to the “original patent” clause.655 The lower
court examined the patent at issue for an objective intent to cover
ovens that utilize heat sources other than steam and that have less
then two steam sources.656 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit
rejected the lower court’s approach and explained that an earlier
decision657 disavowed an objective intent to claim requirement.658
Rather, the focus taken by the earlier decision was similar to that of
the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112: whether one
skilled in the art could identify the subject matter claimed in the
reissue application in the specification of the original application.659
Thus, the Federal Circuit found the district court’s determination on
the original patent issue erroneous, using the objective intent
approach.660
2.

Reexamination
Another post-patent issuance procedure is reexamination.661 In a
reexamination procedure, any person, including the patent owner,
may request reexamination by the PTO of any claim of a patent on
the basis of any prior art.662 The PTO will reexamine the issued
patent only if there is a new question of patentability based on the
prior art cited by the person requesting reexamination.663 However,
no proposed or amended new claim enlarging the scope of a claim of
the patent is permitted during a reexamination.664
In Anderson v. International Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc.,665 the
Federal Circuit held that the owners of a patent impermissibly
broadened the patent’s claims upon reexamination.666 At trial, the
district court focused on whether the owners materially enlarged one
claim during reexamination as compared with the original text of the

655. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
656. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
657. See In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 616, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the objective intent of patentees could not solely form the basis for denial of
reissue claims).
658. See Hester Indus., 142 F.3d at 1484, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (stating that “the Amos
court held that § 251 does not include a separate requirement of an objective intent to claim”).
659. See id. at 1485, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (stating that “the district court’s
conclusion that the ‘original patent’ clause of [35 U.S.C.] § 251 was not satisfied based on an
‘objective intent to claim’ requirement was an error”).
660. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
661. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (1994).
662. See id. § 302.
663. See id. § 301.
664. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
665. 160 F.3d 1345, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
666. See id. at 1346, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632.
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claim.667 The district court found the claim to be invalid because the
description of the stud, which included the phrase “with the tool
engaging said head surfaces,” was not included in the scope of the
original claim.668
Anderson, the owner of the patent, argued that the claim was not
broadened impermissibly upon reexamination.669 Instead, the owner
stated that the changes made in the reexamination claim clarified the
scope of the claim originally granted.670 In its decision, the Federal
Circuit first noted that, under the reexamination statute, the scope of
the patent claim cannot be enlarged.671 Furthermore, the court
observed that in previous decisions involving reexamination, the
court examined the claim as a whole, rather than simply the
differences in the wording of the claim, to determine whether the
owner impermissibly enlarged the claim.672 Upon examination of the
record, the Federal Circuit concluded that the original claims were
directed only to automatic disengagement.673 Thus, the original claim
was not generic to systems where the tool remains engaged until
manually disengaged as claimed by the patent owner.674 Because the
owner argued that the reexamined claims possessed this broader
meaning, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that the reexamined claims were invalid for failure to
comply with the reexamination statute by impermissibly broadening
the scope of the claim.675
In Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp.,676 the Federal Circuit reviewed a
determination that a patent owner’s reexamined claims and original
claims were identical in scope.677 Before addressing the facts of the
case, the court explained that if the reexamined claims of a patent
are deemed “identical” to the original claims, the owner of the
667. See id. at 1348, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633 (noting that the phrases “in a direction
away from” the tool and “with the tool engaging said head surfaces” had been added to the
original description of the “snowmobile stud” in claim one).
668. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
669. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633 (discussing the owner’s argument that the phrases
added to the claim were encompassed by the original claim).
670. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633.
671. See id. at 1349, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634 (discussing the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 305 which provides that “no proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim
of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding”).
672. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634 (citing Meritor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d
992, 996, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
673. See id. at 1350, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (concluding that “the original claim is
limited to systems wherein the stud head is automatically disengaged from the tool”).
674. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
675. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
676. 163 F.3d 1342, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
677. See id. at 1346-47, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03 (explaining that the lower court’s
decision would be reviewed without deference).
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reexamined patent may be awarded damages for the period between
the dates of issuance of the claims.678 The Federal Circuit further
stated that reexamined claims are “identical” if they are “without
substantive change.”679 To determine whether the claims are “without
substantive change,” the court considers whether the scope of the
claims is different, not whether the words used are different.680 If the
court finds that substantive changes were made, the patentee is
entitled only to infringement damages for the period following the
issuance of the reexamination certificate.681
In Laitram, NEC argued that the scope of the original claims was
substantively changed because a limitation was added to overcome a
prior art rejection.682 In addition, NEC argued that, in holding that
the limitation was implicitly contained in the original claims, the
district court improperly used the written description to read
limitations into the claims.683 Laitram argued, in response, that the
original claims, when viewed in light of the written description,
prosecution history, and language of the claims themselves, implicitly
contained the “type quality” limitation.684 The Federal Circuit agreed
with NEC, however, holding that the claims had been substantively
changed because the reissued claims and the original claims differed
substantively in scope.685 The court found very persuasive the fact that
the addition of the limitation resulted in the allowance of claims that
had been previously rejected.686 The Federal Circuit thus noted that
it would be very difficult to argue that the scope of a rejected claim
that was later allowed after amendment was not substantially
678. See id. at 1346, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307(b) (1994));
Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, Inc., 878 F.2d 1413, 1417, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
679. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1346, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
680. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202 (explaining that to determine whether the claims
are substantively different the court must examine their full scope).
681. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202-03; see also 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994) (defining a
reexamination certificate as a certificate published by the Commissioner when the time for
appeal has expired or any appeal proceeding has terminated, which cancels any claim of the
patent finally determined to be unpatentable, confirms any patent claim deemed patentable,
and incorporates any amended or new patentable claim into the patent).
682. See Laitram Corp., 163 F.3d at 1346, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203 (detailing NEC’s
position that the inclusion of the “type quality” description in the reexamined claims serves to
change the scope of the original claims substantively).
683. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203 (holding that the district court improperly read
the “type quality” limitation in the original claims, so that when the patent owner added this
limitation during reexamination, the claims were narrowed, which substantively changed their
scope).
684. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
685. See id. at 1348, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203 (holding that the addition of the “type
quality” limitation effectively narrowed the original claims, thus substantively changing the
claims).
686. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
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changed.687
3.

Fees
In order for a patent to issue, an applicant must, in addition to
paying a patent application fee, pay a patent issuance fee.688 The
failure to pay the proper amount due is grounds for holding a patent
invalid.689 Accordingly, practitioners are advised to stay current on
the ever-changing fee structure at the PTO. In particular, for reasons
detailed in the following section, a practitioner should be careful in
claiming “small entity status,”690 for the purpose of reducing the
required fees.
In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit in DH Technology,
Inc. v. Synergystex International, Inc.691 held that erroneously paid small
entity fees could be corrected provided they were not paid
fraudulently.692
In the process of purchasing a business, DH Technology acquired
U.S. Patent No. 5,115,493 (“the ‘493 patent”).693 When prosecuting
the patent, the original owner claimed small entity status and thus
paid reduced fees.694 Subsequently, DH Technology filed a patent
infringement suit against Synergystex alleging that Synergystex had
willfully infringed, contributorily infringed, or induced infringement
of the ‘493 patent.695 In defense, Synergystex alleged that “the patent
was invalid and unenforceable because DH Technology intentionally
deceived the PTO by paying a small entity fee”696 despite the fact DH
Technology did not qualify as a small entity.697 The district court
agreed with Synergystex’s argument.698 The district court reasoned
that it was too late to correct the error699 even if DH Technology paid
the small-entity fee in good faith.700 Thus, the district court granted
687. See id., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203.
688. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
689. See id.
690. A small entity is defined as an individual inventor, a small business having no more
than 500 employees, and nonprofit institutions and universities. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.9(c)(d)(e);
1.27(b)(c)(d).
691. 154 F.3d 1333, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
692. See id. at 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
693. See id. at 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
694. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
695. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67.
696. Id. at 1338, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
697. See id. at 1336, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
698. See id. at 1337-38, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69 (noting that DH Technology was not
eligible for small-entity status because the company had over 500 employees, and, therefore,
DH Technology’s payment of the lesser fee was not “unavoidable”).
699. See id. at 1338, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69.
700. See id. at 1338, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69.
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Synergystex’s motion for summary judgment.701
On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that correction of an
erroneous small-entity status payment is governed solely by 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.28(c).702 In addition, the Federal Circuit found that 35 U.S.C.
§ 151 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.317 do not apply703 to the erroneous payment
of a small-entity issue fee.704 Because only 37 C.F.R. § 1.28(c) is
applicable and it fails to limit the time during which such an error
may be corrected, the only limitation is that the error must have been
made in good faith.705 Thus, the Federal Circuit overturned the
district court’s determination that the ‘493 patent lapsed and
remanded the case with instructions that the district court determine
whether DH Technology acted in good faith.706
III. INFRINGEMENT
Infringement is the unauthorized making, use, sale or offer for sale
of any patented invention within the United States during the term of
the patent.707 Generally, determining infringement requires a twostep analysis. First the claim must be properly interpreted to
determine its scope and meaning.708 Second, the properly construed
claim must be compared to the accused product.709
A. Claim Construction
The interpretation and construction of patent claims is a matter of
law that is to be determined exclusively by the court.710
A
fundamental maxim in considering the language of claims is that
“words in a claim should be given their ordinary and accustomed

701. See id. at 1337-38, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69.
702. See id. at 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (holding that “this regulation is the sole
provision governing the time for correction of the erroneous payment of the issue fee as a small
entity”).
703. See id. at 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (finding no support for the application of
the provisions to the erroneous payment of the small entity issue fee).
704. See id. at 1341, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (explaining that the two inapplicable
provisions apply in situations where the delay in payment was unavoidable, but that in this case
DT Technology concedes that the delay was avoidable).
705. See id. at 1342-43, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873 (noting that where a company makes
an “honest mistake” in paying the small-entity fee the company will not be punished).
706. See id. at 1343, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
707. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
708. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1776, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1863, 1866 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
709. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
710. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
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meaning, unless it appears that the inventor used them differently.”711
Accordingly, if the ordinary meaning of the claim language is not
dispositive on the issue of claim construction, the claims should also
be interpreted in light of the patent’s specification, the patents
prosecution history, and other claims in the patent from the
perspective of one with ordinary skill of art.712 The prosecution
history limits the interpretation of the claims because claims cannot
be interpreted in a manner that was “disclaimed or disavowed during
the prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.”713 In this regard,
claims cannot be interpreted “one way in order to obtain their
allowance and in a different way against accused infringers.”714 Claims
must be given the same interpretation for purposes of both validity
and infringement.715
In Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,716 the Federal Circuit
examined the claim language, the written description, and the
prosecution history in an effort to evaluate the proper scope of the
claims at issue.717 In its evaluation of the claim language, the Federal
Circuit found that the language “call cost register” had two separate
and equal functions and that both functions were claimed explicitly
in Phonometric’s ‘463 patent at issue.718 The two functions were
described as: (1) providing the caller with “real time, accurate
information” about the cost of the call during the call, and
(2) reflecting the total cost of the call after the call. The most
important evidence considered by the Federal Circuit was the claim
language itself that called for the “substantially instantaneous” display
of information.719 Thus, the first function required by the claim was
established primarily by reference to the claim language. The
patentee, Phonometrics, conceded that the second function was

711. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 479
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
712. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 132930; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 157677, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
713. Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Standard Oil Co.
v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1985));
Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995).
714. Southwall Techs., 54 F.3d at 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
715. SmithKline Diagnostics, 857 F.2d at 882, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
716. 133 F.3d 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
717. See id. at 1464, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425 (citing Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
718. See id. at 1465-66, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
719. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
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implicit in the language of claim one.720 The Federal Circuit also
analyzed the written description and found that it supported the
construction obtained from the review of the claim language and that
when considered as a whole the patent was limited to a device that
displays the cost of long distance during the call and after the call.721
Once the Federal Circuit construed the claims, the court compared
the “accused devices” with the construed claims and held that the
accused products did not infringe the ‘463 patent because the
accused devices only performed one of the functions of the patented
device.722 Thus, the Federal Circuit found the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringers proper.723
The Federal Circuit also reviewed a grant of non-infringement
based on claim construction on summary judgment in Gentry Gallery,
Inc. v. Berkline Corp.724 The Federal Circuit held that the proper
construction of claims is based on the claim language, the written
description, the prosecution history, and, if necessary, extrinsic
evidence.725 Upon review of the interpretation of the terms “fixed”
and “console,” and in particular, reliance on the patent’s
specification, the Federal Circuit determined that Berkline’s accused
sofas did not meet both of the limitations of Gentry’s patent.726 In
this case, the Federal Circuit found it particularly compelling that the
specification only disclosed the console as a possible location of
certain controls.727 Thus, the accused device did not literally infringe
Gentry’s patent. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment on non-infringement grounds.728

720. See id. at 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
721. See id. at 1466, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427 (holding that although the claim itself did
not contain the phrase “in progress,” the district court correctly inferred that that function of
displaying the mounting cost of a call in progress was a part of the claim).
722. See id. at 1467, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
723. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429 (stating that there cannot be infringement as a
matter of law where the described functions of a patented device are not the same as those of
the accused device).
724. 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reh’g denied).
725. See id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (stating that the court must look to
extrinsic evidence only to enable it to construct the proper claim). The court adopted the
definition of extrinsic evidence used in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1461 (1996), which includes expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.
726. See Gallery, Inc., 134 F.3d at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (holding that although
the accused device met the “fixed” limitation, it did not have a “console” and was required to
result in an infringement on the patent).
727. See id. at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
728. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501 (affirming the district court’s judgment on the
infringement of the patent, but holding that the district court erred in finding that the patent
did not limit the location of the recliner controls).
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In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,729 the Federal Circuit also
considered the issue of the proper standard of review for a district
court’s claim construction.730 The Federal Circuit explained that
claim construction is a question of law for the court.731 The Federal
Circuit noted discrepancies in the standard of review that courts had
applied to claim constructions since its decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. (“Markman II”).732
Some courts had
employed a de novo standard of review while others used a clearly
erroneous standard.733 In an effort to resolve the confusion over the
proper standard of review, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected any
language in previous opinions that suggested the proper standard of
review for a district court’s claim construction was anything other
than de novo.734
In Key Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Hercon Laboratories Corp.,735 the Federal
Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction of Key’s U.S.
Patent No. 5,186,938 (“the ‘938 patent”). The lower court construed
the claims to mean a does capable of a patent with 2.5-15 mg of
nitroglycerin per day plus an excess to assure delivery of the desired
amount.
Despite the fact that the standard of review of claim construction
by the Federal Circuit is independent review,736 the court began with a
careful consideration of the district court’s analysis.737 The Federal
Circuit noted that when the district court construed the disputed
claim clause, it adopted Hercon’s claim construction based on
testimony of Hercon’s technical expert, Dr. Richard Guy.738 The trial
729. 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
730. See id. at 1451, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (concluding that claim construction is
subject to de novo appellate review).
731. See id. at 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (emphasizing that claim construction does
not involve questions of fact but questions of law).
732. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1329-31 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that claim construction is a legal determination to be made
by the judge).
733. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (noting the differing
standards of review that courts have employed).
734. See id. at 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (holding that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Markman II did not change the standard of review established in Markman I and
thus, claim construction can be reviewed de novo on appeal).
735. 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
736. See id. at 712, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (stating that the Federal Circuit previously
established the standard of review for claim constructions); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (reaffirming that
the Federal Circuit conducts independent review of claim construction on appeal).
737. See Key Pharm., 161 F.3d at 713, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (observing that appellate
courts “do not start from scratch” when hearing reviews but instead look to trial records for
guidance); Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1462, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (Plager, J., concurring)
(stating that the Federal Circuit benefits from the trial judge’s considered view).
738. See Key Pharm., 161 F.3d at 713, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
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court construed this clause to imply that Key’s adhesive transdermal
patch would provide a patient with an FDA conditionally approved
amount of nitroglycerin (2.5-15 mg per day) along with an additional
amount to ensure delivery of the drug.739 On appeal, however,
Hercon asserted that the trial court erred when it adopted this claim
construction.740
The Federal Circuit looked with “extreme disfavor” on Hercon’s
assertion,741 and stated: “[t]he impropriety of asserting a position
which the trial court adopts and then complaining about it on appeal
should be obvious on its face, and litigants hardly need warning not
to engage in such conduct.”742 The court, however, did not previously
issue an opinion that publicly condemned this behavior and Key did
not object to Hercon’s conduct.743 For these reasons, the Federal
Circuit reviewed the correctness of the district court’s claim
construction out of “an abundance of fairness.”744
Hercon’s primary objection to the claim construction was the
district court’s heavy reliance on extrinsic evidence, namely the
testimony of its own expert.745 The Federal Circuit noted that it
previously issued “strong cautionary statements on the proper use of
extrinsic evidence . . . which might be misread by some members of
the bar as restricting a trial court’s ability to hear such evidence.”746
The court stated, however, that it did not entertain any such
intention.747 Rather, the court emphasized that trial courts can hear
expert testimony as background and educational information on the
technology at issue.748 Nor did the Federal Circuit independently find
739. See Key Pharm., Inc. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 981 F. Supp. 299, 310 (D. Del. 1997), aff’d,
161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
740. See Key Pharm., 161 F.3d at 713, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
741. See id. at 715, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (stating that to allow a party to assert as
“error” a position it advocated at trial would lead to “mischief and judicial inefficiency”).
742. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. The court justified its refusal to entertain Hercon’s
appeal because of the company’s disingenuous conduct. At trial, Hercon’s expert witness (Dr.
Guy) testified as to the purported dosage of nitroglycerin (2.5-15 mg) Key’s patch would
provide a patient daily. The trial court accepted this testimony as the claim construction. On
appeal, however, Hercon sought to assert a lower dosage (1.5 mg) as the claims construction
and disavow their previous claim. As the appellate court found no reasonable justification for
this shift, it believed that the law barred Hercon from fundamentally changing its trial
argument. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
743. See id. at 715-16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
744. See id. at 716, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
745. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916-17.
746. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. The court referred to its decision in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in which the court
stated that review of intrinsic evidence alone “in most situations” is sufficient to resolve a
dispute surrounding a claim and reliance on extrinsic evidence would be improper. See id. at
1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
747. See Key Pharm., 161 F.3d at 716, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
748. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
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any such evidence. According to the court, “a trial court is quite
correct in hearing and relying on expert testimony on an ultimate
claim construction question in cases in which the intrinsic evidence
(i.e., the patent and its file history—the ‘patent record’) does not
answer the question.”749 The Federal Circuit, therefore, concluded
that it was entirely appropriate for the district court to use extrinsic
evidence in this case and that the use of the FDA’a data, in particular,
was “sensible.”750
Moreover, in the present case, neither Hercon nor Key identified
intrinsic evidence that established the numerical range of amounts
represented by the term “pharmaceutically effective amount.”751
In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. United States
International Trade Commission,752 the Federal Circuit reviewed an
interpretation of the claim limitation “digital detector for . . . .”753 In
an administrative proceeding, an ALJ construed this limitation as a
means-plus-function limitation, which he interpreted to be a
functional phrase that was not limited to a particular structure.754
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the applicability of ¶ 6
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to the claims at issue.755 The Federal Circuit noted
that ¶ 6 of § 112 restricts claim limitations drafted in functional
language to those disclosed structures that perform the claimed
function.756 The use of the word “means” in the claim language
creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 is applicable.757
Specifically, “the focus remains on whether the claim as properly
construed recites sufficiently definite structure to avoid the ambit of
[§] 112, [¶] 6.”758 Thus, in Personalized Media Communications, the
Federal Circuit determined that the “digital detector” limitation does
not use the word “means” and therefore, is presumed not to invoke
§ 112, ¶ 6.759 After much factual analysis, the Federal Circuit
749. Id. at 716, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1578).
750. See id. at 718, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (noting that such use allowed a trial judge
to determine the “pharmaceutically effective amount”).
751. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
752. 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
753. See id. at 700, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
754. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (holding that the claim must be construed in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6).
755. See id. at 703, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
756. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994)).
757. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (explaining that the presumption can be rebutted
with intrinsic or other relevant evidence).
758. Id. at 704, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887 (citing Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126
F.3d 1420, 1427-28, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
759. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887 (noting that “detector” has a specific definition
that prevents it from being a generic structural term).
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concluded “that the term ‘detector’ is a sufficiently definite structural
term” to preclude application of § 112, ¶ 6.760 Regardless of the
particular fact pattern at hand, however, the emphasis remains on
whether sufficient structure is disclosed in the claim to avoid
application of § 112, ¶ 6.
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,761 the Federal Circuit
interpreted the scope of a claim in a reissued patent that had been
amended during prosecution.762 Specifically, the patentee claimed
that the term “Kaufman-type ion beam guns” encompassed any
broad-beam, multi-apertured, gridded ion beam source.763 The
Federal Circuit reviewed statements made by the patentee during the
prosecution of the patent and focused upon specific written
statements by the patentee during the prosecution that would limit
the interpretation of the phrase to only ion beam guns composed of
the exact same components of a “kaufman-type” gun.764 Specifically
during prosecution, the patentee defined “ion beam source” to mean
only the Kaufman type.765
Because the patentee’s proposed
construction was inconsistent with the prosecution history of the
reissued patent, the court held that the term “ion beam source” in
the original claims could not be “properly construed to refer to
another ion beam gun,” other than the Kaufman gun.766
The central issue in Mantech Environmental Corp. v. Hudson
Environmental Services, Inc.767 was the claim construction of the term
“well.”768 In Mantech Environmental Corp., Mantech brought a suit for
patent infringement and other causes of action. The only issue on
appeal was the correctness of the claim construction.769 The trial
court held, based on intrinsic evidence, that a “well” was “a structure
which enabled both monitoring and injecting of groundwater.”770
The lower court reached this determination even after it heard
expert testimony that stated a well, as the term is commonly
760. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
761. 140 F.3d 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
762. See id. at 1453-54, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323-24.
763. See id. at 1453, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323 (explaining that a “Kaufman-type ion
beam source” is used to apply optical materials to a substrate that is then used in the
construction of ring-laser gyroscopes).
764. See id. at 1454, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (holding the definition of “Kaufman-type
ion beam source” to be any ion beam gun containing a hot-wire cathode, an anode, grids, and
magnets).
765. Id. at 1453, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
766. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
767. 152 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
768. See id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732.
769. See id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
770. Id. at 1369, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
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understood, is not required to perform both functions.771 In support
of its construction the district court stated that it relied only on the
patent, and consulted expert testimony for background information
only.772 On appeal, Mantech argued that the court erred in its
construction because the expert witnesses of both sides agreed upon
the common meaning of the term “well,” which Mantech argued
neither the claims nor the specification expressly modified.773
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction,
but not on the grounds urged by Mantech.774 First, the Federal
Circuit noted that when construing a claim, a court should primarily
consult the evidence intrinsic to the patent, including the claims,
written description, and any relevant prosecution history.775 The
Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court’s limitation of the claim
construction to the intrinsic evidence when a clear definition can be
ascertained from within the patent itself.776 Second, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that a court may rely on expert testimony for
the purpose of obtaining information on the technology without
having to accept the testimony for purposes of claim construction.777
It re-emphasized that extrinsic evidence in general, and expert
testimony in particular, may be used only to help the court come to
the proper understanding of the claims. Extrinsic evidence could not
be used to vary or contradict the claim language itself.778 Although
the Federal Circuit found that the lower court utilized the proper
analysis, it still held the result incorrect.779
The Federal Circuit noted that the lower court failed to properly
interpret the language of the claims themselves.780 In particular, the
Federal Circuit stated that the lower court erred by incorporating
from the preferred embodiment into the claims a narrow definition
771. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
772. See id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
773. See id. at 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737.
774. See id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (dismissing Mantech’s argument because
steps of claim must be performed in the order provided and not in any order or simultaneously
as Mantel argued).
775. See id. at 1371, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (citing Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
776. See id. at 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736-37.
777. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736-37.
778. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736-37.
779. See id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (overturning the lower court’s summary
judgment of noninfringement, and finding its claim construction too narrow).
780. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (explaining that the lower court “erred because
it . . . incorporated from the preferred embodiment into the claims a narrow definition for the
claim term ‘well,’ as a structure used both for monitoring and injecting groundwater”)
(emphasis in original). The written description and the claims as a whole, however, indicate
that “well” is a structure that can either monitor or inject, but it need not do both. See id., 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
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when the claim itself did not invite such a definition.781 In support of
this argument, the Federal Circuit relied on the following claim
language: “[i]t will be appreciated that a monitoring flow can be
withdrawn from the well, as can a treating or test flow be injected via
the well into the groundwater.”782 The Federal Circuit held that use
of the word “can” in the claim allowed for a well that could either
monitor, inject or do both.783 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
reversed the lower court’s ruling that the term “well” required the
presence of both activities simultaneously.784
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co.,785
Goodyear brought suit against Hercules for infringement of its
patent. Hercules counterclaimed that the patent was unenforceable
for inequitable conduct.786 The Federal Circuit court agreed with the
district court and held that, although the patent was not
unenforceable for inequitable conduct, the patent was not
infringed.787
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Goodyear argued that the district
court erred in its claim construction by limiting “tire” to only truck
tires.788 As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit noted that its
claim construction analysis announced in its Markman decision also
applied to construing design patent claims.789 Goodyear argued that
the meaning of the word “tire” should be defined as any type of
tire.790 The Federal Circuit agreed that the design patent was not
limited to truck tires because no such limitation existed either on the
face of the patent or from the prosecution history.791
In Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,792 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision holding the defendants liable for willful
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,198,904 (“the ‘904 patent”).793 The
Federal Circuit found that the jury’s finding was supported by
781. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
782. Id. at 1374, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738.
783. See id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738 (interpreting the written description and
the claims as having a more inclusive meaning than was given to it by the lower court).
784. See id. at 1376, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739-40.
785. 162 F.3d 1113, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
786. See id. at 1115, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
787. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
788. See id. at 1116, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
789. See id. at 1116, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
790. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
791. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778-79 (explaining that “deception concerning the
patented design is determined from the viewpoint of the person who is the ordinary purchaser
of the article charged to be an infringement”).
792. 156 F.3d 1182, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
793. See id. at 1183, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002 (affirming the district court’s holding of
willful infringement based on the substantial evidence present in the record).
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substantial evidence of willful infringement. Thus, the court upheld
the lower court’s denial of both Harris’s motion for a new trial and
motion for judgment as a matter of law.794
The patent at issue in Comark Communications, related to a common
amplification television transmission technique that combined video
and audio signals before amplification so that a single amplification
tube can amplify both the video and the audio signals.795 Prior art
single amplification techniques caused cross-modulation problems
that disrupted the audio signals.796 In contrast, the ‘904 patent taught
a circuit that cancelled the affects of cross-modulation.797 Comark
alleged that Harris’s aural carrier correction circuit infringed claims
one and fourteen of the ‘904 patent.798
The Federal Circuit analyzed the meaning of the claim element
“video delay circuit for receiving and delaying the video signal to
provide a delayed video signal.”799 Harris argued that the Federal
Circuit should read this element in light of the specification to
compensate for the delay introduced to the video signal by an IF
vision modulator.800 The Federal Circuit refused to limit the term
“video delay circuit” to its functional purpose,801 however, because the
specification should not trump the “clear and well-defined meaning”
of “video delay circuit.”802 The court also noted that if it adopted
Harris’s construction, it would violate the doctrine of claim
differentiation and render claim two superfluous and redundant of
claim one.803
In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,804 the court performed de
novo claim construction on patentee Digital’s U.S. Patent No.
4,933,976 (“the ‘976 patent”).805 The relevant technology concerned

794. See id. at 1193, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (affirming the lower court’s decision that
Harris willfully infringed the patent, and affirming the court’s decision not to grant Harris’
motions).
795. See id. at 1183-84, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
796. See id. at 1184, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002 (explaining the difficulties of the common
amplification technique).
797. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
798. See id. at 1186, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
799. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
800. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
801. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (explaining Harris’ argument that as disclosed in
the preferred embodiment, “video delay circuit” should be limited to its functional purpose).
802. See id. at 1187, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
803. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (stating that although there is not a “hard and fast
rule of construction” in claim differentiation, there is a “presumption that each claim in a
patent has a different scope”).
804. 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
805. See id. at 1343-44, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (stating that courts must construe
patent claims as a matter of law, not as a matter of fact).

1999]

1998 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1399

computerized fingerprinting systems.806 The district court interpreted
the claims to require a “data structure in memory capable of storing
digital data representing a two-dimensional array.”807 Specifically, the
district court found that the data had to be digital and stored in
memory.808 The district court then used this construction of the claim
to determine that the patent was not infringed upon.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first focused on the meaning of the
term “array.”809 The court found the application of “array” in the
context of claim 16 dispositive because it modified two forms of data
structure, namely slice data and a composite array.810 Judge Plager,
writing for the court, further observed that if any doubt remained
after consideration of the intrinsic evidence as to the exact meaning
of the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be
necessary to determine the proper construction. If a claim falls into
this latter category, however, another claim construction canon
comes into play. The court observed that, because a patent applicant
bears the burden of particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter of the invention under § 112, ¶ 2, “if the claim is
susceptible to a broader and a narrowing meaning, and the narrower
one is clearly supported by the intrinsic evidence while the broader
one raises questions of enablement under § 112, ¶ 2, we will adopt
the narrower of the two.”811 Thus, the court held that the claim
language supported the district court’s narrow claim construction.812
Furthermore, the court found that the patent’s written description
supported the lower court’s construction.813
The Federal Circuit summarily dismissed Digital’s argument that
the dictionary definition of “array” did not require the data to be
digital.814 The court found that the specification clearly distinguished
between analog “frames” and digital “arrays,” which made the
inconsistent dictionary definition of little import.815
The court also focused on the meaning of “slice data” when it
construed the claims at issue.816 Identix argued that the term “slice
806. See id. at 1337, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420 (stating that this technology uses
computer imaging to capture, store, and display fingerprint images).
807. Id. at 1343, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
808. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
809. See id. at 1345, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
810. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
811. Id. at 1344, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1424.
812. See id. at 1345, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
813. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425.
814. See id. at 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
815. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
816. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (stating that Indentix asserted that the proper
construction of “slice data” also supported the district court’s grant of summary judgment).
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data” is synonymous with “active area.”817 The court agreed with
Identix and identified two instances in the written description of the
invention where the two terms were used synonymously.818 Digital
attempted to support its proposed interpretation of “slice data” and
“active area” with references to other claims that also used the term
“active area,” thereby indicating that the term “active area” possessed
a meaning different from the meaning of “slice data.”819 The court
rejected Digital’s argument, and noted that words used in different
claims can have application elsewhere in the patent.820
The court also relied on the prosecution history (i.e. preliminary
amendments, amended claims, etc.) to strengthen its claim
construction of the patent.821 The court specifically pointed to an
amendment responding to an anticipation rejection under of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). Digital altered the claims to refer specifically to
“slice data.”822 Further, in an accompanying discussion of its claims,
Digital separately referred to “active area,”823 and Digital distinguished
a prior art reference by demonstrating that the reference did not
teach a system that identified “active portions” of a fingerprint image.
Digital asked the court to limit the remarks in its remarks to claims in
which “active area” explicitly appeared. The court declined to do so,
stating that the remarks were made without reference to a particular
claim. Instead, the court found that the remarks were made to
distinguish all of the pending claims that stood rejected over the
prior art reference.824 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that absent an
obvious qualifying remark, “arguments made to obtain the allowance
of one claim are relevant to interpreting other claims in the same
patent.”825
In Laitram Corp. v. Morehouse Industries,826 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of certain
817. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (comparing Identix’s argument to Digital’s
argument that the term “slice data” is more broadly defined than the term “active area”).
818. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
819. See id. at 1347, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (holding that Digital’s argument has no
force because none of the claims that contain the term “active area” depend on the claim in
question).
820. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (finding that “[j]ust because certain words are
used in different claims does not mean that those terms cannot have application elsewhere in
the patent”) (citing Tandom Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1024,
4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
821. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27 (looking to the prosecution history as definitive
statements made during the patent prosecution process).
822. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
823. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
824. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
825. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
826. 143 F.3d 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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claims of two of Laitram’s patents.827 Laitram owned U.S. Patents B1
4,934,518 (“the ‘518 patent”) and B1 4,886,158 (“the ‘158 patent”),
which both issued from the same parent application.828 The subject
matter of the patents was a “plastic ‘module’ connectable to other
like modules to form a conveyor belt.”829 Laitram brought a suit
claiming that KVP, which produced the “All-In-One” and “Fluid Flo”
modules, infringed various claims of the ‘518 and ‘158 patents.830
KVP moved for summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity
and the district court granted the defendant’s motion.831
The district court construed two claim limitations. First, the
district court construed “driving surface” as limiting the claim to
“angled, planar driving surfaces.”832 Second, the district court
interpreted “sprocket recess” as requiring “opposing transverse
elements, each of which contains a driving surface capable of mating
with the corresponding side of a single sprocket tooth.”833 Based on
this claim construction, the district court found summary judgment
of non-infringement appropriate because it was undisputed that the
defendant’s products contained curved driving surfaces and that “the
‘All-In-One’ module had only a single transverse element and
accordingly did not meet the ‘sprocket recess’ limitation.”834
At issue on appeal to the Federal Circuit were the claim limitations
“driving surface” and “sprocket recess.”835 The Federal Circuit
addressed Laitram’s asserted errors with respect to the district court’s
claim construction before it performed its own de novo claim
construction.836 The court rejected Laitram’s assertion that the
district court erred in its construction of the “driving surface”
limitation.837
First, Laitram insisted that the district court erroneously read the
limitations of the disclosed embodiments contained in the
specification into the claims.838 The Federal Circuit rejected this
827. See id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
828. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
829. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
830. See id. at 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (explaining that KVP was one of several
defendants sued by Laitram on the ‘518 and ‘158 patents).
831. See id. at 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
832. See id. at 1460, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612 (explaining the district court’s conclusion
that a “driving surface” limitation was limited to “angled, planar” driving surfaces as it was
distinguished in the patent application).
833. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
834. Id. at 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
835. See id. at 1462-63, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-15.
836. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
837. See id. at 1462, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (rejecting Laitram’s five arguments
regarding the construction of the “driving surface” limitation as unpersuasive).
838. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
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contention, noting that the district court used the written description
merely as a starting point for its claim interpretation and that this
approach is permissible under Federal Circuit precedent.839
Second, Laitram argued that the district court incorrectly relied
upon a statement made by Laitram during prosecution.840 In an
attempt to distinguish its invention from prior art that disclosed
curved driving surfaces, Laitram had stated that “the cylindrically
shaped wall of the drive link of the chain of Palmaer . . . does not and
could not provide the module of the instant invention having . . . a
driving surface . . . that extends downwardly toward the bottom
surface and in the direction of travel.”841 Laitram insisted that
because the examiner did not rely upon the statement in allowing the
claims, the statement should play no role in claim construction.842
The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the degree to which
an examiner relies on a statement made during prosecution is
irrelevant to its role in claim construction.843
Third, Laitram asserted that because the Palmaer patent and its
curved driving surfaces were cited as prior art during the prosecution
of the ‘158 patent, it mandated the conclusion that the curved
surfaces were covered by the claims.844 The Federal Circuit found that
the Palmaer patent was used as a basis of rejection unrelated to the
“driving surface” limitation at issue and therefore, was irrelevant.845
Fourth, Laitram argued that during the course of its requested
reexamination of the ‘158 patent, KVP admitted that its claims were
broad enough to include curved driving surfaces.846 The court
reminded Laitram that it is the statements of the applicant, and not
the reexamination requested, that “potentially shed light on the
construction of the claims.”847 Thus, the statements from a person
839. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
840. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (noting that Laitram made the statements with
specific reference to the ‘831 patent issued to Palmaer).
841. Id. at 1462, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14.
842. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
843. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (“The fact that an examiner placed no reliance
on an applicant’s statement distinguishing prior art does not mean that the statement is
inconsequential for the purposes of claim construction.”) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1438, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
844. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
845. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (stating that when “Palmaer was cited as a ground
for rejection of the claims, the examiner suggested to the applicant that his claims would be
allowed if they were limited to multiple driving surfaces across the width of the module”).
846. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (“KVP when requesting reexamination of the ‘158
patent, ‘admitted’ that the claims encompassed curved surfaces.”).
847. Id. at 1462-63, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (citing Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1587, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

1999]

1998 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1403

other than the patentee made during prosecution cannot be used to
limit the claims of the patent.848
Fifth, Laitram attempted to use the doctrine of claim
differentiation to argue that the asserted claims were not limited to
flat driving surfaces.849 Claim 85 of the ‘518 patent was specifically
limited to planar driving surfaces.850 Laitram asserted that this
warranted a finding that the other claims were not so limited.851 The
Federal Circuit found this argument unpersuasive, noting that the
doctrine of claim differentiation was limited by the caveat that “if a
claim will bear only one interpretation, similarity [with another
claim] will have to be tolerated.”852
After rejecting Laitman’s five principal arguments, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the claim limitation would “bear only one
interpretation: that the ‘driving surface’ is limited to flat driving
surfaces.”853 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on
the written description.854 The court noted that nothing in the
description suggested that the surfaces could be anything but flat,
citing those benefits as disclosed in the written description.855 The
court also relied on the prosecution history.856 In particular, it found
that statements made by Laitram, in an effort to distinguish its claims
from the Palmaer patent, compelled the conclusion that the “driving
surface” limitation excludes curved surfaces like that on the accused
devices.857
Laitram also argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it
interpreted the second claim limitation, “sprocket recess,”858 which
defined the claims as requiring “opposing transverse elements.”859
848. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
849. See id. at 1462, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (stating that Laitram’s final argument,
that claim differentiation warrants the conclusion that the asserted claims are not limited to flat
driving surfaces, was unpersuasive).
850. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (noting claim 85 of the ‘518 patent is limited to
flat driving surfaces).
851. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (explaining Laitram’s argument that the district
court erred in construing the patent’s written description to include only flat driving surfaces).
852. Id. at 1463, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Rexnird, Inc., 939
F.2d 1533, 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
853. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
854. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14 (construing the language of the patent’s
written description which states, “each of said driving surfaces extending downwardly . . . and in
direction of intended travel” to include only “angled, planar” driving surfaces).
855. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
856. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (stating that the prosecution history confirms the
fact that Laitram distinguished his invention from the respondent’s cylindrical walls).
857. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
858. See id. at 1463-64, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-15.
859. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (affirming the district court’s holding that the
“sprocket recess” limitation requires at least two opposing transverse elements capable of
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Laitram asserted that the claims required multiple transverse
elements.860 The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the district
court’s analysis.861 The court also cited portions of the written
description for additional support that the limitation required “two
opposing transverse elements capable of mating with a
corresponding sprocket tooth.”862 Accordingly, because the “All-InOne” module possessed a single transverse element it did not contain
“sprocket recesses” within the meaning of Laitram’s patent, thereby
precluding a finding of literal infringement.863
B. Literal Infringement
An accused device or process can infringe a claim either literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents. To establish literal infringement,
a plaintiff must show by preponderance of the evidence that every
limitation of the claim is literally met by the accused device or
process.864 Literal infringement requires that the accused device or
process contain each limitation of the claim exactly. Accordingly, any
deviation from the claim precludes a finding of literal
infringement.865
In Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,866 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a judgment of non-infringement and made a de novo
determination of the correct construction of the claims at issue.867
The claims in the ‘266 patent recited a packet that was a combination
of a degradable envelope, an absorbing material, and a treating
material.868 The district court determined that the meaning of
“degradable” in the ‘266 patent did not include the mode of
mating with corresponding sprocket tooth).
860. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (explaining Laitram’s argument that “the reason
the claims require multiple transverse elements is because the claimed module requires
multiple sprocket recesses across the width of the module, each requiring a single transverse
element”).
861. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (rejecting Laitram’s argument and agreeing with
district court’s conclusion that two opposing transverse elements were required to define the
sprocket recesses).
862. Id. at 1464, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
863. See id. at 1463, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
864. Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
865. Litton Systems, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1324.
866. 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
867. See id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. The Federal Circuit stated that:
[S]ince a full and complete understanding of the scope of the claims is requisite to
determining whether the patent is infringed, technical terms or words of art or special
usages in the claims, if in dispute, are construed or clarified by the court before the
construed claims are applied to the accused device.
Id.
868. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431 (discussing the key features of the patented device
and noting the distinctions between the patented and accused devices).
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operation of the Medzam packet, which functioned by bursting open
after expansion of the contents.869
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the specification and
the prosecution history and determined that “the meaning of
‘degradable’ in claims 1 and 6 . . . is limited to the
dissolution/degradation of the envelope as described in the
specification.”870 The court also construed several claims that did not
include the limitation “degradable,” but were written in “means-for”
format.871
The court explained that “[a] claim containing a
functional limitation written in means-for form is literally infringed
when the accused device performs the function stated in the claim, by
means of structure, material, or acts described in the specification or
equivalents thereof.”872 In determining literal infringement under
§ 112, ¶ 6, the court determined the meaning of the words used to
describe the claimed function.873 The district court found that the
function described in these claims did not embrace all envelopes that
release their contents upon contact with liquid.874 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court’s interpretation of the words
used in the claims was correct and dismissed Multiform’s argument
that the doctrine of claim differentiation875 requires claims eleven
through fifteen to be viewed as separate and distinct from claims one
and six.876
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc.,877 Hopkins charged
CellPro with infringement on two of its patents directed at relatively
pure suspensions of immature blood cells and monoclonal antibodies

869. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
870. Id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
871. See id. at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)
(noting a “means-for” format claim is infringed when “the accused device performs the
function stated in the claim, by means of structure, material, or acts described in the
specifications or equivalents thereof”).
872. Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
873. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 6 (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claims shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specifications and equivalents thereof.”).
874. See Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (reviewing the
district court’s interpretation of the function of the claims at issue).
875. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (stating that the doctrine of claim differentiation
“presumes that there is a difference in scope among the claims of a patent”) (citing Tandon
Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1017, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
876. See id. at 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (stating that the doctrine of claim
differentiation cannot be used to broaden claims beyond their correct scope).
877. 152 F.3d 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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used to produce such suspensions.878 CellPro appealed, claiming that
the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in
favor of Hopkins, as well as in excluding certain evidence relevant to
the obviousness issue.879 CellPro also challenged the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Hopkins on CellPro’s
enablement and written description defense and the court’s
upholding of the jury’s verdict of willful infringement and treble
damages.880
Finally, CellPro challenged the district court’s
repatriation order requiring the return to the United States, and
subsequent destruction of, certain vials of CellPro’s product.881
On the issue of infringement, the district court granted Hopkins’
motion for judgment as a matter of law in light of the jury’s verdict
finding all of the asserted claims invalid for obviousness and lack of
enablement.882 Furthermore, the district court found that none of
the asserted claims were infringed.883 The district court held that the
jury improperly constructed the term “substantially free” in the claim
at issue and that a proper construction would not only show that the
claims were valid, but would also establish CellPro’s infringement.884
The Federal Circuit upheld this decision by noting that the jury’s
initial construction would not have encompassed a single
embodiment in the written description.885 The Federal Circuit noted
that a claim construction that does not encompass a disclosed
embodiment is “rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly
persuasive evidentiary support.”886 Thus, the Federal Circuit agreed
that the term “substantially free” required no more than ten percent
of the substance sought to be excluded.887 Because it was undisputed
that the defendant’s product had not more than ten percent of the
excluded substance, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court
that the defendant literally infringed the patent.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,888 the Federal Circuit also upheld the
district court’s ruling that a design patent was not infringed.889 The
878. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
879. See id. at 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706-07.
880. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706-07.
881. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706-07.
882. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D. Del. 1996).
883. See id.
884. See CellPro, 152 F.3d at 1349, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
885. See id. at 1355, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714 (“A patent claim should be construed to
encompass at least one disclosed embodiment in the written description portion of the patent
specification.”).
886. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
887. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
888. 162 F.3d 1113, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
889. See id. at 1121, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (affirming the district court’s holding of
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court explained that infringement of a design patent is “the
unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of the article embodying the
patented design or any colorable imitation of the design.”890 The
Federal Circuit then explained that such infringement occurs when
there “is deception of an ordinary observer, when such person gives
the design the attention usually given by a purchaser of the item
bearing the patented design.”891 If an ordinary observer is deceived
into thinking that two designs are substantially the same, thereby
inducing such observer to purchase one supposing it to be the other,
the first design patented is infringed by the other.892 The measure of
similarity of two designs should not be from the viewpoint of experts
in design, rather it should be measured from the viewpoint of
ordinary, principal purchasers.893
The test for infringement of a design patent is two-pronged:
“(1) the designs must have the same general visual appearance, such
that the purchaser would be deceived into confusing the design of
the accused article with the patented design; and (2) the accused
design must also contain substantially the same points of novelty that
distinguished the patented design from prior art.”894 In this case, the
Federal Circuit found that there were several significant points of
novelty in the appellant’s design patent that did not appear in
Hercules’ tire.895 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that a
trucker, as an ordinary observer, would recognize that the two
designs were not colorably the same, thereby precluding
infringement.896
In Kahn v. General Motors Corp.,897 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
decision of non-infringement of two means-plus-function claims,898
non-infringement).
890. Id. at 1116-17, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
891. Id. at 1117, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
892. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769.
893. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769 (finding that the loss of an advantage in the
market, which the patent was given to secure, is the result of mislead purchasers and not
experts in design).
894. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770 (outlining the test for infringement of a design
patent).
895. See id. at 1121, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (determining that the district court did
not err “in finding, as the essential points of novelty of the ‘080 design, the very minor design
aspects of the narrow decoupling grooves of the shoulder ribs, the minute details of the square
block design, and the offsets on the shoulders”).
896. See id. at 1475, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (affirming the district court’s finding of
non-infringement).
897. 135 F.3d 1122, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 177 (1998).
898. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (1994). The code states that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, materials, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
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but reversed the lower court’s holding that the two claims were
invalid for obviousness.899 Kahn owned U.S. Patent No. 4,018,994
(“the ‘944 patent”), which addressed the problem of minimizing
distortion within an AM stereophonic receiver.900 Kahn sued GM for
allegedly infringing two means-plus-function claims of the ‘994
patent.901
The Federal Circuit first explained that “claims written in meansplus-function form are interpreted to cover the structure set forth in
the specification and its equivalents.”902 The claim limitation at issue
required a “means for deriving a distortion cancellation component
from the stereo sum signal component.”903 The Federal Circuit
identified the structure in the specification and drawings
corresponding to the claimed means to include an electronic
amplifier, summer, and frequency doublers.904
To establish literal infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate by
preponderance of the evidence905 that “every limitation in the claim is
met literally by the accused device.”906 Kahn argued that a feedback
circuit used in the GM receiver was equivalent to the disclosed
structure and therefore literally infringed.907 The feedback circuit
used in the GM receiver consisted of an envelope detector, a
comparitor, and an inverse modulator.908 The court also found
significant differences between this structure and the structure
disclosed in the ‘944 patent.909 For example, the court found that the
frequency doubler in the ‘944 patent had no equivalent counterpart
in the GM receiver to perform a similar function.910 It also found no
equivalent counterpart in the GM circuit to the summer in the ‘944
patent.911 In addition, the court found that the GM comparitor was
not equivalent to the disclosed amplifier, frequency doubler, summer
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
899. See Kahn, 135 F.3d at 1477, 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612, 1614 (finding that
there was no aspect of the invention described in appellant’s claim 53 that was obvious to
someone who has ordinary skill in the art).
900. See id. at 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
901. See id. at 1474, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
902. Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6).
903. Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (citations omitted).
904. See id. at 1476-77, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (basing its determination on the
parameters of the structure identified by Kahn).
905. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611 (citing Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730
F.2d 753, 758, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
906. Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citing Intellicall, Inc. v Phonometrics, Inc.,
952 F.2d 1384, 1388-89, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
907. See id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
908. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
909. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
910. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
911. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
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combination in the ‘944 specification because these “two circuits
utilize very different structures for very different purposes.”912 Thus,
because the “means for deriving a distortion cancellation component
from the stereo sum signal component” limitation was not met by the
accused device, the court held the two means-plus-function claims
were not literally infringed.913
In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,914 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that certain
products made by Identix did not infringe Digital’s U.S. Patent No.
4,933,976 (“the ‘976 patent”), either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Digital’s ‘976 patent was directed to a system (and method) for
capturing, storing, and displaying fingerprint images.
Unlike
conventional systems, which used paper and ink, Digital’s claims were
directed to a computer controlled imaging and retrieval system. By
digitally representing a fingerprint image, the claimed system could
automate fingerprint storage, retrieval, and most importantly,
searching.
After construing the relevant claims,915 the court next considered
whether the properly construed claims read on the accused devices.916
Digital asserted that two Identix devices infringed the ‘976 patent; the
focus on appeal was the TP-600. The court examined the TP-600 and
found that the data generated by the product’s imaging device was
not digital data, but rather analog.917 Furthermore, the court found
that the gernated data was not slice data, but was in fact a complete
image, because all of the image data in the TP-600 was merged
directly into the composite array instead of generating arrays of slice
data as required by the patent.918 Alternatively, Digital argued that
the TP-600 infringed because even if the court construed the term
“array” to require digital data, the TP-600’s A/D converter converted
the analog data to a digital form thereby meeting the requirements of
the claim. The court also disagreed with this analysis because the
term “array” also required that the “two dimensional image” be
produced, however, the converted signal in the TP-600 only

912. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
913. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
914. 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
915. See supra Part III.A (providing detailed discussion of the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction review).
916. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
917. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
918. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
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produced a single value.919 Thus, the accused device lacked two of the
limitations in Digital’s patent.920
C. Doctrine of Equivalents
As mentioned in the previous section, an accused device or process
can infringe a claim either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents allows infringement to be
found even if the accused device or process does not literally infringe
upon the express terms of a patent claim, as long as there is
“equivalence” between the elements of the accused device or process
and the claimed elements of the patented invention.921
In Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,922 Multiform argued
that even if there was no literal infringement, Medzam’s packet
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.923
A finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires a
determination that the accused device performs substantially the
same function, in the same way as the original device, to achieve the
same result.924 Multiform argued that the interchangeability of
Medzam’s envelopes and the patented envelopes favored a finding of
infringement.925 The Federal Circuit, however, found that the two
products would not have been recognized as interchangeable by one
reasonably skilled in the art.926 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the
district court’s finding of no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents was not clearly erroneous.927
In Dawn Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms Inc.,928 the Federal Circuit
reviewed the district court’s denial of Kentucky Farms’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law.929 The Federal Circuit reviews legal
standards given to a jury without deference, whereas a jury’s
resolution of factual disputes are reviewed to determine whether

919. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
920. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
921. Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1612
(Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
(determining if an equivalent exists by asking if the element of the accused device “plays a role
substantially different from the claimed element.”).
922. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
923. See id. at 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
924. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
925. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (discussing the role of interchangeability of
products in a doctrine of equivalents determination).
926. See id. at 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
927. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
928. 140 F.3d 1009, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
929. See id. at 1012-13, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111.
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there is substantial evidence to support its finding.930
Determining infringement is a two step process.931 First, the court
must construe the claims. Second, the construed claims must be
compared to the allegedly infringing device.932 In Dawn Equipment,
however, the Federal Circuit did not resolve the issue of claim
construction, but instead immediately proceeded to the second step
and applied the construed claim to the accused device.933
In Dawn Equipment, the Federal Circuit determined that the two
mechanisms were structurally dissimilar and therefore, operated
differently.934 In addition, the Federal Circuit found that the
mechanisms on both the patented and the accused devices did not
accomplish the same results.935 As a result, there was no infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.936 Thus, the Federal Circuit
determined that the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial
evidence,937 reversed the district court’s decision, and ordered
judgment for the defendant.938
In Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,939 the court
affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant, U.S.
Surgical, on the grounds that U.S. Surgical did not infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents. Ethicon possessed the ‘244 patent for a
lockout mechanism used in linear cutter staplers.940 These staplers
allow a surgeon to make an incision in tissue while stapling each side
of the incision to prevent excessive bleeding.941 The lockout
mechanism prevents the firing apparatus from being used after the
cartridge has been spent,942 thus, preventing a surgeon from using the
stapler unless an unused cartridge is inserted into the linear cutter
stapler.943
U.S. Surgical also possessed a patent, issued after Ethicon’s, for a
930. See id. at 1014, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
931. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
932. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112.
933. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112 (explaining that the claim construction was
sufficient to determine infringement, and not objected to by the parties, or found to contain
errors by the court).
934. See id. at 1016, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113.
935. See id. at 1017, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
936. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114 (concluding that no reasonable jury could have
found infringement).
937. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
938. See id. at 1018, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
939. 149 F.3d 1309, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
940. See id. at 1311, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273.
941. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273.
942. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273.
943. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273 (explaining that the objective of the lockout
mechanism is to prevent the apparatus in the stapler from firing after the cartridge has been
used).
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lockout mechanism for a linear cutter stapler.944 Both the district
court in Ethicon I945 and the Federal Circuit in Ethicon II946 determined
that U.S. Surgical’s device did not literally infringe claims six and
twenty-four of Ethicon’s patent.947 In Ethicon II, however, the Federal
Circuit remanded the case to the lower court to determine if U.S.
Surgical infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.948 On remand,
the district court determined that there was no infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, and granted summary judgment to U.S.
Surgical for both claims.949
The district court determined that U.S. Surgical did not infringe
claim six under the doctrine of equivalents because U.S. Surgical’s
lockout mechanism “differs substantially from the ‘connected to said
longitudinal slots’ limitation.”950 The district court relied on several
Federal Circuit opinions951 for its decision, explaining that “the
doctrine of equivalents is not a license to ignore claim limitations.”952
In other words, the court found that the claim limitations in effect
specifically excluded all other subject matter.953
Ethicon argued that the district court’s reliance on the abovementioned cases was misplaced because these cases were factually
distinguishable from the instant case.954 Specifically, Ethicon argued
that its claim did not address or directly exclude a lockout positioned
as is U.S. Surgical’s staplers.955 Ethicon also argued that all three cited
cases were inconsistent with Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A.,956 in which the “all elements” rule was not strictly applied
because the court found that a simultaneous substitution of two
reciprocal limitations met the established tests for equivalence.957
U.S. Surgical urged the Federal Circuit to affirm the district court’s
finding that its lockout’s structure was excluded specifically from the

944. See id. at 1313, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
945. 900 F. Supp. 172, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
946. 98 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
947. See id. at 1316-21, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276-80.
948. See id. at 1315, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
949. See id. at 1315, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
950. Id. at 1316, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
951. See Dolly v. Spaulding & Evenflo, 16 F.3d 394, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Wierner v. NEC Electronics, 102 F.3d 534, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
952. Ethicon, 149 F.3d at 1316, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
953. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
954. See id. at 1316, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
955. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
956. 868 F.2d 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
957. See Ethicon, 149 F.3d at 1319, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279; see also 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1277.
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coverage of Ethicon’s claim six.958
The Federal Circuit agreed with Ethicon that U.S. Surgical’s
arguments “would force the All Elements rule to swallow the doctrine
of equivalents, reducing the application of the doctrine to nothing
more than a repeated analysis of literal infringement.”959 The
doctrine of equivalents, by necessity, contemplates subject matter that
is not included in the literal scope of a claim.960 “Such subject matter
is not necessarily ‘specifically excluded’ from coverage under the
doctrine unless its inclusion is somehow inconsistent with the
language of the claim.”961 The Federal Circuit then explained its
factually-based decisions in Dolly, Wiener, and Sage, and expressed the
following: “on the facts presented, no reasonable finder of fact could
have found infringement by equivalents because the differences
between the allegedly infringing devices and the claimed inventions
were plainly not insubstantial.”962 The Federal Circuit, finding that
Corning Glass Works was consistent with the district court’s decision,
explained that “[a]s with all infringement questions, it was decided
on its facts.”963
The Federal Circuit applied, as the appropriate law of the case, the
claim construction previously used when the parties were before it in
Ethicon II. The Federal Circuit noted that U.S. Surgical’s lockout was
not even close to the longitudinal slots as required by claim six.964
Similarly, claim six’s “in a staple cartridge” limitation was not met by
an equivalent.965 The court found that no reasonable jury could have
found that the difference between the location of the U.S. lockout
and the location of the claimed lockout was insubstantial. Thus, U.S.
Surgical did not infringe claim six under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,966 the Federal Circuit
addressed the “all-elements” or “all-limitations” rule enunciated in
Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.967 The Federal Circuit
958. See id. at 1317, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
959. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
960. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
961. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
962. Id. at 1318, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
963. Id. at 1319, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
964. See Ethicon, 149 F.3d at 1319, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279 (undercutting Ethicon’s
argument that mere disconnect between lockout and longitudinal device was insufficient to
conclude non-infringement).
965. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279 (acknowledging that U.S. Surgical’s lockout is not
positioned anywhere near the cartridge).
966. 140 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
967. See id. at 1474, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (articulating the Supreme Court’s
clarification of the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17 (1997)).
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recognized the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate in Warner-Jenkinson
that the doctrine of equivalents be applied to individual elements of
the claim and not to the invention as a whole.968 Accordingly, courts
should analyze the role played by each element in the context of the
specific patent claim where the focus is on whether a substitute
element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element
and not the entire invention as a whole.969 The Federal Circuit found
that the lower court properly performed the all-elements analysis as
stated in Warner-Jenkinson and, therefore, re-affirmed the lower
court’s decision.970
Of significance in Hughes Aircraft is the Federal Circuit’s reliance
on the “doctrine of later-developed technology.”971 Under this
doctrine, the significance of a claim’s limitation is lessened where a
subsequent change in the state of the art creates a modern day
equivalent to the limitation.972 The Federal Circuit noted that
although the element at issue in the accused device performed the
same function and achieved the same result in a different way, the
difference in the way was obfuscated by the “doctrine of later
developed technology.”973 Thus, while the accused device may not
contain an element or limitation found in the patent claim, the
accused device still can be found to infringe if it contains an
equivalent element, which is unknown at the time of the invention,
that substantially achieves the same result and performs the same
function.974
In Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International, Inc.,975 the
plaintiff accused the defendant’s automatic locking differential of
infringing upon its patent.976 The Federal Circuit proceeded to
perform a two-step infringement analysis, which construed the scope
of the claims and then compared the properly construed claims to
the accused device.977 The plaintiff conceded that there was no literal
968. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (declaring that each element of a patent claim is
material to the definition of scope of patented invention).
969. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
970. See id. at 1475, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (determining that the lower court
correctly concluded that the elements equivalently met claim limitations).
971. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289 (noting that equivalency evaluation should occur
at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent is issued).
972. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
973. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
974. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289 (applying the doctrine of later-developed
technology to equivalency analysis).
975. 141 F.3d 1084, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
976. See id. at 1087, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
977. See id. at 1088, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260 (demonstrating the determination of
whether all limitations are present).
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infringement because the accused device lacked a concentric spring
assembly limitation.
The plaintiff argued, however, that the
defendant’s spring and plug assembly was a system equivalent to the
patent’s concentric spring system.978 Therefore, the issue facing the
Federal Circuit was whether under the doctrine of equivalents the
defendant’s product was a substantial equivalent to the plaintiff’s
invention.979
In performing its doctrine of equivalents analysis, the Federal
Circuit noted that “[e]ach element contained in a patent claim is
deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention,
and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual
elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.”980
Accordingly, the court first focused on the claim limitation that was
literally absent from the accused device. The court then proceeded
to interpret the scope of the limitation by reviewing the “role” played
by the claim limitation. The court noted that if the accused device
could not play that “role” it could not be found to infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents.981
The court focused on the claim language and the explanation of
such claim found in the written description of the patent.982 The
court noted that the patent’s written description repeatedly
emphasized a particular benefit of the limitation at issue.983 The
particular benefit was the ability of the limitation to serve as a back-up
or redundancy to another part.984 The court then analyzed the
accused device to determine if it could perform this back-up role and
found that it could not.985 The court found that the written
description identified and clarified a function of an element in the
claim that was not addressed by the district court when it found the
patentee had a reasonable likelihood of success in establishing
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.986 Thus, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court’s finding was wrong because
it was based on an error concerning the functions performed by a

978. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
979. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
980. Id. at 1089, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)).
981. See id. at 1090, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
982. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (investigating the patent’s written description to
determine the applicability of limitations).
983. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (establishing that the written description clearly
discusses a function not addressed previously by the district court).
984. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
985. See id. at 1091, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
986. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
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claim limitation, and “it thus misapprehended the possible range of
equivalents available to the patentee.”987
In a sharp dissent, Judge Newman criticized the court for imposing
a new rule of law that “bars liability for infringement by an equivalent
device if the equivalent does not possess the unclaimed advantages or
functions described in the specification.”988 The dissent concluded
that this identical-function rule directly contradicted the established
rule of claim construction, which bars the importing of limitations
into the claims from the specification.989
In Insituform Technologies Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc.,990 defendant
appealed from the district court’s holding that it infringed U.S.
Patent No. 4,336,012 (“the ‘012 patent”) owned by plaintiff
Insituform Technologies under the doctrine of equivalents.991 The
Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part this portion of
the district court’s decision. The court agreed that defendant’s
Process 1 infringed while it reversed and found that defendant’s
Process 2 did not infringe the ‘012 patent.992
The ‘012 patent covers a process for lining pipelines and
passageways in a way that they could be repaired without removing
them from the ground.993 The claimed inventive process involves
inserting a flexible liner, including an impermeable plastic layer and
a felt layer impregnated with a thermosetting resin, in a pipe with the
impregnated felt layer positioned between the inner wall of the pipe
and the impermeable plastic layer.994 The defendants used two
processes for impregnating a liner with resin: (1) the “multiple cup
process,” which used four to six cups to draw the vacuum; and (2) the
“multiple needle process,” which used metal tubes or needles
inserted through the wall of the liner.995 The ‘012 patent further
directed the application of a vacuum to the inside of the liner by
attaching a cup to the liner and the other end of the cup to a vacuum
source.996
The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s analysis of

987. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
988. Id. at 1093, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
989. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264 (criticizing the majority for limiting the factfinders’ abilities).
990. 161 F.3d 688, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254 (1999).
991. See id. at 689, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
992. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
993. See id. at 689-90, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
994. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
995. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
996. See id. at 692, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.997 In deciding
whether infringement occurred, the court compared the accused
products or processes to determine the similarity between their
functions, ways, or results.998 The court found no clear error in the
district court’s analysis of the multiple cup process and dismissed as
irrelevant the defendant’s argument that its multiple cup method was
more efficient.999
The Federal Circuit did find clear error, however, with the lower
court’s ruling that the multiple needle method infringed the ‘012
patent.1000 The court held that the district court’s examination, based
on the function-way-result analysis, involved too much overlapping
and was unduly broad.1001 The court also noted that the ‘012 patent
inventor had tried using a needle instead of a cup while developing
the claimed method, but the application made no mention of using a
needle.1002 From this, the court inferred that the inventor was unable
to practice the claimed method using a needle.1003
In Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,1004 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision finding Harris liable for willful
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,198,904 (“the ‘904 patent”).1005
The Federal Circuit found substantial evidence to support the jury’s
finding of willful infringement and upheld the lower court’s denial of
both Harris’s motion for a new trial and motion for JMOL.1006
The ‘904 patent related to a common amplification television
transmission technique that combined video and audio signals before
amplification. This process allowed a single amplification tube to
amplify both the video and the audio signals. Prior art single
amplification techniques caused cross-modulation problems that
disrupt the audio signals.1007 Comark’s ‘904 patent, however, taught a
circuit that cancelled the effects of cross-modulation.1008 Plaintiff
Comark alleged that Harris’s aural carrier correction circuit
infringed claims one and fourteen of the ‘904 patent.1009
997. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
998. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
999. See id. at 692-93, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14 (asserting that more efficient does
not mean substantial difference).
1000. See id. at 694, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1001. See id. at 693, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1002. See id. at 694, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1003. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1004. 156 F.3d 1182, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1005. See id. at 1182, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1006. See id. at 1186, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1007. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1008. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03.
1009. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
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The Federal Circuit rejected Harris’s contention that insufficient
evidence existed on the record to support a jury finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc.,1010
the Federal Circuit examined the interplay between the equivalency
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and the doctrine of equivalents.1011
Significantly, the court noted the similarities between the two
analyses but discovered a key difference between the chronological
foci of the two doctrines.1012
Chiuminatta’s U.S. Patent No. 5,056,499 (“the ‘499 patent”)
claimed an apparatus for cutting concrete prior to it reaching a final,
hardened stage.1013 Chiuminatta sued Cardinal for infringement of its
‘499 patent by marketing a similar concrete cutting tool.1014 The
district court granted Chiuminatta’s summary judgment motion for
literal infringement and Cardinal subsequently appealed.1015 The
Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment order, finding that
the district court’s conclusions were based on an erroneous claim
construction of a means-plus-function limitation.1016
The decision is more interesting in this regard for its discussion of
Chiuminatta’s alternative argument in support of the district court’s
summary judgment ruling. Chiuminatta argued that the lower
court’s finding of literal infringement could still be affirmed under
the doctrine of equivalents.1017
Chiuminatta pointed to the
“undisputed evidence,” which established that “the wheels of the
accused device differ from the patented invention only
insubstantially.”1018 The court disagreed, stating that its analysis of the
devices in the context of the means-plus-function limitation
precluded a finding of equivalence.1019
The Federal Circuit noted that although an “equivalence analysis
under section 112, paragraph 6, and the doctrine of equivalents are
not coextensive . . . and have different origins and purposes, their
tests for equivalence are closely related.”1020 Both tests protect “the

1010. 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1011. See id. at 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1012. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758 (declaring that only the doctrine of equivalents
adapts to technological advances).
1013. See id. at 1305, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
1014. See id. at 1306-07, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1754-55.
1015. See id. at 1307, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
1016. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
1017. See id. at 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1018. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1019. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
1020. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
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substance of a patentee’s right to exclude by preventing mere
colorable differences or slight improvements from escaping
infringement . . . [and] do so by applying similar analyses of
insubstantiality of the differences.”1021 Thus, the court found that, “a
finding of a lack of literal infringement for lack of equivalent
structure under a means-plus-function limitation may preclude a
finding of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents.”1022
The court stressed, however, that the key difference between the
two tests related to the timing of the variance in the invention.1023
The doctrine of equivalents protects against insubstantial
technological advances developed after the patent of the invention
that could not have been disclosed in the patent.1024 If such “an
element is found . . . not equivalent to the structure disclosed in the
patent, this analysis should not foreclose it from being an equivalent
under the doctrine of equivalents.”1025
The Federal Circuit concluded, however, that this was not the
situation at bar, because the technology predated the invention.1026
The court held that “a finding of non-equivalence for § 112, ¶ 6
purposes should preclude a contrary finding under the doctrine of
equivalents.”1027 The court based its holding on the theory that the
patentee could have disclosed the technology in the patent and
therefore, should not be permitted “two bites at the apple.”1028 Thus,
because the wheels on the Cardinal apparatus substantially differed
from the skid plate under § 112, ¶ 6, the court was precluded from
finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.1029
In Laitram Corp. v. Morehouse Industries, Inc.,1030 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.1031 At issue were
Laitram’s U.S. Patent Nos. B1 4,934,518 and B1 4,886,158, covering
technology related to conveyor belts.1032 Laitram’s argued that the
district court erroneously granted summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The court focused

1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.

Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
See id. at 1311, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
143 F.3d 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609.
See id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
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on two critical claim limitations in rejecting Laitram’s argument.
With regard to the first or “driving surface” limitation, the court
found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents precluded by
statements made during prosecution. During prosecution, Laitram
used the “driving surface” limitation to distinguish the invention
from those with cylindrical shaped driving surfaces.1033
The court also rejected Laitram’s argument with respect to the
second limitation, “sprocket recess.”1034 The single bar employed by
the accused device created a module that moved only in one
direction, whereas Laitram’s claimed device was capable of moving in
two directions.1035 The court concluded that such a manifest
difference prevented a “reasonable fact finder” from determining
that the differences were insubstantial.1036
The Federal Circuit clarified its holding in Maxwell v. J. Baker,
Inc.1037 with regards to the doctrine of equivalents when it reviewed an
International Trade Commission (“ITC”) decision in YBM Magnex v.
United States International Trade Commission.1038 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit refused to validate the ITC’s expansive reading of its
statement in Maxwell that “subject matter disclosed but not claimed in
the a patent application is dedicated to the public.”1039
YBM Magnex’s U.S. Patent No. 4,588,439 (“the ‘439 patent”)
claimed permanent magnet alloy compositions consisting of varying
oxygen contents for increased stability in warm and humid
conditions.1040 Claim 1 expressly required that the oxygen level of the
alloy fall between “6,000 to 35,000 ppm.”1041 YBM asserted that several
companies infringed the ‘439 patent when they imported certain
magnets.1042 Three of the companies entered into a Consent Order
and agreed to cease the importation and marketing of magnets that
infringed Claims 1 through 3 of the ‘439 patent.1043 The ALJ hearing
the dispute ultimately found infringement under literal infringement

1033. See id. at 1463, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1034. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1035. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1036. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1037. 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.P.S.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1115
(1997).
1038. 145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1039. See id. at 1319, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (quoting Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006).
1040. See id. at 1318, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
1041. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
1042. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (asserting literal infringement and doctrine of
equivalents infringement).
1043. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
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and the doctrine of equivalents.1044 Specifically, the ALJ “found that
the magnet alloys having an oxygen content between 5,450 ppm and
6,000 ppm infringed under the doctrine.”1045
YBM subsequently filed an enforcement complaint asserting that
the three companies subject to the Consent Order continued to
import products that infringed upon the ‘439 patent.1046 The accused
companies asserted that the Federal Circuit’s holding in Maxwell
precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the ‘439
patent.1047 Specifically, the three companies argued that the oxygen
content relied upon by the ALJ in defining an infringing product was
disclosed but not claimed in the patent.1048 Under the court’s
rationale in Maxwell, this range of oxygen content was dedicated to
the public and cannot be asserted by the patentee under an
equivalency theory.1049
The ALJ ruled that Maxwell did not prevent, as a matter of law, the
application of the doctrine of equivalents using the oxygen content
range. The ALJ found that Maxwell was fact specific and needed to
be read in conjunction with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
precedent.1050 This precedent indicated that subject matter not
claimed but disclosed could be the basis for a finding of
equivalency.1051 Thus, the ALJ held that the three accused companies
had violated the Consent Order.
The ITC rejected the ALJ’s interpretation of Maxwell. The ITC
found that Maxwell had “established a new rule of law, and that the
doctrine of equivalents can no longer be applied to reach subject
matter that is disclosed in the patent but not claimed.”1052
Accordingly, the ITC ruled that magnet alloys below 6,000 ppm could
not infringe the ‘439 patent and that the Consent Order did not
prevent the importation of such magnets.1053 YBM then appealed the
ITC’s interpretation of Maxwell to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s decision. The
court stressed that Maxwell must be read in light “of precedent and its

1044. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
1045. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
1046. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1047. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (attempting to persuade the court that magnets
are now a public matter).
1048. See id. at 1319, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1049. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1050. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1051. See id. at 1319, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1052. Id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1053. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
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context.”1054 Importantly, the ITC’s interpretation would place
Maxwell “into conflict with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
precedent.”1055
The Federal Circuit specifically discussed the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.1056 and
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.1057 The
court found that these decisions “[do] not permit the blanket rule
that everything disclosed but not claimed is barred from access to the
doctrine of equivalents, whatever the facts, circumstances, and
evidence.”1058
For example, the Supreme Court in Graver Tank validated a finding
of equivalence based on disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.1059
Notably, it did so despite the specific objections raised in dissent that
disclosed but unclaimed matter was dedicated to the public.1060
Further, the court’s acknowledgement in Warner-Jenkinson that
equivalents are not limited to disclosed materials implicitly recognizes
that the equivalents may be disclosed.1061
The Federal Circuit also detailed how the Commission’s reading of
Maxwell conflicted with its own precedent. The court cited several
cases that reviewed disclosed subject matter for equivalency.1062 In
addition, the court noted cases1063 similar to Maxwell that deemed
unclaimed subject matter as abandoned.1064 Accordingly, the court
held that Maxwell did not change the fundamental principles of the
doctrine of equivalents.1065 These decisions illustrate the principle
that the doctrine of equivalents criteria must be applied to the
specific facts of the case, thereby producing individualized results.1066
In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc.,1067 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that certain
1054. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1055. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1056. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
1057. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
1058. YBM, 145 F.3d at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1059. See id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1060. See id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1061. See id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1062. See id. at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (providing prior decisions addressing
“examples of subject matter that was included in the body of the specification but not in the
claims, and that was considered for equivalency on the particular facts, with varying results as
the evidence warranted”).
1063. See Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1881); Unique Concepts, Inc. v Brown,
939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1064. See YBM, 145 F.3d at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
1065. See id. at 1322, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1066. See id. at 1322, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1067. 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418.
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products made by Identix did not infringe Digital’s U.S. Patent No.
4,933,976 (“the ‘976 patent”), either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Digital’s ‘976 patent was directed to a system (and method) for
capturing, storing, and displaying fingerprint images.
Unlike
conventional systems, which used paper and ink, Digital’s claims were
directed to a computer controlled imaging and retrieval system. By
digitally representing a fingerprint image, the claimed system could
automate fingerprint storage, retrieval, and most importantly,
searching.
Having construed the claims, the court next considered whether
the properly construed claims read on the accused devices.1068 After
finding no literal infringement,1069 the court proceeded to compare
the accused products and the claims of the patent at issue under the
doctrine of equivalents.1070
Digital’s accused two devices of
infringement, Identix’s TP-600 and TP-900, however, on appeal the
focus was on the TP-600.
Judge Plager emphasized that the “touchstone for determining
whether an element in an accused device if equivalent to a claimed
limitation is the substantiality of their differences.”1071 Thus, in order
for there to be infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, “the
element must differ only unsubstantially from the asserted claim
limitation.”1072 Applying these principles, the court found that the TP600 was too different from the patented invention primarily because,
unlike the patented invention that required each digital data value
produced to be accumulated and then stored in memory, the data
value produced in the TP-600 was temporarily held in a register while
that value was processed.1073 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the
accused devices did not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.1074
D. Willful Infringement
A potential infringer with actual notice of existing patents has an
affirmative duty of care to avoid infringement.1075 Failure to exercise
due care can result in a finding of willful infringement and increased
1068. See id. at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
1069. For a full discussion of the court’s literal infringement analysis, see infra Part III.B.
1070. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1349, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1071. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1072. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1073. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1074. See id. at 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1075. See Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
185, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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damages.1076 In assessing willfulness, a court must examine all the
evidence and circumstances before it.1077 A common issue in this
regard is the attorney opinion of non-infringement or patent
invalidity often obtained by the infringer.
In Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., the Federal Circuit
examined the interplay between attorney opinions and willful
infringement.1078
CellPro and Hopkins both employed similar
processes relating to the separation of stem cells from mature blood
cells.1079 Hopkins received its ‘680 and ‘204 patents covering such
processes in 1987 and 1990 respectively.1080 CellPro began using its
process after the ‘680 and ‘204 patents issued and was aware of their
existence.1081
Accordingly, CellPro engaged outside counsel to perform an
opinion regarding the validity of the Hopkins patents. The opinions
concluded that both patents were invalid and unenforceable and that
CellPro’s process was non-infringing.1082
At trial, the district court found that CellPro had infringed
Hopkins’ patents.1083 The jury subsequently found that infringement
willful and Hopkins moved for enhanced damages pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 284, ¶ 2.1084 In granting the damages, the court concluded
that CellPro’s validity opinions were “obviously deficient,”
incompetent, and belated.1085
On appeal, CellPro argued that the district court erred in failing to
grant its renewed JMOL on willfulness.1086 It argued that upon
consideration of its validity opinions no jury could have concluded
that its infringement was willful.1087
The Federal Circuit disagreed. It noted that once a defendant
obtains notice of a patent, it has a duty to exercise due care and
determine whether it is infringing that patent.1088 The Federal
Circuit, however, reaffirmed that for an opinion to insulate a
defendant from a finding of willfulness, the opinion must be

1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.

See id., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 191.
See id. at 1110, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 192.
152 F.3d 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
See id. at 1352, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
See id. at 1363, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
See id. at 1364, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
See id. at 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
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competent.1089 An opinion is competent if “it is thorough enough, as
combined with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a
court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or
unenforceable.”1090
The Federal Circuit held that the obtained opinion was not
competent. It noted that although the opinion stated that certain
claims in the patents were not infringed, it failed to mention or
address the claims asserted in the infringement action.1091 The court
also noted that the opinion failed to link the disclosures of the prior
art references, which were relied upon to establish anticipation or
obviousness, with the limitations of the claims of the patents.1092
Of particular interest is the Federal Circuit’s consideration of the
expertise of the person receiving the opinion of counsel. Specifically,
the court acknowledged that the CellPro representative who received
the opinion was a former patent examiner and a practicing patent
attorney that should have noted the deficiencies in the opinions.
The combination of the failure to mention the claims in the opinion,
the failure to link prior art references with current limitations, and
the experience of the CellPro representative in the field led the court
to hold that the opinion was not competent. Thus, the Federal
Circuit upheld the finding of willful infringement and treble
damages.
The court addressed similar issues in Comark Communications, Inc. v.
Harris Corp.1093 In Comark, the jury found Harris’ infringement of
Comark’s ‘904 patent to be willful. On appeal, Harris challenged the
jury finding as unsupportable because Harris had obtained a legal
opinion that its actions did not infringe the ‘904 patent.
The Federal Circuit’s willfulness analysis rested on whether Harris
had obtained a competent opinion of counsel upon the best
information known to Harris. Specifically, the analysis focused on
whether Harris had deliberately withheld information in order to
obtain a favorable validity opinion.1094 Although Harris referred its
attorney to an engineer, it was not the particular engineer that
designed the accused circuit.1095 In addition, the counsel’s opinion
did not cover the spectrum analyzer design that Harris reverted to
1089. See id. at 1364, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
1090. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721 (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936,
944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1091. See id. at 1364, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
1092. See id. at 1364, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
1093. 156 F.3d 1182, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1094. See id. at 1191, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
1095. See id. at 1192, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
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after the opinion was completed. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
found substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find,
by clear and convincing evidence, that Harris willfully infringed the
‘904 patent.1096
E. Induced Infringement
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, Inc.,1097
the Federal Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment on
induced infringement based on representations made on product
advertising.1098 Chiuminatta owned U.S. Patent No. 4,889,675 (“the
‘675 patent”) directed to methods of cutting concrete prior to its
complete hardening. Chiuminatta accused Cardinal of, among other
things, induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. The district
court granted summary judgment to Chiuminatta on the issue of
induced infringement, and Cardinal appealed.
Cardinal argued on appeal that genuine issues of material fact
existed, precluding summary judgment. Cardinal asserted that no
evidence existed to show that they encouraged consumers to use
their product during the claimed time period.1099 Rather, Cardinal
claimed that their advertisements suggested using the saw at a time
prior to that claimed by Chiuminatta.1100
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this argument and
explained that, although the advertisements encourage use of the
device at a time prior to that claimed, it nonetheless encouraged use
from that time onwards. Thus, Cardinal encouraged the use of the
device during the claimed time period and therefore, induced
infringement.1101
F.

Infringement Analysis—Preliminary Injunctions

The patentee, upon an allegation of patent infringement, may
receive a preliminary injunction upon a showing of: (1) a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the irreparable harm if the
preliminary relief is not granted, (3) the balance of hardships tipping
in its favor, and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public
sector.1102 It is within the trial court’s discretion to grant the
1096. Id. at 1193, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
1097. 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1098. See id. at 1312, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
1099. See id. at 1311, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
1100. See id. at 1312, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
1101. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
1102. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Co., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191,
1195 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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injunction.1103 Further, the court often engages in at least an initial
construction of the claims for analysis of the first prong.1104
In Canon Computer Systems, Inc. v. Nu-Kote International, Inc.,1105 the
Federal Circuit reviewed a district court’s determination of
infringement in the context of a preliminary injunction. Nu-Kote
argued that Canon failed to make a strong showing that its device
read on Canon’s claimed product. Specifically, “Nu-Kote focuses on
two limitations in the claim, asserting that (1) the groove in NuKote’s cartridge does not form an ‘air flow passage’ as required by the
claim, and (2) the Nu-Kote cartridge lacks the claimed ‘first
chamber.’”1106
The Federal Circuit found that Nu-Kote failed to establish clear
error in the district court’s determination that the groove in NuKote’s cartridge forms an air flow passage.1107 Nu-Kote failed to do
anything more than offer other conclusory statements rather than
rebut the testimony of Canon’s expert witness.1108 In addition, the
Federal Circuit noted that Nu-Kote’s claim construction-based attack
on the limitation “chamber” was insufficient to constitute clear
error.1109 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
neither based its issuance of the preliminary injunction on clearly
erroneous findings of fact nor abused its discretion in granting
Canon’s motion for a preliminary injunction.1110
In Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International,1111 the
plaintiff (“PowerTrax”), a manufacturer of automatic locking
differentials for use in automotive vehicles, sought a preliminary
injunction against the defendant (“Tratech”). To do so, PowerTrax
had to establish its right to a preliminary injunction in light of the
four above outlined factors.1112 Although the district court held that
the PowerTrax was entitled to a preliminary injunction, the Federal
Circuit found that PowerTrax had not shown that it was likely to
succeed on the merits and reversed.1113 Specifically, the Federal
1103. See Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781,
1783 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1104. See Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1455, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.
1105. 134 F.3d 1085, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1106. Id. at 1089, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
1107. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
1108. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.
1109. See id. at 1089-90, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.
1110. See id. at 1086, 1090, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357, 1360.
1111. 141 F.3d 1084, 1085, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1112. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257-58.
1113. Id. at 1092, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. A plaintiff establishes likelihood of success
in patent cases by showing: (1) that it is likely to prove defendant’s infringement, and (2) that
its patent is valid and enforceable. See id. at 1088, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
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Circuit held that PowerTrax failed to show that Tratech actually
infringed.1114
IV. INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
A. Damages
A successful infringement action entitles the patent holder to
recover damages, interest, and costs.1115 While the Federal Circuit did
not issue a precedential decision broadly on damages in 1998, it did
examine two related issues: attorney fees and enhanced damages.
1.

Attorney fees
In 1998, the Federal Circuit dealt with several reviews of denial of
attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit generally reverses a refusal to
grant attorney fees only if the lower court was clearly erroneous in
finding that the particular circumstances were not exceptional and
that denial was an abuse of discretion.1116 Attorney fees will be
awarded upon a finding that the case was “exceptional.”1117
In Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,1118 Medzam alleged
three reasons why the case was “exceptional.” First, Medzam argued
that Multiform admitted that Medzam’s envelope was not
“degradable,” which was contrary to Multiform’s infringement
argument.1119 The court held that Medzam “mischaracterize[d]”
Multiform’s “admission.”1120 Second, Medzam accused Multiform of
adding “means-for” claims to try and cover Medzam’s product and
claimed this as an additional act of bad faith.1121 According to the
Federal Circuit, however, Multiform’s activities were neither illegal
nor acts of bad faith. Finally, the court rejected Medzam’s third
argument that Multiform had provided misleading dictionary
definitions to the patent examiner because Medzam failed to show
how they were incorrect.1122 Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s denial of attorney fees.1123
1114. See id. at 1092, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1115. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
1116. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1117. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
1118. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429.
1119. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429.
1120. See id. at 1482, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1121. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (finding that “it is neither illegal nor bad faith for
an applicant to amend the claims in view of a competitor’s product”).
1122. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1123. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436-37 (stating that the trial judge is better suited to
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In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,1124 the Federal Circuit denied
Gentry’s claim for attorney fees because Gentry was not “the
prevailing party” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 284. “[T]o prevail within
the meaning of section 285, Gentry must have achieved some of ‘the
benefits . . . sought in bringing suit,’ i.e., damages or an
injunction.”1125 In the instant case, Gentry succeeded only in
overcoming an inequitable conduct defense raised by Berkline and
therefore, was not considered a “prevailing party.”1126
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies Inc.,1127 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.1128 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
although ultimately unsuccessful, Cybor’s arguments were not
frivolous or asserted for an improper purpose and that Cybor
litigated in good faith.1129 The court also rejected FAS’s assertions
that a finding of willful infringement does not require a finding that
a case is exceptional.”1130 Thus the Federal Circuit determined that
the lower court’s denial of exceptional status was not clearly
erroneous and, therefore, FAS was not entitled to attorney fees.
2.

Enhanced damages
A trial court’s determination of increased or enhanced damages
under § 284 is guided by two principles.1131 First, the circumstances
justifying an enhanced award must be demonstrated.1132 This is
reviewed for clear error.1133 Second, if justification is found, the
increase must be warranted by the totality of the circumstances. This
determination is reviewed for “clear showing of abuse of
discretion.”1134
In Cybor Corp.,1135 FAS challenged the district court’s decision not to
enhance the damages. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a court is entitled to
enhance damages “up to three times the amount found or assessed.”
weigh the considerations necessary for an award of attorney fees because of his closeness to the
case and “other factors that may contribute to a fair allocation of the burdens of litigation as
between winner and loser”).
1124. 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1125. Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1480, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1126. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
1127. 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
1128. See id. at 1457, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1129. See id. at 1460-61, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1130. See id. at 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1131. See State Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1576, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1738, 1740 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1132. See id., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1133. See id., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1134. See id., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1135. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
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In affirming the denial of enhanced damages, the Federal Circuit
noted that the trial court concluded the evidence of copying and
willfulness was weak.1136 Further, the relative merit of Cybor’s
arguments, although unsuccessful, marshaled against enhancing
damages.1137 Thus, the court ruled that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying enhanced damages.1138
B. Marking
A patentee or authorized party may mark a patented article to give
public notice that the items are patented.1139 Failure to mark the
products may prevent recovery in an infringement action barring
notice to the infringer that he was infringing and continued to do
so.1140 The patentee has the burden of proving at trial that he
complied with statutory requirements and that marking substantially
consistent and continuous.1141
In Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1142 the Federal Circuit
considered the issue of whether the marking statute1143 applies when
the remedy for infringement is obtained under the design patent
infringement statute.1144 The district court opined that the marking
statute, which can limit recovery for the patentee in a successful
infringement action under certain scenarios for a failure to mark its
patented product,1145 does not apply when the remedy is an
infringer’s profits.1146 Because Nike was awarded Wal-Mart’s profits
under § 284, the limitation of § 289 did not apply.1147
In reversing the district court’s conclusion, the Federal Circuit
extensively analyzed the legislative histories of both the patent
marking provisions and the damages and profits provisions of Title
35.1148 The court stated that “[u]pon review of statute, legislative
history, policy, and precedent, we conclude that the marking
requirement, section 287(a), applies to design patents whether
1136. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1137. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1138. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1139. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
1140. See id.; see also American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that such notice is required for damages
upon infringement).
1141. See American Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1142. 138 F.3d 1437, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1143. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
1144. See 35 U.S.C. § 289.
1145. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
1146. See Nike, 138 F.3d at 1439, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03.
1147. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1148. See id. at 1440-46, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-08.
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remedy for infringement is sought under section 284 or section
289.”1149 In particular, such a reading was commensurate with the
history of marking and its role in preventing innocent infringement
through notice.1150 Because a dispute arose as to whether Nike met its
burden of demonstrating its compliance with the marking statute, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further
determinations on this question.1151
C. Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel is an equitable defense that can preclude a
claim of infringement.1152
Equitable estoppel requires the
establishment of three elements.1153 First, the patentee, through
misleading conduct, must lead the alleged infringer reasonably to
believe that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent.1154
Second, the alleged infringer must rely on the patentee’s conduct.1155
Finally, this reliance must materially prejudice the alleged infringer if
the patentee proceeds with its infringement claim.1156 A district
court’s decision on equitable estoppel is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.1157
In Scholle Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding Co., Inc.,1158 the court
considered Blackhawk’s claim of equitable estoppel against Scholle.
The patentee, Scholle Corp., instituted a claim against Blackhawk for
allegedly infringing its patent for valved bottle caps used on fivegallon water bottles.1159 In 1991, Scholle sent a cease and desist letter
to Blackhawk that accused Blackhawk of infringing Scholle’s
patent.1160 Subsequent to the receipt of this letter, Blackhawk began
work on a new valved cap design that functioned by a different
mechanism than Scholle’s cap.1161 In 1995, Blackhawk obtained a
patent on this new cap design.1162 After the creation of this new

1149. Id. at 1446, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1150. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1151. See id. at 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1152. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1153. See id. at 1028, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1154. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1155. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1156. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1157. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1158. 133 F.3d 1469, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1159. See id. at 1470, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1160. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1161. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1162. See id. at 1470, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70 (noting that U.S. Patent No. 5,392,939
was issued to Blackhawk on February 28, 1995).
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design, Scholle and Blackhawk had numerous contacts and
Blackhawk provided Scholle with samples of the new design.1163 In
fact, the companies considered merging during the relevant time
period.1164
At no point during this time did Scholle indicate that it considered
Blackhawk’s new design to be infringing.1165 Nevertheless, Scholle
filed suit against Blackhawk in 1996.1166 The district court granted
summary judgment to Blackhawk on the grounds of equitable
estoppel and the Federal Circuit affirmed this decision.1167
The Federal Circuit held that Scholle failed to provide any credible
evidence that refuted the district court’s finding of equitable
estoppel.1168 In so holding, the court recognized that, in equitable
estoppel determinations, the patentee’s conduct can include both
specific actions and statements, as well as inaction and/or silence.1169
In the instant case, both Scholle’s failure to indicate that it
considered Blackhawk’s new design infringing and Scholle’s
affirmative actions, which included the prior threat of suit and
regular discussions with Blackhawk about other pending actions,
were significant.1170 The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
grant of estoppel.1171
In Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,1172 after it entered
judgment of non-infringement, the district court stated that it did not
need to reach a decision on the issue of patent validity because
Medzam did not assert invalidity as a counterclaim during the
proceeding.1173 On appeal, Medzam objected to the district court’s
exercise of judicial discretion1174 and argued that it was entitled to a
decision because “the validity issue was fully litigated.”1175 The Federal
Circuit cited Medzam’s failure to assert a counterclaim of invalidity as
1163. See id. at 1470-71, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470 (describing the contacts between
Scholle and Blackhawk during the relevant time period).
1164. See id. at 1471, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1165. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1166. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.
1167. See id. at 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
1168. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472 (holding that there was “no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s determination that the circumstances presented here properly gave rise to
equitable estoppel”).
1169. See id. at 1471, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1170. See id. at 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472 (“In any case, Scholle’s conduct was not
merely silence but also consisted of affirmative acts such as its prior threats to sue Blackhawk
and its regular discussions about the Cap Snap litigation.”).
1171. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
1172. 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1173. See id. at 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1174. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1175. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
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D. Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of
protection available under the doctrine of equivalents.1178 It prevents
a patentee from asserting a scope of equivalency that would include
subject matter disclaimed during prosecution in order to obtain
allowance of the claims in their issued form.1179 Prosecution history
estoppel is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.1180
One of the Federal Circuit’s more interesting decisions during the
1998 term was Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.1181 In Hughes, the
Federal Circuit reviewed the impact that the Supreme Court’s WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.1182 decision had on the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.1183 The Federal Circuit
emphasized that Warner-Jenkinson created a rebuttable presumption
of prosecution history estoppel that arises whenever an amendment
to a claim is made, but the reason for such amendment remains
unknown.1184 The Federal Circuit noted, however, that prosecution
history estoppel does not automatically serve as an absolute bar to
preclude any equivalents to a claim limitation added to overcome a
patentability rejection.1185
Rather, prosecution history estoppel
merely precludes subject matter that was surrendered or disclaimed
in order to overcome the rejection.1186
In the case at bar, the Federal Circuit held that the amendments
made to the Hughes Aircraft patent did narrow the range of
1176. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (noting that Medzam’s motion for judgment filed
after close of plaintiff’s case was insufficient as a matter of law to convert the defense into a
counterclaim).
1177. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (stating “that appellate review was unnecessary
when the issue of validity was raised only as an affirmative defense”) (quoting Cardinal Chem.
Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 93-94, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1726 (1993)).
1178. See Townsend Eng’g Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1136,
1139 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generally supra Part III.C (discussing decisions on the doctrine of
equivalents).
1179. See Zenith Labs, Inc. v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1180. See La Bounty Mfg. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572, 1576,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1181. 140 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Parts I.E, III.C
(discussing Hughes Aircraft).
1182. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
1183. See Hughes, 140 F.3d at 1475, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
1184. See id. at 1476, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289.
1185. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (“We reject the government’s contention that
Warner-Jenkinson requires such a wooden approach to prosecution history estoppel.”).
1186. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
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equivalents, but they did not preclude all of the equivalents.1187 The
court determined further that because the accused device did not fall
within the range of subject matter surrendered, prosecution history
estoppel did not preclude infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.1188
The court faced a related issue in Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. CAT
Contracting, Inc.1189 Here, the defendants argued that because the
Warner-Jenkinson decision created a presumption that an amendment
is made for the purposes of patentability where no explanation is
given for such amendment, the doctrine of equivalents could not
apply in this case.1190 Thus, when the plaintiff amended its claim, it
relinquished coverage of any process that created a vacuum at
multiple sources because it gave no explanation for such a narrowing
amendment.1191 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and
pointed to the prosecution history, which provided an explanation
for the narrowing amendment, namely to avoid a prior art
teaching.1192 The Federal Circuit held that the bar created in WarnerJenkinson only applies when no explanation for an amendment
exists.1193
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,1194 Honeywell argued for a
broad rule that automatically would bar all equivalents to an element
added by amendment for reasons of patentability, regardless of
whether the record established that the applicant had in fact
surrendered all coverage beyond the literal claim scope.1195 The
Federal Circuit noted that such a rule would bar both after-rising
equivalents (expressly approved by the Supreme Court) and any
equivalents to the majority of claim limitations amended during
patent prosecution.1196 Accordingly, the court refused to interpret the
Warner-Jenkinson decision in such a manner.1197
Instead, the Federal Circuit interpreted Warner-Jenkinson to reaffirm
the doctrine that an estoppel only bars recapture of that subject
matter that is actually surrendered during prosecution.1198
1187. See id. at 1477, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
1188. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
1189. 161 F.3d 688, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1254
(1999); see also supra Part III.C (detailing the doctrine of equivalents analysis in Insituform).
1190. See id. at 691-92, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14.
1191. See id. at 691, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
1192. See id. at 692, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1193. See id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1194. 140 F.3d 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1195. See id. at 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1196. See id. at 1457, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1197. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1198. See id. at 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
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Accordingly, the reason for a claim amendment remains relevant to
the application of an estoppel. A claim amendment to avoid prior art
prevents recapture of subject matter that the applicant surrendered
to obtain patent protection.1199
The Federal Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court articulated
an additional rule to trigger prosecution history estoppel. If no clear
reason for an amendment can be discerned from the prosecution
record, a trial court can presume that the applicant did so for a
reason related to patentability, thereby triggering an estoppel.1200
Litton argued that the reason for the amendment in the case at bar
was to respond to a PTO rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.1201
Therefore, the plaintiff argued that no estoppel arose.
The Federal Circuit agreed that amendments made in response to
indefiniteness and enablement rejections generally are not related to
patentability issues.1202 The court, however, noted that amendments
made to what the inventor “regards as his invention” pursuant to a
§ 112 rejection were related to patentability.1203 The court noted that
a § 112 rejection of this type normally follows some other rejection of
the inventive material set forth in the claim; therefore, a court should
look at the rejections made prior to the § 112 rejection and
determine whether amendments made in response to the § 112
rejection were in fact the result of a previous patentability
rejection.1204 Applying this analysis, the Federal Circuit held that
prosecution history estoppel applied to the phrase claim limitation at
issue.1205
After the Federal Circuit established that prosecution history
estoppel applied, it proceeded to determine the scope of the
estoppel.1206 Subject matter is relinquished when one of “ordinary
skill in the art would objectively conclude from the prosecution
history that an applicant surrendered it.”1207 When the subject matter
or limitation is relinquished as a result of a patentability rejection, the
1199. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1200. See id. at 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1201. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-30. This provision requires the patent applicant
to point out and claim specifically what they regard as their invention and that rejections under
this provision are not related to patentability.
1202. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1203. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1204. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citing In re Prater, 56 C.C.P.A. 1381, 415 F.2d
1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
1205. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (holding that Litton made its amendment for
reasons related to patentability).
1206. See id. at 1462, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1207. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citing Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons
Co., 66 F.3d 285, 291, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1095, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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applicant is estopped from asserting that the original limitation, or
variation thereof, is an equivalent of the substituted limitation.1208
Based on this reasoning, the Federal Circuit held that Litton was
estopped from asserting that Honeywell’s disputed claim element was
equivalent to elements in its patent claims because Litton had
amended its original claim language as a result of a patentability
rejection, thus precluding an equivalency argument.1209
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,1210 the Federal Circuit
considered whether the accused device infringed under the doctrine
of equivalents.1211 Specifically, Cybor argued that there was no
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because prosecution
history estoppel precluded the patentee from claiming the doctrine
of equivalents subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the
application for the parent.1212 According to the Federal Circuit, the
inventors’ statements to the PTO with respect to the prior art did not
demonstrate the surrender of the features in question.1213 Cybor’s
pump and reservoir did not fall within the range of subject matter
relinquished during prosecution and therefore, prosecution history
estoppel did not preclude infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.1214 Because there were significant differences between
the prior art reference cited during prosecution and the claimed
invention, the court found that the statements made by the patentee
during prosecution could not be properly interpreted to preclude
coverage of the accused device.1215
E. Assignor Estoppel
The doctrine of assignor estoppel prevents a party who assigns a
patent from later challenging that patent’s validity.1216 The Federal
Circuit has reasoned that such an assignment contains an “implicit
representation by the assignor that the patent rights that he is

1208. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citing Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54
F.3d 1570, 1580, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1209. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1210. 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
1211. See id. at 1460, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1212. Id. at 1178.
1213. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (stating that every statement made by a patentee
during prosecution to distinguish a prior art reference does not create a separate estoppel).
1214. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (explaining that the district court was correct in
denying Cyber Corporation’s motion for judgment as a matter of law).
1215. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1178.
1216. See Diamond Scientific v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 2028, 2030
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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assigning (presumably for value) are not worthless.”1217
In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.,1218 the
Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s ruling that a patent assignor,
and its wholly owned subsidiary, were estopped from challenging the
validity of the assigned patent.1219 In 1992, Mentor assigned its ‘473
patent directed to hardware emulation to Quickturn. Quickturn
later dedicated subject matter in certain ‘473 claims, choosing to
pursue its own application to similar technology. Ultimately,
Quickturn received its ‘353 patent.
Later, Mentor purchased a French company called Meta, which
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Mentor. Believing that Meta’s
products were infringing its patents, Quickturn asked the ITC to
prevent importation of the allegedly infringing devices pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1337.1220 In response, Mentor sought a declaratory judgment
of invalidity and non-infringement of Quickturn’s patents, including
the ‘473 patent it had assigned to Quickturn.1221
The district court granted Quickturn’s motion for partial summary
judgment because the court found it unlikely that Mentor would be
able to show that the patent was invalid because Mentor is estopped
from attacking its validity in the first place.1222 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding.1223 The Federal Circuit stated
that “[a]ssignor estoppel prevents a party who assigns a patent to
another from later challenging the validity of the assigned patent,”
because the “assignment contains an ‘implicit representation by the
assignor that the patent rights that he is assigning are not
worthless.’”1224
In response, Mentor argued that a warranty disclaimer signed by
Quickturn at the time of the assignment gave Mentor the right to
attack the patent’s validity.1225 The warranty language stated that
“seller also disclaims any warranty as to the validity or enforceability
of the patent and patent applications assigned to Purchaser under

1217. Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2030.
1218. 150 F.3d 1374, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1683 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1219. See id. at 1380, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1220. See id. at 1376-77, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1221. See id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1222. See id. at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (finding that the doctrine of assignor
estoppel barred Mentor from challenging the patent’s validity).
1223. See id. at 1380, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
1224. Id. at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (quoting Diamond Scientific v. Ambico, Inc.,
848 F.2d 1220, 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2028, 2030 (Fed. Cir. 1988), which held that assignor
estoppel is properly supported by public policy in order to prevent injustice against the
assignee).
1225. See id. at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
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this Agreement.”1226 Although the Federal Circuit noted that an
assignor may expressly reserve the right to attack the patent’s validity,
or that an assignee may waive its right to assert assignor estoppel,
such a reservation or waiver must be clear and explicit.1227 Thus, the
Federal Circuit concluded that this warranty was not a sufficient
disclaimer of the right to sue.1228
With respect to Meta, the Federal Circuit held that because it was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Mentor, it also was unable to attack the
patent’s validity.1229 The court noted that assignor estoppel prevents
parties that are in privity with an estopped assignor from challenging
the validity of the patent.1230 To determine whether privity existed,
the court looked at all direct and indirect party contacts to examine
the nature of the relationship between the parties in light of the
alleged infringement.1231 The court found three compelling factors in
favor of privity: Mentor owned all of Meta’s stock, the two companies
shared personnel, and Meta sold itself to Mentor to develop capital
that would allow it to import the allegedly infringing device.1232 The
Federal Circuit found these factors sufficient to estop Meta from
asserting an invalidity defense.1233 The court concluded, however,
that Mentor and Meta could still attempt other defense strategies
such as arguing for a narrow claim construction1234 or that the accused
devices were within the prior art and therefore, cannot infringe.1235
1226. Id. at 1367, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1227. See id. at 1378, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Without exceptional circumstances (such as an express reservation by the assignor of
the right to challenge the validity of the patent or an express waiver by the assignee of
the right to assert assignor estoppel), one who assigns a patent surrenders with that
assignment the right to later challenge the validity of the assigned patent.
Id. at 1378, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686; see also Q.C. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming application of assignor estoppel which
barred alleged patent infringer’s invalidity defense).
1228. See Mentor Graphics, 150 F.3d at 1378, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (noting that the
warranty language served merely to allocate the risk that the patent will be declared invalid to
Quickturn, rather than reserving a right to challenge its validity).
1229. See id. at 1379, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
1230. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1231. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1232. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1233. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1234. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687. The court held that:
State of the art can not be used to destroy the patent and defeat the grant, because the
assignor is estopped to do this. But, the state of the art may be used to construe and
narrow the claims of the patent, conceding their validity. The distinction may be a
nice one but it seems workable.
Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (citing Westinghouse Elec. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S.
342, 351 (1924)).
1235. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687. The court believed that:
The judgment is affirmed for the reason that we find that the application of the
doctrine of estoppel so as to foreclose the assignor of a patent from asserting the right
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Licensing

One of a patent’s advantages is the power to license another,
presumably for royalties, to practice the patented invention.
Although often contractual in nature, and thus settled in state court,
the Federal Circuit will examine licensing issues in the context of
patent infringement or validity.
In Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,1236 while affirming a
decision by the district court to dismiss an infringement suit, the
Federal Circuit examined the relationship between inventorship and
the grant of a license. Dr. In-Bae Yoon and his exclusive licensee,
Ethicon Inc., own U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773 (“the ‘773 patent”),
which related to trocars. In 1989, Yoon and Ethicon sued United
States Surgical Corp. for infringement of the ‘773 patent.1237 While
the suit was still pending, U.S. Surgical became aware that Mr. Young
Jae Choi, an associate of Yoon’s, also worked on portions of the
patented trocars and claimed to have contributed to the ‘773
invention.1238 Choi, who was not named as a co-inventor on the ‘773
patent, granted U.S. Surgical a “retroactive license” to practice
“Choi’s trocar related inventions.”1239 U.S. Surgical first moved to
correct inventorship of the ‘773 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256,
claiming Choi as a co-inventor.1240 U.S. Surgical then moved to
dismiss the infringement suit and asserted that Choi, as joint owner
of the patent, granted U.S. Surgical a valid license under the
patent.1241
The Federal Circuit observed that ownership attaches not to
individual claims, but to a patent as a whole and therefore concluded
that a joint inventor with respect to even one claim enjoys a
presumption of ownership in the entire patent.1242 Thus, because
Choi was found to be a co-inventor, Yoon must share ownership of all
to make use of the prior art invention of an expired patent, which anticipates that of
the assigned patent, is inconsistent.
Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg., 326 U.S. 249, 257-58
(1945)).
1236. 135 F.3d 1456, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 278 (1998);
see also supra Part II.J (detailing inventorship aspects of Ethicon).
1237. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. Yoon was listed as the sole inventor and was
issued the ‘773 patent with fifty-five claims. Ethicon filed suit against U.S. Surgical for
infringement of claims 34 and 50.
1238. See id. at 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
1239. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547; see also id. at 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 155152 (affirming the district court’s finding that Choi did, in fact, co-invent claims 33 and 47).
1240. See id. at 1459, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
1241. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
1242. See id. at 1465-66, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 261 as
suggesting that property rights vest in the patent as a whole and not in each individual claim).
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of the claims with Choi, even those that Yoon invented himself.
Consequently, the court concluded that Choi did have the authority
to license rights in the entire patent when he licensed U.S.
Surgical.1243 The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with Ethicon’s
challenge to the retroactive effect of the license.1244 The Federal
Circuit noted that a license to a third party by one co-owner only
operates prospectively because, absent agreement to the contrary,
one co-owner cannot grant a release of another co-owner’s right to
accrued damages.1245
The Federal Circuit reiterated, however, that “as a matter of
substantive patent law, all co-owners must ordinarily consent to join
as plaintiffs in an infringement suit. Consequently, ‘one co-owner
has the right to impede the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers
by refusing to voluntarily join in such as suit.’”1246 Thus, because Choi
did not consent to the suit, the Federal Circuit was forced to affirm
the district court’s dismissal of the case.1247
V. OTHER SOURCES OF LIABILITY
A. Antitrust
In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,1248 the Federal Circuit
altered its precedent regarding review of certain antitrust issues in
patent cases. The Federal Circuit heard Nobelpharma AB’s and
Nobelpharma USA, Inc.’s (“NP”) appeal of the district court’s denial
of its motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, motion for JMOL
on the jury’s verdict that NP violated antitrust laws.1249 NP argued that
there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the jury’s
1243. See id. at 1466, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1244. See id. at 1467, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (“Choi cannot release U.S. Surgical from
its liability for past accrued damages to Ethicon, only from liability to himself.”).
1245. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553 (holding that co-ownership agreement did not bar
one co-owner from granting license to third party) (citing Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA,
104 F.3d 341, 345, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1246. Id. at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF
SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1247. See id. at 1467, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (“An action for infringement must join as
plaintiffs all co-owners.”). The Supreme Court has written that:
The Patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, and convey,
either (1) the whole patent . . .; or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive
right; or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified
part of the United States. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an
assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the
patent itself, with a right to sue infringers.
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
1248. 141 F.3d 1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 178 (1998).
1249. See id. at 1061-62, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
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finding.1250 Implant Innovations, Inc. (“3I”) responded by arguing
that the jury’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and
that these findings provided a sound basis for imposing antitrust
liability.1251
Typically, the Federal Circuit is guided by the law of the regional
circuit in which the district court sits when reviewing a judgment
involving federal antitrust law.1252 Nevertheless, “[w]hether conduct
in the prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its
immunity from the antitrust laws is one of those issues that clearly
involves our exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.”1253 Accordingly,
an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit concluded that the court
“should decide these issues as a matter of Federal Circuit law, rather
than rely on various regional precedents.”1254 This new rule applies
equally to all antitrust claims premised upon patent infringement,
and therefore, all inconsistent precedent was expressly overruled.1255
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that it would continue to apply
the regional circuit law to other antitrust issues, including relevant
market, market power, and damages.1256
To strip a patentee of its exemption, the antitrust plaintiff must
demonstrate that the patentee obtained the patent by knowingly and
willfully misrepresenting facts to the PTO.1257 Fraud, however, is
distinguished from inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct is an
equitable defense in a patent infringement action, while fraud is a
potentially more serious offense and may expose a patentee to
antitrust liability.1258 A finding of fraud requires a higher threshold of
both intent and materiality than does a finding of inequitable
conduct.1259 A finding of fraud under the Walker Process Doctrine
must be based upon clear and independent evidence of an intent to
deceive, coupled with a clear showing of reliance upon such
1250. See id. at 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1251. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1252. See id. at 1067, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103; see also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 875, 228 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 90, 99 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We must approach a federal
antitrust claim as would a court of appeals in the circuit of the district court whose judgement
we review.”).
1253. Nobelpharma, 141 F.2d at 1067, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1254. Id. at 1068, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1255. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104 (overruling Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA
Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1161, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1996), Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 99 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and Atari, Inc. v.
JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1438-40, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1086-87 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), to the extent that they hold otherwise).
1256. See id. at 1068, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1257. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1258. See id. at 1069, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
1259. See id. at 1070-71, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
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misrepresentation. Therefore, inequitable conduct may act as a
shield, whereas fraud acts as a sword.1260
After reviewing the facts, the Federal Circuit concluded that
substantial evidence existed upon which a reasonable finder of fact
could deny NP immunity from antitrust liability.1261 First, the jury
reasonably could have concluded that Branemark, a named inventor
of the disputed patent and a member of NP’s board of directors,
withheld important prior art with the requisite intent to defraud the
PTO.1262 Second, the Federal Circuit determined that substantial
evidence existed with respect to the materiality of the withheld prior
art.1263 Third, a reasonable jury could have found that NP brought
suit against 3I with knowledge of the patent applicant’s fraud based
upon given testimony which suggested that two of NP’s then-officers
were aware of such fraud.1264
Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s
instructions to the jury regarding fraud substantially comported with
the law. As a result, there was no basis for granting NP’s motion for a
new trial.1265 Thus, the court affirmed the denial of NP’s motion for
JMOL and found that NP was properly deprived of its antitrust
immunity under the Walker Process doctrine.1266
B. Breach of Contract
In Celeritas Technologies, Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp.,1267 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Rockwell’s
motion for JMOL on a breach of contract claim.1268 Celeritas
Technologies, Ltd. was the assignee of the ‘590 patent, which claimed
a way to increase the rate of data transmission over analog cellular
networks by de-emphasizing the data signal before presenting it to
the cellular network.1269 Thus, the patent claimed to counteract the
adverse distortion effects of pre-emphasis and limiter circuits.1270
In September 1993, Celeritas met with Rockwell representatives to

1260. See id. at 1070, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1261. See id. at 1072, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
1262. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
1263. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
1264. See id. at 1073, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
1265. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108 (suggesting that instructions to the jury were
explicit and specific and were otherwise, “not lethally erroneous”).
1266. See id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109.
1267. 150 F.3d 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 874 (1998).
1268. See id. at 1356, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517-18 (affirming district court’s decision
regarding the contract claim, but reversing the decision concerning the patent claim).
1269. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
1270. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
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demonstrate their proprietary de-emphasis technology.1271
The
parties signed a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) which covered
the subject matter of the meeting and forbade Rockwell from
disclosing any proprietary information.1272
The proprietary
information did not include information that was already in the
public domain as of the date of the meeting.1273 Furthermore, the
contract stated:
Injunctive Relief. Celeritas and Rockwell acknowledge that the
extent of damages in the event of the breach of any provision of
this Agreement would be difficult or impossible to ascertain, and
that there will be available no adequate remedy at law in the event
of any such breach. Each party therefore agrees that in the event it
breaches any provision of this Agreement, the other party will be
entitled to injunctive or other equitable relief, in addition to any
1274
other relief to which it may be entitled.

In March 1994, Rockwell informed Celeritas that it decided not to
license Celeritas’s proprietary technology.1275 At the same time,
Rockwell began its own research to incorporate de-emphasis
technology into its modem chip sets.1276 Rockwell did not, however,
independently develop this technology, but instead employed the
same engineers who learned of Celeritas’s de-emphasis technology
under the NDA.1277 Rockwell’s subsequent sales surpassed its own
projections.1278
Celeritas sued Rockwell in 1995 under three theories: (1) breach
of contract, (2) patent infringement, and (3) misappropriation of
trade secrets.1279 Celeritas stipulated that it would accept the highest
award it received under the three independent theories to avoid
duplicative recovery.1280 Celeritas prevailed at trial on each of its
theories and stood to gain the most for its breach of contract claim,
with the damages award at $57,658,000.1281 Rockwell moved for
JMOL, which the district court denied.1282

1271. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (“Rockwell is the leading manufacturer of modern
‘chip sets’ which contain the core functions of commercial modems, including the modulation
function where de-emphasis is performed.”).
1272. See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
1273. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
1274. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518.
1275. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1276. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1277. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1278. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1279. See id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1280. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1281. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1282. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Rockwell first argued that the deemphasis technology, disclosed to Rockwell at the September 1993
meeting, was already in the public domain and therefore Rockwell
did not breach the NDA.1283 The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting
that the jury reasonably found that the information given by Celeritas
to Rockwell was proprietary.1284 Further, the evidence demonstrated
that Rockwell learned implementation details and techniques that
extended beyond the information disclosed in the patent.1285 Thus,
even after the patent issued in January 1995, the time Rockwell began
to ship its prototype chip sets, Rockwell already had breached the
NDA because it had utilized proprietary information.1286
Second, Rockwell argued that the subject matter of the NDA
existed in the public domain before Rockwell began to use such
information, because AT&T Paradyne had sold a modem that
incorporated de-emphasis technology during the intervening
period.1287 Rockwell asserted that this technology was “readily
ascertainable” because a competent engineer could simply reverse
engineer the modem.1288
The Federal Circuit again disagreed with Rockwell because the jury
implicitly found that the technology had not been placed in the
public domain by the sale of the modem.1289 The Federal Circuit
noted that California law was unsettled with respect to the issue of
whether a trade secret enters the public domain when it is “readily
ascertainable” or whether it must be “actually ascertained” by the
public.1290 Under either standard, however, the Federal Circuit
determined that the jury’s verdict, which granted Celeritas monetary
damages, could be supported.1291
Testimony revealed that an
engineer would need a spectrum analyzer to discover that AT&T’s
modem had de-emphasis technology and most engineers did not
have such equipment.1292
1283. See id. at 1358, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1284. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520 (“[T]he law presumes the existence of findings
necessary to support the verdict the jury reached.”) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 669, 672-73 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1285. See id. at 1358, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1286. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1287. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1288. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1289. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1290. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. Compare ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1991) (holding that a trade secret is protectable if it has not yet been ascertained by
others), with American Paper & Packaging Prod. v. Kirgan, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1986)
(suggesting that a trade secret is not protectable if readily ascertainable by others).
1291. See Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1358, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1292. See id. at 1359, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520 (asserting that Rockwell’s own expert
testimony contradicted the assertion that the technology was “readily ascertainable”).
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The Federal Circuit further dismissed Rockwell’s assertion that
because the parties previously agreed that damages would be difficult
to calculate, Celeritas was not entitled to receive damages at all.1293
Rockwell also was unsuccessful in arguing that Celeritas was not
harmed, that the damages were speculative, and that under
California laws contract damages should be limited to the statutory
remedies for misappropriation of Celeritas’s trade secrets.1294
In Bradley v. Chiron Corp.,1295 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to dismiss Bradley’s claims of mistake of law and fact,
fraud, and failure of consideration in an attempt to rescind a
settlement agreement of a potential interference action between the
parties.1296
In 1977, while employed at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”), Dr. Daniel Bradley isolated a concentrated,
purified form of the Hepatitis C Virus (“HCV”).1297 In 1982, Chiron
Corporation entered into a collaboration with the CDC and Bradley,
where Chiron would attempt to use recombinant procedures to clone
HCV using samples of HCV supplied by Bradley.1298 In 1987, Chiron
succeeded in cloning a portion of the virus and developed a
diagnostic assay for detecting the presence of HCV.1299 Based on
these developments, Chiron filed a corresponding patent application
without naming Bradley as a co-inventor.1300 Bradley filed a separate
patent application and named himself as a co-inventor, attempting to
provoke an interference proceeding with Chiron’s patent
application.1301
Chiron and Bradley then entered into a settlement agreement
whereby Bradley released Chiron and discharged his rights in any
claims arising thereafter.1302 Bradley further warranted, by signing the
1293. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520 (“The clause providing for injunctive relief in fact
clearly and unambiguously provides for an injunction ‘in addition to any other relief to which it
may be entitled.’”).
1294. See id. at 1359-60, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.
1295. 136 F.3d 1317, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1296. See id. at 1320, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820 (applying California law).
1297. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.
1298. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820 (indicating that all parties to the agreement
understood the potential for commercial gain).
1299. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820 (recognizing Bradley’s contention that he
contributed to the invention).
1300. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820 (noting that such filing led to a deterioration of
the collaborative effort between the parties).
1301. See id. at 1320-21, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-21 (stating that Bradley first consulted
with several CDC lawyers to discuss possibility of legal action).
1302. See id. at 1321, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821 (“CDC . . . the United States . . . and Dr.
Bradley hereby forever release, discharge and assign to Chiron their entire right, title and
interest in and to, any and all claims, actions and the like based in law or equity known or
unknown, now existing or which might arise hereafter.”).
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agreement, that no patent application would be maintained that
would name himself as an inventor or co-inventor.1303 The settlement
agreement also contained language that made Dr. Bradley available
to Chiron for the sole purpose of evaluating his claim to
inventorship.1304 After Chiron completed such evaluation, “the
[settlement] agreement allowed Chiron, at its discretion, (i) to add
Dr. Bradley to one or more Chiron patents as an inventor if in
Chiron’s opinion Dr. Bradley is an inventor, or (ii) to submit any
material information regarding inventorship to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).”1305 Chiron also agreed to pay CDC over
$1.9 million and to pay Bradley $337,500 over five years.1306
Four years after the settlement agreement was signed, however,
Bradley sued to rescind the agreement alleging mistake, fraud, and
failure of consideration.1307 The district court dismissed Bradley’s suit
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1308 Bradley then amended
his complaint, but in response to another motion by Chiron under
Rule 12(b)(6), Bradley needed, and the district court granted, leave
to amend his complaint to state additional facts concerning his
assertion of unilateral mistake.1309 Several assertions in Bradley’s
second amended complaint, however, differed from those in the
previous complaint.
The district court dismissed the second
amended complaint and declared the changes “false and [a]
sham.”1310
Bradley argued on appeal that the language of the settlement
agreement lead him to believe that the issue of inventorship would be
resolved by the PTO and that this supported his claim of mistake of
law and fact.1311 The Federal Circuit found, however, that Bradley
failed to show that Chiron was aware of Bradley’s mistaken belief that
the PTO would determine the issue of inventorship.1312 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the language of the settlement agreement
clearly stated that Chiron would retain “sole” discretion in the
1303. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1304. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1305. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1306. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1307. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1308. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821.
1309. See id. at 1324, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
1310. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824 (reiterating the district court’s description of
Bradley’s changes as “a transparent attempt to conform the facts to the requirement of the
cause of action”).
1311. See id. at 1323, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (claiming that § 2.3 of the settlement
agreement entitled Bradley to have his rights determined by PTO).
1312. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822.
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determination of inventorship.1313 The Federal Circuit further found
that Bradley neglected his duty to learn and know the content of the
contract he had signed.1314
The Federal Circuit noted that in California, “‘when a person with
the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he
is, in the absence of fraud or imposition, bound by its contents, and is
estopped from saying that its provision is contrary to his intentions or
understanding.’”1315 The Federal Circuit also noted that “the weight
of public policies favoring settlement of disputes, the integrity of
contracts, and the stability of agreements that had been fully
performed by a party, require ‘reasonable inquiry to ascertain or
effort to understand the meaning and content of the contract upon
which one relies.’”1316 Against these policies and Bradley’s asserted
“false and sham” facts, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision that Bradley failed “to state a claim for rescission based on
mistake of fact or law.”1317
Turning to the district court’s dismissal of Bradley’s fraud claim,
the Federal Circuit stated that fraud is grounds for contract
rescission:1318
The charge of actual fraud requires that the accused party made a
material representation or omission with knowledge of its falsity,
with intent to deceive, or to induce the other party to enter into a
contract. The accused party must have intentionally induced a
misunderstanding of the contract terms, or known of it and
1319
fostered it.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that Chiron mislead Bradley into thinking
that the agreement provisions provided for the resolution of patent
ownership.1320 Rather, the Federal Circuit found that the language of
the settlement agreement that prohibited Bradley from entering into
1313. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (“[T]he contract provisions were unambiguous,
fully consistent as written, and not consistent as construed by Dr. Bradley.”).
1314. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (asserting that if mistake existed it was due to
neglect of legal duty imposed by § 1577 of the California Civil Code).
1315. Id. at 1323, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822 (quoting Dobler v. Story, 268 F.2d 274, 277
(9th Cir. 1959)).
1316. Id. at 1324, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (quoting Wal-Noon Corp. v. Hill, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 646, 652 (1975)).
1317. Id. at 1326, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
1318. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(1) (West
1997)).
1319. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572 (West 1997)).
1320. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825 (“There was no allegation that Chiron had
exclusive knowledge, or that it withheld knowledge, or induced Dr. Bradley to enter into the
contract, or presented a misleading interpretation. We agree with the district court’s
analysis.”).
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an interference proceeding clearly dictated against such
construction.1321 Therefore, the Federal Circuit found the evidence
insufficient to state a claim for rescission of the settlement agreement
on the ground of fraud.1322
Finally, the court agreed with the district court that Bradley could
not sustain a claim for rescission based on failure of consideration.1323
Bradley had been paid full monetary compensation prior to the
suit.1324 Further, the court found Bradley’s argument that rescission
was proper based on Chiron’s failure to submit all inventorship
information to the PTO was unpersuasive,1325 and duty on Chiron was
discretionary and was not “consideration.”1326

1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.

See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825.
See id. at 1327, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.
See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826.

